Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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(2008) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511490118 · Cited by 100
Social preferences and emotions as regulators of behavior in processes⋆
Urda, J., & Loch, C. H. (2012) · Journal of Operations Management · doi:10.1016/j.jom.2012.11.007 · Cited by 92
How the shadow of the future might promote cooperation
Lange, P. A. M. V., Klapwijk, A., & Munster, L. M. V. (2011) · Group Processes & Intergroup Relations · doi:10.1177/1368430211402102 · Cited by 83
“(e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich et al., 2005).”
Chen, X., Sasaki, T., & Perc, M. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep17050 · Cited by 76
Evolutionary dynamics of group cooperation with asymmetrical environmental feedback
Shao, Y., Wang, X., & Fu, F. (2019) · Europhysics Letters (EPL) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/126/40005 · Cited by 80
Fischer, B., Gutsche, G., & Wetzel, H. (2021) · Energy Research & Social Science · doi:10.1016/j.erss.2021.102013 · Cited by 69
Earth stewardship: Shaping a sustainable future through interacting policy and norm shifts
Chapin, F. S., Weber, E. U., Bennett, E. M., Biggs, R., van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., Adger, W. N., Crépin, A., Polasky, S., Folke, C., Scheffer, M., et al. (2022) · AMBIO · doi:10.1007/s13280-022-01721-3 · Cited by 103
“Some consumption, such as electricity use, is less visible and thus less susceptible to social pressure (Fischer et al. 2012).”
BackgroundStrong altruism can evolve in randomly formed groups
Fletcher, J., & Zwick, M. (2004) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2004.01.004 · Cited by 92
Motion of influential players can support cooperation in Prisoner’s Dilemma
Droz, M., Szwabiński, J., & Szabó, G. (2009) · The European Physical Journal B · doi:10.1140/epjb/e2009-00160-1 · Cited by 82
Campanhã, C., Minati, L., Fregni, F., & Boggio, P. S. (2011) · Journal of Neuroscience · doi:10.1523/jneurosci.1253-11.2011 · Cited by 85
“When making a decision faced with unfairness, we tend to punish others even when this results in a loss for ourselves (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundInfluentialDeontic Justice and Organizational Neuroscience
Cropanzano, R., Massaro, S., & Becker, W. J. (2016) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-016-3056-3 · Cited by 92
“Likewise, research on ‘altruistic punishment’ (Fehr and Gächter 2002), shows that individuals will sacrifice economic benefits in order to punish someone who violates social norms (Fehr and Fishbacher 2004; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr et al.”
BackgroundChoosing the Stick or the Carrot? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma SituationsPreprint
HAIGNER, S. D., Kocher, M. G., & Sutter, M. (2006) · SSRN Electronic Journal · Cited by 76
Making punishment palatable: Belief in free will alleviates punitive distress
Clark, C. J., Baumeister, R. F., & Ditto, P. H. (2017) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2017.03.010 · Cited by 84
“The second is a strong inclination to punish those who pose harm to the self or social group (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundIndividual solutions to shared problems create a modern tragedy of the commons
Gross, J., & Dreu, C. K. W. D. (2019) · Science Advances · doi:10.1126/sciadv.aau7296 · Cited by 87
“Yet, creating and sustaining public goods and shared solutions is challenging: They require cooperation that can quickly deteriorate in the absence of social preferences ( 6 , 7 ), reciprocity ( 3 , 4 , 8 ), and norm enforcement ( 9 – 13 ).”
InfluentialHuman Morality Is Based on an Early-Emerging Moral Core
Woo, B. M., Tan, E., & Hamlin, J. K. (2022) · Annual Review of Developmental Psychology · doi:10.1146/annurev-devpsych-121020-023312 · Cited by 95
Role of Investment Heterogeneity in the Cooperation on Spatial Public Goods Game
Yuan, W.-J., & Xia, C. (2014) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0091012 · Cited by 76
O’Gorman, R., Wilson, D. S., & Miller, R. R. (2005) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2004.12.006 · Cited by 89
“One possibility is that altruistic punishment is an adaptation that evolved because bgroups with a high fraction of altruistic punishers would have sustained cooperation more successfully than groups with fewer punishers, and so would have prevailed over themQ (Bowles & Gintis, 2002, p. 128).”
BackgroundSupernatural and secular monitors promote human cooperation only if they remind of punishment
Yilmaz, O., & Bahçekapili, H. G. (2016) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2015.09.005 · Cited by 75
“Although it is known that punishment is an effective tool for large-scale cooperation (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Johnson, 2005; Krasnow, Delton, Cosmides, & Tooby, 2015; Sigmund, Hauert, & Nowak, 2001; Yamagishi, 1986; however, see Guala, 2012), little is known…”
ResultLaw without the State: Legal Attributes and the Coordination of Decentralized Collective Punishment
Hadfield, G. K., & Weingast, B. R. V. (2013) · Journal of Law and Courts · doi:10.1086/668604 · Cited by 98
“Fehr and Gachter ð2002Þ show that people in laboratory settings are frequently willing to engage in such conduct; Henrich et al. ð2006Þ demonstrate this for several populations around the world.”
BackgroundTransmission and development of costly punishment in children
Salalι, G. D., Juda, M., & Henrich, J. (2014) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2014.09.004 · Cited by 87
“…of egalitarian distribution is violated, and (2) that the threat of punishment in laboratory games often raises the levels of cooperation and increases long-term payoffs (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004b; Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002; Fischbacher, Gachter, & Fehr, 2001; Gatcher, 2012; Henrich et al., 2006).”
BackgroundMoral judgment as information processing: an integrative review
Guglielmo, S. (2015) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2015.01637 · Cited by 101
“…and to ultimately promote cooperation, groups and individuals must be able to identify instances of wrongdoing and flag them for subsequent correction and punishment (Boyd and Richerson, 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; DeScioli and Kurzban, 2009; Tooby and Cosmides, 2010; Chudek and Henrich, 2011).”
BackgroundStability of cooperation under image scoring in group interactions
Nax, H. H., Perc, M., Szolnoki, A., & Helbing, D. (2015) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep12145 · Cited by 76
Religious Context and Prosociality: An Experimental Study from Valparaíso, Chile
Ahmed, A. M., & Salas, O. (2013) · Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion · doi:10.1111/jssr.12045 · Cited by 83
Impact of individual response strategy on the spatial public goods game within mobile agents
Chen, M.-H., Wang, L., Wang, J., Sun, S., & Xia, C. (2014) · Applied Mathematics and Computation · doi:10.1016/j.amc.2014.11.052 · Cited by 74
Preschool children and chimpanzees incur costs to watch punishment of antisocial others
Mendes, N., Steinbeis, N., Guerra, N. B., Call, J., & Singer, T. (2017) · Nature Human Behaviour · doi:10.1038/s41562-017-0264-5 · Cited by 81
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.