Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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Capraro, V., & Perc, M. (2018) · Frontiers in Physics · doi:10.3389/fphy.2018.00107 · Cited by 167
Sustainable institutionalized punishment requires elimination of second-order free-riders
Perc, M. (2012) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep00344 · Cited by 166
“The provisioning of social benefits or the preservation of environmental resources relies on selfless contributions and collaborative efforts [1–4].”
BackgroundThe evolution of punishment through reputation
Santos, M. D., Rankin, D. J., & Wedekind, C. (2011) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2010.1275 · Cited by 166
A cue of kinship promotes cooperation for the public good
KRUPP, D., DEBRUINE, L., & BARCLAY, P. (2008) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2007.08.002 · Cited by 166
“Strides have been made in recent years (e.g., Barclay, 2006; DeBruine, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Haley & Fessler, 2005; Henrich et al., 2005; Kiyonari, Tanida, & Yamagishi, 2000; Kurzban, DeScioli, & O'Brien, 2007; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002), and we expect…”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialMoral torch fishing: A signaling theory of blame
Shoemaker, D., & Vargas, M. (2021) · Noûs · doi:10.1111/nous.12316 · Cited by 165
The False Allure of Group Selection
Pinker, S. (2015) · The Handbook of Evolutionary Psychology · doi:10.1002/9781119125563.evpsych236 · Cited by 117
Replicator dynamics of reward & reputation in public goods games
Hauert, C. (2010) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2010.08.009 · Cited by 165
“Over recent years, altruistic punishment as an efficient way to encourage and stabilize cooperation has attracted considerable attention from theorists as well as experimentalists (Clutton-Brock and Parker, 1995; Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Hauert et al., 2007; Sigmund, 2007; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2006; Gürerk et al.,…”
BackgroundLotz, S., Okimoto, T. G., Schlösser, T., & Fetchenhauer, D. (2011) · Journal of Experimental Social Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2010.10.004 · Cited by 165
The Pleistocene Social Contract: Culture and Cooperation in Human Evolution
Sterelny, K. (2021) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197531389.001.0001 · Cited by 164
Distinguishing four fundamental approaches to the evolution of helping
BSHARY, R., & BERGMÜLLER, R. (2008) · Journal of Evolutionary Biology · doi:10.1111/j.1420-9101.2007.01482.x · Cited by 164
“Differences in cognitive abilities are often used as argument why humans should be able to cooperate with unrelated individuals on a scale that is apparently unmatched in other animals (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Gintis et al., 2003).”
BackgroundInfluentialInteroception Drives Increased Rational Decision-Making in Meditators Playing the Ultimatum Game
Kirk, U., Downar, J., & Montague, P. R. (2011) · Frontiers in Neuroscience · doi:10.3389/fnins.2011.00049 · Cited by 164
“a cooperative social environment (Fehr and Gachter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004).”
BackgroundConflict, sticks and carrots: war increases prosocial punishments and rewards
Gneezy, A., & Fessler, D. M. T. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2011.0805 · Cited by 162
Natural disasters and indicators of social cohesion
Calo-Blanco, A., Kovářík, J., Mengel, F., & Romero, J. G. (2017) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0176885 · Cited by 163
Kogan, A., Oveis, C., Carr, E. W., Gruber, J., Mauss, I. B., Shallcross, A., Impett, E. A., van der Lowe, I., Hui, B., Cheng, C., et al. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0037509 · Cited by 162
An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons
Traulsen, A., Röhl, T., & Milinski, M. (2012) · Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rspb.2012.0937 · Cited by 162
The Revolution in Welfare Economics and Its Implications for Environmental Valuation and Policy
Gowdy, J. M. (2004) · Land Economics · doi:10.2307/3654741 · Cited by 162
“Results from game theory and behavioral economics show that people act to affect the well-being of others, positively or negatively, even at significant cost to themselves (Fehr and Gächter 2002).”
BackgroundDisgust selectively modulates reciprocal fairness in economic interactions.
Moretti, L., & di Pellegrino, G. (2010) · Emotion · doi:10.1037/a0017826 · Cited by 161
Punishers Benefit From Third-Party Punishment in Fish
Raihani, N. J., Grutter, A. S., & Bshary, R. (2010) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1183068 · Cited by 159
Raihani, N., & Bshary, R. (2015) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2014.12.003 · Cited by 182
“Humans are apparently willing to engage in costly punishment of others and derive subjective pleasure from doing so [4, 5].”
BackgroundReputation, a universal currency for human social interactions
Milinski, M. (2016) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0100 · Cited by 159
Wilson, D. S., Van Vugt, M., & O'Gorman, R. (2008) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-8721.2008.00538.x · Cited by 160
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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