CoChat

Altruistic punishment in humans

Fehr, Ernst, Gächter, Simon · 2002 · Nature

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.

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Research works printed but not linked: 2

  1. Smuts, B. B., Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., Wrangham, R. W., & Struhsaker, T. T. (eds) Primate Societies (Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987).
  2. Fischbacher, U. Z-tree: Zürich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments Working Paper No. 21 (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. Zürich, 1999).

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Items 801–900 of 1,038

Metadata

Authors
Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
Affiliations
  • University of Zurich (CH)
  • University of St.Gallen (CH)
Corresponding author
Fehr, Ernst
Venue
Nature
Published
2002-01
Volume
415
Issue
6868
Pages
137-140
ISSN
  • 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
  • 1476-4687
OpenAlex
W2129135549
Cited by
5,616
References
29
Citations by year
2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
FWCI
459.06
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Licence
Locations
  • Nature (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
  • Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
  • Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
Funders
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
  • Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
MeSH terms
Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment

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