Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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BackgroundConsumer anger: a label in search of meaning
Antonetti, P. (2016) · European Journal of Marketing · doi:10.1108/ejm-08-2015-0590 · Cited by 64
The dynamics of punishment and trust.
Wang, L., & Murnighan, J. K. (2017) · Journal of Applied Psychology · doi:10.1037/apl0000178 · Cited by 67
Righting a wrong: Retaliation on a voodoo doll symbolizing an abusive supervisor restores justice
Liang, L. H., Brown, D. J., Lian, H., Hanig, S., Ferris, D. L., & Keeping, L. M. (2018) · The Leadership Quarterly · doi:10.1016/j.leaqua.2018.01.004 · Cited by 58
The language of cooperation: reputation and honest signalling
Számadó, S., Balliet, D. P., Giardini, F., Power, E. A., & Takács, K. (2021) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2020.0286 · Cited by 72
Taking charge and stepping in: Individuals who punish are rewarded with prestige and dominance
Redhead, D., Dhaliwal, N., & Cheng, J. T. (2021) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12581 · Cited by 53
“…been personally harmed, chooses to inflict harm on a defector who has inflicted cost on others (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gachter, 2000; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Hirshleifer & Rasmusen, 1989); or (c) ‘centralized punisher’ who is designated to punish free‐riders on behalf of other group…”
BackgroundGoals and emotional outcomes of revenge activities in interpersonal relationships
Yoshimura, S. M. (2007) · Journal of Social and Personal Relationships · doi:10.1177/0265407507072592 · Cited by 71
“In group contexts, for example, participants have been observed acting upon altruistic interests in games of ‘public good’ by punishing cheaters in ways that are increasingly costly to themselves as the offense becomes increasingly detrimental to the group’s common interest (Fehr & Gachter, 2002).”
BackgroundConstitutions as Coordinating Devices
Hadfield, G. K., & Weingast, B. R. V. (2014) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781107300361.009 · Cited by 57
How history and convention create norms: An experimental study
Guala, F., & Mittone, L. (2010) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2010.05.009 · Cited by 60
“The most thoroughly investigated case is people’s willingness to pay a material cost to punish behaviour that violates norms of fairness (e.g. Fehr and Gachter 2002).”
BackgroundThe social world as an experimental game
Murnighan, J. K., & Wang, L. (2016) · Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes · doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2016.02.003 · Cited by 65
McClung, J., Placì, S., Bangerter, A., Clément, F., & Bshary, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2017.1682 · Cited by 66
“This is related to our willingness to punish defectors [1,2] and the importance we give to reputational effects [3,4].”
BackgroundThe behavioral model and game theory
Askari, G., Gordji, M. E., & Park, C. (2019) · Humanities and Social Sciences Communications · doi:10.1057/s41599-019-0265-2 · Cited by 74
Mediating artificial intelligence developments through negative and positive incentives
Han, T. A., Pereira, L. M., Lenaerts, T., & Santos, F. C. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0244592 · Cited by 57
“Incentives such as punishment and rewards have been shown to provide important mechanisms to promote the emergence of positive behaviour (such as cooperation and fairness) in the context of social dilemmas [25–35].”
BackgroundResultThe Conflict Between Explainable and Accountable Decision-Making Algorithms
Lima, G., Grgić-Hlača, N., Jeong, J. K., & Cha, M. (2022) · ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT) · doi:10.1145/3531146.3534628 · Cited by 98
“Being able to hold someone responsible is critical for promoting cooperation by deterring selfish behavior [37].”
BackgroundEvolutionary mechanisms that promote cooperation may not promote social welfare
Han, T. A., Duong, M. H., & Perc, M. (2024) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2024.0547 · Cited by 80
“Typically (and intuitively), peer punishment is considered more efficient than peer reward as the former can lead to a higher level of cooperation since peer punishers are more advantageous than peer rewarders when playing against defectors (see also our results in figure 1).”
Halmburger, A., Baumert, A., & Schmitt, M. (2014) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.2071 · Cited by 64
Privacy, technology, and norms: The case of Smart Meters
Horne, C., Darras, B., Bean, E., Srivastava, A. K., & Frickel, S. (2014) · Social Science Research · doi:10.1016/j.ssresearch.2014.12.003 · Cited by 71
“A prominent approach focuses on the consequences of behaviors (Demsetz 1967; Coleman 1990; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Heckathorn 1989; Yamagishi 1986).”
BackgroundTHE EVOLUTION OF PUNISHMENT IN n-PLAYER PUBLIC GOODS GAMES: A VOLUNTEER'S DILEMMA
Raihani, N., & Bshary, R. (2011) · Evolution · doi:10.1111/j.1558-5646.2011.01383.x · Cited by 61
“…show that punishment may only be stable when it is already common in a population (Boyd and Richerson 1992; Gintis 2000; Boyd et al. 2003; Bowles and Gintis 2004), raising the question of how punishment becomes established in the first place (Fowler 2005; Barclay 2006; Lehmann et al. 2007).”
BackgroundGonin, M., Palazzo, G., & Hoffrage, U. (2011) · Business Ethics A European Review · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8608.2011.01643.x · Cited by 72
Evolution of All-or-None Strategies in Repeated Public Goods Dilemmas
Pinheiro, F. L., Vasconcelos, V. V., Santos, F. C., & Pacheco, J. M. (2014) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003945 · Cited by 56
“In the absence of additional mechanisms, such as the presence of thresholds [4,5], risk [6], an embedding network of interactions [7–12], institutions [13–15], punishment or voluntary participation [16–19], evolutionary game theory predicts a population fated to fall into a tragedy of the commons [20].”
BackgroundMartin, J. W., & Cushman, F. A. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0125193 · Cited by 62
“Ultimately, punishment will be favored when it successfully changes others’ behavior in a way that improves one’s own fitness [4,9,42].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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