Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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Citations
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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