Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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Barclay, P., & Raihani, N. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.12.004 · Cited by 67
“…and monetary costs to harm social cheats, in pairs and in groups, in laboratory studies (e.g. Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2000; Barclay, 2006; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992; Raihani & Bshary, 2015; Yamagishi, 1986), in field experiments (Barr, 2001; Henrich et al.,…”
BackgroundEvolutionary Social Psychology
Neuberg, S. L., Kenrick, D. T., & Schaller, M. (2010) · Handbook of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002021 · Cited by 67
Fairness in Non-human Primates?
Bräuer, J., & Hanus, D. (2012) · Social Justice Research · doi:10.1007/s11211-012-0159-6 · Cited by 74
“Therefore, there is no doubt that cooperation becomes more successful and stable if individuals are able to compare their own efforts and outcomes with those of others and react accordingly (Brosnan & de Waal, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).”
InfluentialBlaming the messenger: Notes on the current state of experimental economics
Eckel, C. C., & Gintis, H. M. (2010) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.03.026 · Cited by 81
“…(Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004), the contract games that are the subject of the Binmore and Shaked critique, and the public goods game with punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002).2 Far from being “slender data,” this is an impressive amount of data, internally consistent and pointing in the same…”
BackgroundAsymmetric morality: Blame is more differentiated and more extreme than praise
Guglielmo, S., & Malle, B. F. (2019) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0213544 · Cited by 87
Young children police group members at personal cost.
Yudkin, D. A., Bavel, J. J. V., & Rhodes, M. (2019) · Journal of Experimental Psychology General · doi:10.1037/xge0000613 · Cited by 78
“Because such behavior provides a deterrent for would-be cheaters and free riders, it can promote cooperation over time (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Mathew & Boyd, 2011).”
BackgroundUnobserved punishment supports cooperation
Fudenberg, D., & Pathak, P. A. (2009) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2009.10.007 · Cited by 83
“Experimental Design The experiment consists of two treatments: one with observed punishment – the standard voluntary contribution mechanism followed by a punishment stage designed to mimic the strangers treatment of designed to mimic the strangers treatment of Fehr and Gächter [2000, 2002] and one where the results of…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialChildren's use of moral behavior in selective trust: Discrimination versus learning.
Doebel, S., & Koenig, M. A. (2013) · Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0031595 · Cited by 73
“While it is always in the interests of a listener or audience to be accurately informed, sincerity does not always serve a speaker’s interests (Bergstrom, Moehlmann, & Boyer, 2006; Dawkins & Krebs, 1978; Faulkner, 2011; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Sperber, 2001; Williams, 2002).”
The ‘spiteful’ origins of human cooperation
Marlowe, F. W., Berbesque, J. C., Barrett, C., Bolyanatz, A., Gurven, M., & Tracer, D. P. (2010) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.2342 · Cited by 76
Harring, N. (2015) · Political Studies · doi:10.1111/1467-9248.12209 · Cited by 82
“Therefore, those who have little trust that their fellow citizens (or other actors) are complying are not likely to prefer economic incentive rewards, but rather to prefer regulatory punishments because people want to punish defectors (e.g. Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Herrmann et al., 2008).”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Superorganism Account of Human Sociality: How and When Human Groups Are Like Beehives
Kesebir, S. (2011) · Personality and Social Psychology Review · doi:10.1177/1088868311430834 · Cited by 78
“This punishment, in turn, has been shown to uphold cooperation levels in a public goods game, in the absence of which cooperation quickly disappears (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundExperimental Games and Games of Life among the Ju/’hoan Bushmen
Wiessner, P. (2009) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/595622 · Cited by 79
THE TERRIBLE, HORRIBLE, NO GOOD, VERY BAD TRUTH ABOUT MORALITY AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT
Greene, J. D. (2002) · Cited by 81
Gender Differences in Cooperation: Experimental Evidence on High School Students
Molina, J. A., Giménez-Nadal, J. I., Cuesta, J. A., Gracia-Lázaro, C., Moreno, Y., & Sánchez, Á. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0083700 · Cited by 89
“gender may affect how individuals punish non-cooperative partners, one of the most relevant mechanisms to foster cooperation [35-37].”
Parsing the Behavioral and Brain Mechanisms of Third-Party Punishment
Ginther, M. R., Bonnie, R. J., Hoffman, M. B., Shen, F. X., Simons, K. W., Jones, O. D., & Marois, R. (2016) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.4499-15.2016 · Cited by 69
“Although forms of cooperation can occur without it, the potential for third-party punishment (i.e., punishment administered by a neutral party) helps counteract temptations to defect (free riding) (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundHauser, O., Nowak, M. A., & Rand, D. G. (2013) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2014.06.041 · Cited by 78
“…punishment often (although not always) results in an increase in cooperation (Almenberg et al., 2011; Dreber et al., 2008; Espín et al., 2012; Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Gächter et al., 2008; Gurerk et al., 2006; Herrmann et al., 2008; Janssen et al., 2010;…”
Can we infer social preferences from the lab? Evidence from the trust game
Baran, N. M., Sapienza, P., & Zingales, L. (2010) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w15654 · Cited by 77
Human uniqueness-self-interest and social cooperation
Okada, D., & Bingham, P. M. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.02.041 · Cited by 69
Oxytocin-enforced norm compliance reduces xenophobic outgroup rejection
Marsh, N., Scheele, D., Feinstein, J. S., Gerhardt, H., Strang, S., Maier, W., & Hurlemann, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1705853114 · Cited by 68
SOCIAL NORMS AND HUMAN NORMATIVE PSYCHOLOGY
Kelly, D., & Davis, T. (2018) · Social Philosophy and Policy · doi:10.1017/s0265052518000122 · Cited by 85
Children punish third parties to satisfy both consequentialist and retributive motives
Marshall, J., Yudkin, D. A., & Crockett, M. J. (2020) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-020-00975-9 · Cited by 72
Intergenerational conflicts of interest and prosocial behavior during the COVID-19 pandemic
Jin, S., Balliet, D. P., Romano, A., Spadaro, G., Lissa, C. J. V., Agostini, M., Bélanger, J. J., Gützkow, B., Kreienkamp, J., Abakoumkin, G., et al. (2020) · Personality and Individual Differences · doi:10.1016/j.paid.2020.110535 · Cited by 76
Using Neural Measures of Economic Value to Solve the Public Goods Free-Rider Problem
Krajbich, I., Camerer, C., Ledyard, J., & Rangel, A. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1177302 · Cited by 66
The evolution of sanctioning institutions: an experimental approach to the social contract
Zhang, B., Li, C., Silva, H. D., Bednarik, P., & Sigmund, K. (2013) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9367-7 · Cited by 78
“Since we wanted to favor conditions for social learning, we provided the players with information on the frequencies and payoffs obtained by the various strategies in their group (see online Supplemental material). However, we refrained from giving them opportunities to build up individual profiles, for instance reput…”
The role of Social Value Orientation in response to an unfair offer in the Ultimatum Game
Karagonlar, G., & Kuhlman, D. M. (2013) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2012.07.006 · Cited by 73
Preschoolers’ social dominance, moral cognition, and moral behavior: An evolutionary perspective
Hawley, P. H., & Geldhof, G. J. (2012) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2011.10.004 · Cited by 78
“In addition, by sanctioning others for norm violations, one can instrumentally advance one’s own goals (cf. Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundERP correlates of social conformity in a line judgment task
Chen, J., Wu, Y., Tong, G., Guan, X., & Zhou, X. (2012) · BMC Neuroscience · doi:10.1186/1471-2202-13-43 · Cited by 70
“The MFN effect may reflect the detection of social expectancy violation as egalitarian distribution of assets is an expected social norm [28,29].”
BackgroundAntonetti, P., & Maklan, S. (2018) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3095-9 · Cited by 66
“These emotions are generated by the appraisal of unjust behavior and generate a strong desire to revenge against the culprit (Fehr and Gächter 2002).”
BackgroundProsociality predicts labor market success around the world
Kosse, F., & Tincani, M. M. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-19007-1 · Cited by 86
Horne, C. (2007) · Rationality and Society · doi:10.1177/1043463107077386 · Cited by 86
“Experimental evidence, for example, supports the view that human beings may be hardwired to experience negative emotions when they see people take advantage of others (Fehr and Gächter 2002).”
BackgroundSocial norms and social choicePreprint
Botelho, A., Harrison, G. W., Pinto, L. M. C., & Rutström, E. E. (2005) · RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · Cited by 81
Social Dilemma Cooperation (Unlike Dictator Game Giving) Is Intuitive for Men As Well As WomenPreprint
Rand, D. G. (2017) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2017.06.013 · Cited by 71
FOLK RETRIBUTIVISM AND THE COMMUNICATION CONFOUND
Nadelhoffer, T., Heshmati, S., Kaplan, D. M., & Nichols, S. (2013) · Economics and Philosophy · doi:10.1017/s0266267113000217 · Cited by 77
“Rather, they tend to focus on the fact that the punisher can expect no personal monetary gain from punishing, suggesting that the punishment is ‘altruistic’ (e.g. Fehr and Gachter 2002). punishee to know when his income has been diminished.”
BackgroundComplex evolutionary dynamics due to punishment and free space in ecological multigames
Chowdhury, S. N., Kundu, S., Perc, M., & Ghosh, D. (2021) · Proceedings of the Royal Society A Mathematical Physical and Engineering Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspa.2021.0397 · Cited by 67
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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