Altruistic punishment in humans
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 29 of the 29 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
5 more claims about this paper
Create a free account to see every claim other papers make about this one.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cites
Axelrod, R., & Hamilton, W. D. (1981) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.7466396 · Cited by 20,065
The genetical evolution of social behaviour. I
Hamilton, W. D. (1964) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/0022-5193(64)90038-4 · Cited by 15,725
The Evolution of Reciprocal Altruism
Trivers, R. L. (1971) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/406755 · Cited by 11,010
z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments
Fischbacher, U. (2007) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-006-9159-4 · Cited by 9,510
Nielsen, R. P., & Axelrod, R. (1985) · The Academy of Management Review · doi:10.2307/257983 · Cited by 6,321
Passions within reason: the strategic role of the emotions
(1989) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.26-4535 · Cited by 2,967
Evolution of indirect reciprocity by image scoring
Nowak, M. A., & Sigmund, K. (1998) · Nature · doi:10.1038/31225 · Cited by 2,700
Unto Others: The Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior
(1999) · Ethology · doi:10.1046/j.1439-0310.1999.00372.x · Cited by 2,545
An Evolutionary Approach to Norms
Axelrod, R. (1986) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055400185016 · Cited by 2,205
Covenants with and without a Sword: Self-Governance Is Possible
Ostrom, E., Walker, J., & Gardner, R. (1992) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.2307/1964229 · Cited by 2,063
Research works printed but not linked: 2
- Smuts, B. B., Cheney, D. L., Seyfarth, R. M., Wrangham, R. W., & Struhsaker, T. T. (eds) Primate Societies (Univ. Chicago Press, Chicago, 1987).
- Fischbacher, U. Z-tree: Zürich Toolbox for Readymade Economic Experiments Working Paper No. 21 (Institute for Empirical Research in Economics, Univ. Zürich, 1999).
Cited by
Items 501–600 of 1,038
The evolution of authoritarian processes: Fostering cooperation in large-scale groups.
Kessler, T., & Cohrs, J. C. (2008) · Group Dynamics: Theory, Research, and Practice · doi:10.1037/1089-2699.12.1.73 · Cited by 126
Running Behavioral Operations Experiments Using Amazon's Mechanical Turk
Lee, Y. S., Seo, Y. W., & Siemsen, E. (2018) · Production and Operations Management · doi:10.1111/poms.12841 · Cited by 147
“Moreover, Suri and Watts (2011) replicated a public goods exper-iment by Fehr and Gachter (2002) and found no significant differences between online subjects and a prior study conducted in the classroom.”
Neural basis of egalitarian behavior
Dawes, C. T., Loewen, P. J., Schreiber, D. M., Simmons, A. N., Flagan, T., McElreath, R. L., Bokemper, S., Fowler, J. H., & Paulus, M. P. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1118653109 · Cited by 142
“Importantly, those with the greatest sensitivity to inequality in the random-income game are also those most likely to engage in costly punishment of noncontributors in a separate public-goods game (9), a behavior that has been shown to promote cooperation in humans (10).”
BackgroundNeanderthals and Modern Humans: An Ecological and Evolutionary Perspective
Finlayson, C. (2004) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511542374 · Cited by 122
Discriminatory attitudes against unvaccinated people during the pandemic
Bor, A., Jørgensen, F., & Petersen, M. B. (2023) · Nature · doi:10.1038/s41586-022-05607-y · Cited by 123
Subiaul, F., Vonk, J. M., Okamoto, S., & Barth, J. (2008) · Animal Cognition · doi:10.1007/s10071-008-0151-6 · Cited by 143
“However, it remains an open question whether the ability to make reputation judgments, as deWned here, transfers to other tasks and other problems such as tasks that may elicit altruistic punishment when confronted with a ‘selWsh’ donor ( Fehr 2002 ) or, conversely, elicit prosocial behaviors when in the presence of a…”
BackgroundPurzycki, B. G., Henrich, J., Apicella, C. L., Atkinson, Q. D., Baimel, A., Cohen, E. E. A., McNamara, R. A., Willard, A. K., Xygalatas, D., & Norenzayan, A. (2017) · Religion Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2016.1267027 · Cited by 134
“…that benefit others who are neither kin nor likely ever to reciprocate (i.e., when there is little to no concern for maintaining a reputation) is widely considered to be an evolutionarily unique problem (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Henrich & Henrich, 2007; Richerson & Boyd, 1999; Turchin, 2013).”
BackgroundBlair, J. (2018) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2017.0155 · Cited by 171
Neanderthals and modern humans an ecological and evolutionary perspective
Finlayson, C. (2004) · Cited by 137
Sylwester, K., & Roberts, G. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2012.11.009 · Cited by 130
The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution
Bowles, S. (2012) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139012980 · Cited by 159
In-group defense, out-group aggression, and coordination failures in intergroup conflict
De Dreu, C. K. W., Gross, J., Méder, Z., Giffin, M., Prochazkova, E., Krikeb, J., & Columbus, S. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1605115113 · Cited by 121
Toddlers and infants expect individuals to refrain from helping an ingroup victim’s aggressor
Ting, F., He, Z., & Renée Baillargeon, B. (2019) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1817849116 · Cited by 128
Philpot, R., Liebst, L. S., Levine, M., Bernasco, W., & Lindegaard, M. R. (2019) · American Psychologist · doi:10.1037/amp0000469 · Cited by 139
On the preconditions for large-scale collective action
Jagers, S. C., Harring, N., Löfgren, Å., Sjöstedt, M., Alpízar, F., Brülde, B., Langlet, D., Nilsson, A., Almroth, B. C., Dupont, S. T., et al. (2019) · AMBIO · doi:10.1007/s13280-019-01284-w · Cited by 155
Baumeister, R. F., Ainsworth, S. E., & Vohs, K. D. (2015) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x15000618 · Cited by 159
Civai, C., Corradi‐Dell’Acqua, C., Gamer, M., & Rumiati, R. I. (2009) · Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.09.001 · Cited by 133
“Individuals’ ‘‘irrational” choices have been explained in terms of altruistic punishment ( Fehr & Gachter, 2002 ).”
InfluentialNelissen, R. M. A., & Zeelenberg, M. (2009) · Research portal (Tilburg University) · Cited by 122
Do humans really punish altruistically? A closer look
Pedersen, E. J., Kurzban, R., & McCullough, M. E. (2013) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.2723 · Cited by 122
“Fifth, previous claims that anger is the predominant emotional response of third-party punishers have relied on self-reports of anger in response to hypothetical scenarios [4,6].”
BackgroundResultInfluentialHow chimpanzees cooperate in a competitive world
Suchak, M., Eppley, T. M., Campbell, M., Feldman, R. A., Quarles, L. F., & de Waal, F. Β. Μ. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1611826113 · Cited by 149
“In the laboratory, humans respond more cooperatively when punishment is allowed (15), and even the mere threat of punishment maintains high levels of cooperation (16).”
BackgroundThe Ritual Animal: Imitation and Cohesion in the Evolution of Social Complexity
Whitehouse, H. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199646364.001.0001 · Cited by 196
Lange, P. A. M. V., Bekkers, R., Chirumbolo, A., & Leone, L. (2011) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.845 · Cited by 141
“This focus has been complemented by research examining instrumental forms of cooperation, or second-order forms of cooperation, such as providing punishment to those who free-ride on the efforts of others, or providing reward to people who cooperated (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Yamagishi, 1988).”
MethodCOVID-19: Large-scale collective action, government intervention, and the importance of trust
Harring, N., Jagers, S. C., & Löfgren, Å. (2020) · World Development · doi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2020.105236 · Cited by 137
The price you pay: cost-dependent reputation effects of altruistic punishment
Nelissen, R. M. A. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2008.01.001 · Cited by 145
The Evolution of Contingent Cooperation
Gurven, M. (2006) · Current Anthropology · doi:10.1086/499552 · Cited by 119
“Nonetheless, a number of experiments have also shown that concerns over fairness affect people’s emotions, attitudes, and behavior toward distribution rules and perceptions of equity (see Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr and Schmidt 1999).”
BackgroundIs Strong Reciprocity a Maladaptation? On the Evolutionary Foundations of Human AltruismPreprint
Fehr, E., & Henrich, J. (2003) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.382950 · Cited by 128
Self-citationEvolutionary causes and consequences of consistent individual variation in cooperative behaviour
Bergmüller, R., Schürch, R., & Hamilton, I. M. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0124 · Cited by 145
“Such factors may also be involved in explaining 'altruistic punishment' (Fehr & Gächter 2002), i.e. individuals punish unfamiliar individuals that deviate from social norms, thereby stabilizing cooperation in humans.”
Public goods in relation to competition, cooperation, and spite
Levin, S. A. (2014) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1400830111 · Cited by 124
Altruistic punishment and the threat of feuds
Nikiforakis, N., & Engelmann, D. (2011) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2011.01.017 · Cited by 138
Institutional factors affecting biophysical outcomes in forest management
Coleman, E. A. (2008) · Journal of Policy Analysis and Management · doi:10.1002/pam.20405 · Cited by 121
Reciprocity and emotions in bargaining using physiological and self-report measures
Ben‐Shakhar, G., Bornstein, G., Hopfensitz, A., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (2007) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2007.02.005 · Cited by 154
Baldassarri, D. (2015) · American Journal of Sociology · doi:10.1086/682418 · Cited by 141
Men behaving nicely: Public goods as peacock tails
van Vugt, M., & Iredale, W. (2012) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1111/j.2044-8295.2011.02093.x · Cited by 135
“Humans are an extremely cooperative species (Barclay, 2010; Fehr & Gachter, 2002).”
BackgroundInfluentialPositivity of the English Language
Kloumann, I. M., Danforth, C. M., Harris, K. D., Bliss, C. A., & Dodds, P. S. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029484 · Cited by 118
“Yet everyday experience and many findings of psychology, behavioral economics, and neuroscience indicate people favour seemingly irrational heuristics [3,4] over strict rationality as exemplified in loss-aversion [5], confirmation bias [6], and altruistic punishment [7].”
BackgroundEmotional Intelligence predicts individual differences in social exchange reasoning
Reis, D. L., Brackett, M. A., Shamosh, N. A., Kiehl, K. A., Salovey, P., & Gray, J. R. (2007) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2006.12.045 · Cited by 144
“Reasoning about social exchange has proven to be a conceptually rich topic across the social sciences: it is an important problem faced over evolutionary time and an ability that develops without requiring effort or understanding of formal logic (Cosmides and Tooby, 2004; Fehr and Gachter, 2002).”
BackgroundGao, X., Yu, H., Sáez, I., Blue, P. R., Zhu, L., Hsu, M., & Zhou, X. (2018) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1802523115 · Cited by 132
Strategic investment in reputation
Semmann, D., Krambeck, H.-J., & Milinski, M. (2004) · Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology · doi:10.1007/s00265-004-0782-9 · Cited by 125
“Similarly, when human subjects were allowed to punish uncooperative players (by imposing a fine) in a public goods game, the level of cooperation increased immediately (Fehr and G?chter 2002), showing that they were well aware of whether uncooperative behaviour could be punished.”
BackgroundRecognizing contributors: an experiment on public goods
Samek, A. S., & Sheremeta, R. M. (2014) · Experimental Economics · doi:10.1007/s10683-013-9389-1 · Cited by 132
“In the BOTTOM treatment, we find that displaying the identities of only the lowest (Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gaechter, 2000, 2002; Masclet et al., 2003).”
Psychology of Human Kin Recognition: Heuristic Cues, Erroneous Inferences, and Their Implications
Park, J. H., Schaller, M., & Van Vugt, M. (2008) · Review of General Psychology · doi:10.1037/1089-2680.12.3.215 · Cited by 114
“…independent of kin recognition—such as social exchange, interdependence, coalitional alliances, and costly signaling—have contributed to the human capacity for altruism and cooperative behavior (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; McAndrew, 2002; Richerson & Boyd, 2005; Tooby & Cosmides, 1996).”
BackgroundWu, Y., Zhou, Y., van Dijk, E., Leliveld, M. C., & Zhou, X. (2011) · Frontiers in Human Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnhum.2011.00131 · Cited by 121
“A large number of studies, employing different paradigms, show that people demand fairness in wealth allocation and are willing to sacrifice economic interests to punish unfair behavior (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Camerer, 2003).”
BackgroundHow We Can Promote Behavior That Serves All of Us in the Future
Van Lange, P. A. M., & Joireman, J. A. (2008) · Social Issues and Policy Review · doi:10.1111/j.1751-2409.2008.00013.x · Cited by 114
“…with definitions of altruism, which across disciplines, range from behavioral definitions (i.e., acts of costly helping are considered altruistic ; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) to definitions that seek to exclude any possible mechanism that may be activated by some consideration that may not be free of…”
BackgroundMoral Punishment in Everyday Life
Hofmann, W., Brandt, M. J., Wisneski, D. C., Rockenbach, B., & Skitka, L. J. (2018) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167218775075 · Cited by 145
“…behind punitive sentiments as well as the neural systems that trigger the desire for punishment (e.g., Bone & Raihani, 2015; Carlsmith et al., 2002; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Fehr & Rockenbach, 2004; Knoch, Gianotti, Baumgartner, & Fehr, 2010; McCullough, Kurzban, & Tabak, 2013) will benefit from a…”
BackgroundSustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
Perc, M. (2017) · University of Maribor digital library (University of Maribor) · Cited by 115
Emergence of responsible sanctions without second order free riders, antisocial punishment or spite
Hilbe, C., & Traulsen, A. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00458 · Cited by 115
Evolutionary accounts of belief in supernatural punishment: a critical review
Schloss, J. P., & Murray, M. J. (2011) · Religion, Brain & Behavior · doi:10.1080/2153599x.2011.558707 · Cited by 114
“Although empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that punishment increases the amount of cooperative investment in public goods games (Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002), subsequent experimental work has found that punishment may not increase average payoff (Botelho, Harrison, Pinto, & Rutström,…”
BackgroundEvolution in group-structured populations can resolve the tragedy of the commons
Killingback, T., Bieri, J., & Flatt, T. (2006) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3476 · Cited by 116
“Finally, we note that direct (Trivers 1971) or indirect (Nowak & Sigmund 1998; Milinski et al. 2002) reciprocity, or punishment ( Fehr & Gachter 2002 ), are not involved in the maintenance of cooperation in our model, since we have not assumed that the individuals playing the game have any capacity for individual reco…”
InfluentialBEHAVIOR IN GROUP CONTESTS: A REVIEW OF EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH
Sheremeta, R. M. (2015) · Journal of Economic Surveys · doi:10.1111/joes.12208 · Cited by 135
De Dreu, C. K. W., & Gross, J. (2019) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x18002170 · Cited by 112
The neglected complexities of shark fisheries, and priorities for holistic risk-based management
Booth, H. L., Squires, D., & Milner‐Gulland, E. J. (2019) · Ocean & Coastal Management · doi:10.1016/j.ocecoaman.2019.104994 · Cited by 131
Public Goods Provision and Sanctioning in Privileged Groups
Reuben, E., & Riedl, A. M. (2008) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002708322361 · Cited by 137
“The treatments differ in two dimensions: first, the public good game is either followed by a decentralized punishment stage a la Fehr and Gächter (2000) (punishment condition) or there is no such punishment stage (baseline condition); second, subjects in a group differ with respect to the marginal benefit they receive…”
BackgroundMaking index insurance attractive to farmers
Patt, A., Peterson, N. D., Carter, M. R., Vélez, M. A., Hess, U., & Suárez, P. (2009) · Mitigation and Adaptation Strategies for Global Change · doi:10.1007/s11027-009-9196-3 · Cited by 122
“Researchers have found that levels of trust correlate with cultural backgrounds (Greig and Bohnet 2005), with gender (Bohnet and Zeckhauser 2004), and with the exact structure of the game (Bohnet and Huck 2004); for example, making it possible for players to punish those who fail to play for the common good, can also…”
BackgroundLotz, S., Baumert, A., Schlösser, T. M., Gresser, F., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011) · Negotiation and Conflict Management Research · doi:10.1111/j.1750-4716.2011.00084.x · Cited by 125
“It has been termed altruistic punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Heckathorne, 1989), strong reciprocity (e.g., Gintis, 2000), norm enforcement (e.g., Horne & Cutlip, 2002), third-party revenge (Tripp & Bies, 2009), or deontic justice (Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003;…”
BackgroundNeuroscientific approaches and applications within anthropology
Rilling, J. K. (2008) · American Journal of Physical Anthropology · doi:10.1002/ajpa.20947 · Cited by 112
“…aversion to ‘‘free riders’’ (i.e., those who accept benefits without paying expected costs), as suggested by behavioral economics experiments in which people often choose to punish free riders, even if the punishment is personally costly (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).”
BackgroundOutsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment.
Laurin, K., Shariff, A. F., Henrich, J., & Kay, A. C. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0615 · Cited by 112
Social exclusion in finite populations
Li, K., Cong, R., Wu, T., & Wang, L. (2015) · Physical Review E · doi:10.1103/physreve.91.042810 · Cited by 112
Martela, F. (2019) · Journal of Organization Design · doi:10.1186/s41469-019-0062-9 · Cited by 207
Emotions as a mechanism for boundedly rational agents: The fast and frugal way
Muramatsu, R., & Hanoch, Y. (2004) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2004.03.001 · Cited by 141
“For example, in a recent paper, Fehr and Gachter (2002) try to explain their experimental findings of high rates of social cooperation by hypothesizing a behavioral process called altruistic punishment.”
BackgroundEgalitarian motive and altruistic punishment
Fowler, J. H., Johnson, T., & Smirnov, O. A. (2005) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature03256 · Cited by 119
MIGRATION AS A MECHANISM TO PROMOTE COOPERATION
HELBING, D., & YU, W. (2008) · Advances in Complex Systems · doi:10.1142/s0219525908001866 · Cited by 112
Justice in America: The Separate Realities of Blacks and Whites
Peffley, M., & Hurwitz, J. (2010) · Cited by 111
Evolved mechanisms for revenge and forgiveness.
McCullough, M. E., Kurzban, R., & Tabak, B. A. (2010) · American Psychological Association eBooks · doi:10.1037/12346-012 · Cited by 130
“Fehr and Gächter (2002) ran a similar game, with a few modifications, the most”
BackgroundEvolutionary dynamics in the public goods games with switching between punishment and exclusion
Liu, L., Wang, S., Chen, X., & Perc, M. (2018) · Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science · doi:10.1063/1.5051422 · Cited by 107
Punishing free riders: direct and indirect promotion of cooperation
Shinada, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2007) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.04.001 · Cited by 132
“Experimental studies have consistently demonstrated that punishment (monetary and symbolic alike) promotes cooperation (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Masclet, Noussair, Tucker, & Villeval, 2003).”
BackgroundMethodResultInfluentialPunish and Voice: Punishment Enhances Cooperation when Combined with Norm-Signalling
Andrighetto, G., Brandts, J., Conte, R., Sabater-Mir, J., Solaz, H., & Villatoro, D. (2013) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0064941 · Cited by 132
“To test our hypothesis, we build an experimental design utilizing a standard public-goods game with costly punishment [6].”
BackgroundMethodThe Effect of Social Category on Third Party Punishment
Lieberman, D., & Linke, L. H. (2007) · Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1177/147470490700500203 · Cited by 128
“…effects of punishment on cooperation have found that while individuals are willing to incur a cost to punish a free-rider or norm violator, (e.g., Fehr and Gachter, 2000, 2002; O’Gorman, Wilson, and Miller, 2005; Ostrom, Walker and Gardner, 1992), greater magnitudes of punishment are levied…”
BackgroundCompassionate Love: A Framework for Research
Underwood, L. G. (2008) · The Science of Compassionate Love · doi:10.1002/9781444303070.ch1 · Cited by 90
Monitoring and sanctioning in the commons: An application to forestry
Coleman, E. A., & Steed, B. C. (2009) · Ecological Economics · doi:10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.02.006 · Cited by 136
“It is supported by a number of recent empirical findings in laboratory settings with students (Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gachter, 2000, 2002; Bowles et al., 2001; Sefton et al., 2007) and in field experiments from societies around the world (Henrich et al., 2004, 2006).”
ResultExtrapolating Weak Selection in Evolutionary Games
Wu, B., García, J., Hauert, C., & Traulsen, A. (2013) · PLoS Computational Biology · doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003381 · Cited by 107
“The game is devised to inspect the emergence of altruistic punishment, a behavior commonly found in human subjects [12].”
Incorporating institutions and collective action into a sociohydrological model of flood resilience
Yu, D. J., Sangwan, N., Sung, K., Chen, X., & Merwade, V. (2017) · Water Resources Research · doi:10.1002/2016wr019746 · Cited by 123
Zettler, I., Hilbig, B. E., & Heydasch, T. (2013) · Journal of Research in Personality · doi:10.1016/j.jrp.2013.01.012 · Cited by 122
Baer, J., Kaufman, J. C., & Baumeister, R. F. (2008) · Cited by 107
Experiments for Public Management Research
Margetts, H. Z. (2011) · Public Management Review · doi:10.1080/14719037.2010.532970 · Cited by 107
“Laboratory experiments have also been used to show that many people are willing to contribute to public goods and to punish those who do not contribute, even when these activities are costly and when members of the group are anonymous (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).”
MethodReward and Social Valuation Deficits following Ventromedial Prefrontal Damage
Moretti, L., Dragone, D., & di Pellegrino, G. (2009) · Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience · doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21011 · Cited by 107
“This evidence is generally interpreted by saying that people are not driven exclusively by self-regarding preferences based on material gains, but also by other-regarding preferences guided by fairness and equality motives (Bowles, 2006 ; Fehr & Gachter, 2002 ).”
BackgroundEmergence and resilience of cooperation in the spatial prisoner's dilemma via a reward mechanism
Jiménez, R., Lugo, H., Cuesta, J. A., & Sánchez, Á. (2007) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2007.10.010 · Cited by 111
“Preprint submitted to Elsevier 5 February 2008”
BackgroundFairness violations elicit greater punishment on behalf of another than for oneself
FeldmanHall, O., Sokol-Hessner, P., Van Bavel, J. J., & Phelps, E. A. (2014) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms6306 · Cited by 106
Aspiration-induced reconnection in spatial public-goods game
Zhang, H.-F., Liu, R.-R., Wang, Z., Yang, H.-X., & Wang, B.-H. (2011) · EPL (Europhysics Letters) · doi:10.1209/0295-5075/94/18006 · Cited by 106
Sanctions and moral judgments: The moderating effect of sanction severity and trust in authorities
Mulder, L. B., Verboon, P., & Cremer, D. D. (2008) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.506 · Cited by 126
Human punishment is motivated by inequity aversion, not a desire for reciprocity
Raihani, N., & McAuliffe, K. (2012) · Biology Letters · doi:10.1098/rsbl.2012.0470 · Cited by 118
How institutions shaped the last major evolutionary transition to large-scale human societies
Powers, S. T., van Schaik, C. P., & Lehmann, L. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0098 · Cited by 124
“We conclude that the key puzzle about large-scale human societies is not how to explain the existence of altruistic cooperation that is costly and fitness reducing over an individual’s lifetime, as has been widely suggested [91].”
Xia, C., Meng, X.-K., & Wang, Z. (2015) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0129542 · Cited by 107
How do social norms influence prosocial development?
House, B. R. (2017) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.08.011 · Cited by 140
Lönnqvist, J., Verkasalo, M., Wichardt, P. C., & Walkowitz, G. (2013) · European Journal of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/ejsp.1976 · Cited by 115
“…with punishing for unfairness (measured in the ultimatum game) have had a pivotal role in the evolutionary development of human cooperation (Fehr & Gächter, 2002), and trusting behaviour (measured in the trust game) has famously been argued to be the ‘lubricant that enables most essential…”
BackgroundUnifying the Theories of Inclusive Fitness and Reciprocal Altruism
Fletcher, J., & Zwick, M. (2006) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/506529 · Cited by 130
Laughter and Literature: A Play Theory of Humor
Boyd, B. (2004) · Philosophy and literature · doi:10.1353/phl.2004.0002 · Cited by 139
The Neuroscience of Compassion and Empathy and Their Link to Prosocial Motivation and Behavior
Chierchia, G., & Singer, T. (2016) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-0-12-805308-9.00020-8 · Cited by 124
From reciprocity to unconditional altruism through signalling benefits
Lotem, A., Fishman, M. A., & Stone, L. (2003) · Proceedings of the Royal Society of London. Series B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2002.2225 · Cited by 104
“…of altruism and cooperation is still one of the most challenging problems in evolutionary theory that continues to attract empiricists and theoreticians alike (Sober & Wilson 1998; Reeve 2000; Wedekind & Milinski 2000; Clutton-Brock et al. 2001; Fehr & Gächter 2002; Milinski et al. 2002).”
BackgroundInfluentialCai, G. G., & Kock, N. (2008) · European Journal of Operational Research · doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2008.01.021 · Cited by 107
“As shown by Axelrod and Dion (1988), Brandt et al. (2003), Doebeli and Hauert (2005), Fehr and Gachter (2002), Fehr and Fischbacher (2003), Jaffe (2004), McElreath (2003), Milinski et al. (2002), reputation, punishment, shadow of future, altruism and other psychological and sociologic factors play…”
BackgroundLearning to live in a global commons: socioeconomic challenges for a sustainable environment
Levin, S. A. (2006) · Ecological Research · doi:10.1007/s11284-006-0162-1 · Cited by 105
“Fehr and Gächter (2002), in a set of elegant experiments, showed that not only can beneficial social norms, like charitable giving, evolve quickly in societies, but that their evolution can be enhanced by the coevolution of individuals’ willingness to punish defectors from the social norms, even…”
BackgroundComputational Social Psychology
(2017) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9781315173726 · Cited by 104
A Review of Theoretical Studies on Indirect Reciprocity
Okada, I. (2020) · Games · doi:10.3390/g11030027 · Cited by 129
“Several groups have considered punishment to be a social norm and have explored conditions under which punishment emerges and its functions [122,124,129].”
BackgroundSupply-chain data sharing for scope 3 emissions
Stenzel, A., & Waichman, I. (2023) · npj Climate Action · doi:10.1038/s44168-023-00032-x · Cited by 175
Punishment Despite Reasonable Doubt - A Public Goods Experiment with Uncertainty Over Contributions
Grechenig, K. R., Nicklisch, A., & Thöni, C. (2010) · Journal of Empirical Legal Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1740-1461.2010.01197.x · Cited by 128
“Most of the studies find that punishment is predominantly directed toward defectors (Fehr & Gächter 2000, 2002).10 If punishment is used to enforce cooperation norms, subjects should become more reluctant to use the punishment option if there is the danger of erroneous punishment, that is, “Type I”…”
BackgroundGenetic royal cheats in leaf-cutting ant societies
Hughes, W. O. H., & Boomsma, J. J. (2008) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0710262105 · Cited by 104
“In systems as diverse as selfish genetic elements (28), worker reproduction in social insect colonies (29) and punishment in human societies (30), suppression by cooperators can prevent cheats being common but cannot eliminate them altogether.”
BackgroundInequality and IndignationPreprint
Ullmann-Margalit, E., & Sunstein, C. (2001) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.301110 · Cited by 102
From Responsibility to Reason-Giving Explainable Artificial Intelligence
Baum, K., Mantel, S., Schmidt, E., & Speith, T. (2022) · Philosophy & Technology · doi:10.1007/s13347-022-00510-w · Cited by 103
“Such an incentive for diligent decision-making may lead to better hiring decisions and less wrongdoing (for empirical evidence, see Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundThe ontogeny of human prosociality: behavioral experiments with children aged 3 to 8
House, B. R., Henrich, J., Brosnan, S. F., & Silk, J. B. (2012) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2011.10.007 · Cited by 111
“…that we do not know and are unlikely to meet again, impose costly punishment on wrongdoers, and adhere to costly group-beneficial social norms (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Henrich et al., 2005, 2006; Marlowe et…”
BackgroundA group selection perspective on economic behavior, institutions and organizations
van den Bergh, J. C. J. M., & Gowdy, J. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2009.04.017 · Cited by 118
The second wave of evolutionary economics in biology
Hammerstein, P., & Hagen, E. H. (2005) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2005.07.012 · Cited by 117
“In Fehr and Ga ¨chter’s public goods game [ 29 ], four anonymous participants simultaneously contribute real money, in an amount of their choosing, to a ‘group project.’ The experimenter then multiplies the total amount contributed, creating the public good.”
BackgroundA Psychology of Ideology: Unpacking the Psychological Structure of Ideological Thinking
Zmigrod, L. (2022) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916211044140 · Cited by 158
“These mechanisms are further amplified by propaganda (Holbig, 2013) and systems of punishment for deviance and disbelief (Boyd et al., 2003; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundKerr, N. L., Rumble, A. C., Park, E. S., Ouwerkerk, J. W., Parks, C. D., Gallucci, M., & Lange, P. A. M. V. (2009) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.02.017 · Cited by 126
“In their laboratory work, Fehr and Gächter (2002) permitted punishment of defectors via fines.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.