Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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“Psychologists and behavioral economists have long recognized that the assumptions of normative models of choice are frequently violated (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 1984; Tversky, 1969; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981). Psychologists have come to distinguish between two processing systems. These generally correspond to wha…”
BackgroundConformists and Mavericks: The Empirics of Frequency-Dependent Cultural Transmission
EFFERSON, C., LALIVE, R., RICHERSON, P., MCELREATH, R., & LUBELL, M. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.003 · Cited by 336
“…have evolved in humans via cultural group selection (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003; Boyd & Richerson, 1982; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003, 2004; Fehr & Gaechter, 2002; Guererk, Irlenbusch, & Rockenback, 2006; Guzmán, RodríguezSickert, & Rowthorn, 2006; Henrich, 2004; Henrich & Boyd, 2001).”
Changing Social Norm Compliance with Noninvasive Brain Stimulation
Ruff, C. C., Ugazio, G., & Fehr, E. (2013) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1241399 · Cited by 340
Self-citationIndirect reciprocity provides only a narrow margin of efficiency for costly punishment
Ohtsuki, H., Iwasa, Y., & Nowak, M. A. (2009) · Nature · doi:10.1038/nature07601 · Cited by 337
Strategies for cooperation in biological markets, especially for humans
Barclay, P. (2013) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2013.02.002 · Cited by 339
“…limited: one can use partner control mechanisms like conditional cooperation and punishment to enforce a partner's cooperation (e.g. Axelrod, 1984; Fehr & Gächter, 2002), but one cannot use partner choice to assort with better cooperators or enforce cooperation by threatening to leave (e.g.…”
BackgroundCooperation under the threat of expulsion in a public goods experiment
Cinyabuguma, M., Page, T., & Putterman, L. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.011 · Cited by 338
The multiplicity of emotions: A framework of emotional functions in decision making
Pfister, H.-R., & Böhm, G. (2008) · Judgment and Decision Making · doi:10.1017/s1930297500000127 · Cited by 335
“In line with the assumptions of Frank (1988), Fehr and Gächter (2002) demonstrate that people cooperate with strangers in one-shot interactions even when it is costly for them, showing strong reciprocity (Gintis et al., 2005). Using a public good paradigm, they showed that a majority of participants was willing to pun…”
BackgroundInfluentialBridoux, F., & Stoelhorst, J. W. (2016) · Academy of Management Review · doi:10.5465/amr.2013.0475 · Cited by 335
“A second mechanism is the negative moral emotions generated by a continuing transgression: switching relational model or ending the relationship is a way to avoid these negative emotions (Fehr & G¨achter, 2002; Fiske, 1991).”
Game theory and human evolution: A critique of some recent interpretations of experimental games
Hagen, E. H., & Hammerstein, P. (2006) · Theoretical Population Biology · doi:10.1016/j.tpb.2005.09.005 · Cited by 334
“Perhaps, Fehr et al. (2002) argue, by cultural group selection.”
Synergy and discounting of cooperation in social dilemmas
Hauert, C., Michor, F., Nowak, M. A., & Doebeli, M. (2006) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.08.040 · Cited by 335
“Punishment and reputation have been identified as very potent promoters of human cooperation in social dilemmas (Fehr & Gächter, 2002, Milinski et al., 2002, Wedekind & Milinski, 2000).”
BackgroundInfluential(Mis)perceptions of inequality
Hauser, O. P., & Norton, M. I. (2017) · Current Opinion in Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.copsyc.2017.07.024 · Cited by 331
Corporate Social Responsibility: Is it Rewarded by the Corporate Bond Market? A Critical Note
Menz, K.-M. (2010) · Journal of Business Ethics · doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0452-y · Cited by 332
“Various articles (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Güth et al., 1982; Trivers, 1971, 1985; White, 2004), for example, have shown that social and ethical values also affect economic behaviour (fairness, reciprocity) and that subjective utility often also depends on the utility of others and all,…”
BackgroundCentralized sanctioning and legitimate authority promote cooperation in humans
Baldassarri, D., & Grossman, G. (2011) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1105456108 · Cited by 330
“By contrast, when endowed with sanctioning powers, conditional cooperators can discipline defectors, thus leading to greater overall levels of contribution (2, 9, 10).”
The Hitchhiker's Guide to Altruism: Gene-culture Coevolution, and the Internalization of Norms
GINTIS, H. (2003) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1006/jtbi.2003.3104 · Cited by 327
Haidt, J., & Kesebir, S. (2010) · Handbook of Social Psychology · doi:10.1002/9780470561119.socpsy002022 · Cited by 325
SEXUAL SELECTION FOR MORAL VIRTUES
Miller, G. F. (2007) · The Quarterly Review of Biology · doi:10.1086/517857 · Cited by 325
Johnson, D. D. P. (2005) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-005-1017-0 · Cited by 323
Exploiting a cognitive bias promotes cooperation in social dilemma experiments
Wang, Z., Jusup, M., Shi, L., Lee, J.-H., Iwasa, Y., & Boccaletti, S. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-05259-5 · Cited by 318
Mean Gods Make Good People: Different Views of God Predict Cheating Behavior
Shariff, A. F., & Norenzayan, A. (2011) · International Journal for the Psychology of Religion · doi:10.1080/10508619.2011.556990 · Cited by 318
Cooperation and contagion in web-based, networked public goods experiments
Suri, S., & Watts, D. J. (2011) · ACM SIGecom Exchanges · doi:10.1145/1998549.1998550 · Cited by 318
“We emphasize that unlike other known strategies for stimulating cooperation, such as allowing punishment [5] or reward [8], or Figure 9.”
MethodThe essential role of ritual in the transmission and reinforcement of social norms.
Rossano, M. J. (2012) · Psychological Bulletin · doi:10.1037/a0027038 · Cited by 315
Evolutionary games and population dynamics: maintenance of cooperation in public goods games
Hauert, C., Holmes, M., & Doebeli, M. (2006) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2006.3600 · Cited by 307
“…this includes repeated interactions and direct reciprocity (Trivers 1971; Axelrod & Hamilton 1981), punishment (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; Fehr & Gächter 2002), spatially structured populations (Nowak & May 1992; Hauert & Doebeli 2004) or voluntary participation in social interactions…”
BackgroundJustice at Work and Reduced Risk of Coronary Heart Disease Among Employees: The Whitehall II Study
Kivimäki, M., Ferrie, J. E., Brunner, E., Head, J., Shipley, M. J., Vahtera, J., & Marmot, M. G. (2005) · Archives of Internal Medicine · doi:10.1001/archinte.165.19.2245 · Cited by 313
“The following items were included: (1) Do you ever get criticized unfairly (reverse scored)? (2) Do you get consistent information from line management (your superior)? (3) Do you get sufficient information from line management (your superior)? (4) How often is your superior willing to listen to your problems? and (5)…”
BackgroundResultA field study on cooperativeness and impatience in the Tragedy of the Commons
Fehr, E., & Leibbrandt, A. (2011) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.05.013 · Cited by 313
Self-citationHow is human cooperation different?
Melis, A. P., & Semmann, D. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0157 · Cited by 311
“But the control mechanisms mentioned earlier, reputation, punishment and ostracism, can change the outcome of CAPs towards high cooperation (Fehr & Gächter 2002; Milinski et al. 2002b; see also Gächter et al. 2010).”
BackgroundFree Will and Punishment: A Mechanistic View of Human Nature Reduces Retribution
Shariff, A. F., Greene, J. D., Karremans, J. C., Luguri, J. B., Clark, C. J., Schooler, J. W., Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (2014) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797614534693 · Cited by 311
“Indeed, the presence of norms ensuring the punishment of transgressors is essential for group cohesion (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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