Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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“The approach is adopted in some later experiments by Fehr and Gächter as well; see Fehr and Gächter (2002).”
MethodChildren's altruistic behavior in the dictator game
Benenson, J. F., Pascoe, J., & Radmore, N. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2006.10.003 · Cited by 633
“…unrelated individuals stems from studies of strong reciprocity in which individuals sacrifice their own resources simply to punish individuals who refuse to behave altruistically (e.g., Fehr, Fischbacher, & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Gintis, 2000; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003).”
BackgroundBeyond WEIRD: towards a broad-based behavioral science
Henrich, J., Heine, S. J., & Norenzayan, A. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x10000725 · Cited by 631
Valid Facial Cues to Cooperation and Trust: Male Facial Width and Trustworthiness
Stirrat, M., & Perrett, D. I. (2010) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797610362647 · Cited by 613
“As such, this is a measure of a prosocial behavior that has been called altruistic punishment (see Fehr & Gachter, 2002, for Corresponding Author: Michael Stirrat, University of St Andrews, School of Psychology, St Mary’s Quad, St Andrews, Fife KY16 0HE, United Kingdom E-mail:…”
BackgroundCambridge Handbook of Experimental Political Science
(2011) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511921452 · Cited by 611
The Long-Run Benefits of Punishment
Gächter, S., Renner, E., & Sefton, M. (2008) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1164744 · Cited by 605
Self-citationGroup Competition, Reproductive Leveling, and the Evolution of Human Altruism
Bowles, S. (2006) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1134829 · Cited by 604
Oxytocin is associated with human trustworthiness
ZAK, P., KURZBAN, R., & MATZNER, W. (2005) · Hormones and Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.yhbeh.2005.07.009 · Cited by 595
“YHBEH-02223; No. of pages: 6; 4C: Laboratory studies consistently show substantial amounts of interpersonal trust in monetary exchange experiments (Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Camerer, 2003).”
The Neural Signature of Social Norm Compliance
Spitzer, M., Fischbacher, U., Herrnberger, B., Grön, G., & Fehr, E. (2007) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2007.09.011 · Cited by 584
“Although much compliance is voluntary, there can be little doubt that social order would quickly break down in the absence of punishment threats because a minority of noncompliers can trigger a process that leads to widespread noncompliance due to the conditional nature of many people’s compliance (Fischbacher et al.,…”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citationDawes, C. T., Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., McElreath, R., & Smirnov, O. (2007) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05651 · Cited by 579
Social learning promotes institutions for governing the commons
Sigmund, K., De Silva, H., Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C. (2010) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature09203 · Cited by 580
Conditional Cooperation and Costly Monitoring Explain Success in Forest Commons Management
Rustagi, D., Engel, S., & Kosfeld, M. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1193649 · Cited by 575
Why be nice? Psychological constraints on the evolution of cooperation
Stevens, J. R., & Hauser, M. D. (2004) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/j.tics.2003.12.003 · Cited by 564
“Some argue that reciprocity is so integral to human society that we have evolved specialized cognitive mechanisms to facilitate its stability, including the detection and punishment of cheaters (see Box 1; [12, 13 ]).”
BackgroundGrandparental investment: Past, present, and future
Coall, D. A., & Hertwig, R. (2010) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x09991105 · Cited by 562
“The most influential interpretation of this behavior – which conflicts with the assumption made routinely by most economists (see Fehr & Schmidt 2006) that material self-interest is the sole motivation of all people – has been in terms of altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gächter 2002).”
BackgroundPrisoner’s dilemma game model Based on historical strategy information
Gou, Z., & Li, Y. (2023) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-022-26890-9 · Cited by 561
Emotion and Rationality: A Critical Review and Interpretation of Empirical Evidence
Pham, M. T. (2007) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.11.2.155 · Cited by 552
“Publicgood experiments show that a majority of players are willing to incur personal financial costs to punish free-riders even in settings where players meet only once and where, therefore, there is no material incentive to punish—a phenomenon called altruistic punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002).”
BackgroundSpontaneous Altruism by Chimpanzees and Young Children
Warneken, F., Hare, B., Melis, A. P., Hanus, D., & Tomasello, M. (2007) · PLoS Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pbio.0050184 · Cited by 552
“Human cultural groups might have created unique social mechanisms to preserve and foster altruism, such as sanctioning selfish behavior and internalizing social norms [11,28,29].”
BackgroundChoosing the Carrot or the Stick? Endogenous Institutional Choice in Social Dilemma Situations
SUTTER, M., HAIGNER, S., & KOCHER, M. G. (2010) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00608.x · Cited by 542
“Over the past decade, the effects of reward and punishment on cooperation in social dilemma games have received considerable attention, for instance, in Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Andreoni, Harbaugh and Vesterlund (2003), Masclet et al. (2003), or Sefton, Shupp and Walker (2007).”
BackgroundSixteen common misconceptions about the evolution of cooperation in humans
West, S. A., El Mouden, C., & Gardner, A. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.08.001 · Cited by 541
“…and proximate factors is provided by work on " strong reciprocity, " which is defined proximately but then given as a solution to an ultimate problem (Bowles & Gintis, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2003, 2004; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Fehr et al., 2002; Gintis et al., 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialCooperation and human cognition: the Vygotskian intelligence hypothesis.
Moll, H., & Tomasello, M. (2007) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2006.2000 · Cited by 531
“In the modern context, multi-level selection theories stress that the so-called 'strong reciprocity' could be the basis of human cooperative interactions (see Fehr & Gächter (2002) for a review), and this in the context of the so-called cultural group selection (Richerson & Boyd 2005).”
BackgroundHuman Motivation and Social Cooperation: Experimental and Analytical Foundations
Fehr, E., & Gintis, H. (2007) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131812 · Cited by 528
“In order to test whether self-regarding motives or strong reciprocity drives punishment, Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) conducted experiments in which the group composition changed randomly from period to period in such a way that no subject ever encountered another subject more than once.”
BackgroundSelf-citationReciprocity: Weak or strong? What punishment experiments do (and do not) demonstrate
Guala, F. (2012) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x11000069 · Cited by 522
“In contrast, strong reciprocity mixes different explanatory levels: it uses proximate arguments to explain ultimate problems (Bowles & Gintis 2004; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003; 2004; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Fehr & Rockenbach 2003; Gintis et al. 2003).”
InfluentialHow infants and toddlers react to antisocial others
Hamlin, J. K., Wynn, K., Bloom, P., & Mahajan, N. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1110306108 · Cited by 507
Emotion expression in human punishment behavior
Xiao, E., & Houser, D. (2005) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0502399102 · Cited by 501
The efficient interaction of indirect reciprocity and costly punishment
Rockenbach, B., & Milinski, M. (2006) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature05229 · Cited by 498
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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