Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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“Players received randomly assigned sums (distributed as in the Fehr–Ga¨chter experiment [ 4 ]) and then could inflict costly ‘punishment’ just as before, except that they were fully aware that their coplayers had done nothing wrong.”
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“Moreover, as Kahneman et al. (1986), Turillo et al. (2002), and Fehr and Gachter (2002) showed, people readily punish partners whom they believe did not make a fair offer to unknown others.”
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“; (4) Some fraction of people altruistically punish defectors for the good of the group (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2003), and this trait is propagated by group selection (however, this requires that humans are genuinely altruistic, a claim that is problematic for a number of…”
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“In treatments with punishment, subjects can punish each other as in Fehr and Gächter (2002). In these treatments, the contribution stage is followed by a punishment stage in which each subject i simultaneously decides how many punishment points, pij ∈ [0, 10], to assign to each subject j 6= i in the group.”
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“Up to now, however, the interest of researchers has been mostly in investigating negative emotions associated with the detection of cheaters (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
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“In comparison to peer (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Semmann et al., 2003; de Quervain et al., 2004; Fowler, 2005; Hauert et al., 2007; Gächter et al., 2008; Ohtsuki et al., 2009; Rockenbach and Milinski, 2009; Deng et al., 2012; Vukov et al., 2013) and pool punishment (Sigmund et al., 2010; Szolnoki…”
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“Fehr and colleagues (Fehr and Ga¨chter 2000, 2002; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) go further, suggesting that metanorms are also rooted in strong emotional reactions that drive cooperators as well as mere observers to punish noncooperators, even at a net cost and without the promise People may also…”
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BackgroundInfluentialMore ‘altruistic’ punishment in larger societies
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“trust, culture, punishment, cooperation, social capital, meta-analysis Indeed, in two seminal articles, Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002) developed a public good paradigm that demonstrated that the use of punishment could effectively increase contributions to public goods.”
BackgroundMethodInfluentialInferring Reputation Promotes the Evolution of Cooperation in Spatial Social Dilemma Games
Wang, Z., Wang, L., Yin, Z.-Y., & Xia, C.-Y. (2012) · PLoS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0040218 · Cited by 223
“Typical examples include kin selection [37], direct and indirect reciprocity [25,38– 40], differences in evolutionary time scales [41], the potential influence of noise [42,43], group selection [44], altruistic punishment [45,46], effective strategies [47–50] such as the titfor-tat or win-stay-lose-shift, and spatiall…”
BackgroundStochastic Evolutionary Game Dynamics
Traulsen, A., & Hauert, C. (2009) · Reviews of Nonlinear Dynamics and Complexity · doi:10.1002/9783527628001.ch2 · Cited by 220
Atkinson, Q. D., & Bourrat, P. (2011) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2010.07.008 · Cited by 225
“Economic games under anonymous laboratory conditions have revealed that humans are willing to pay a cost to punish free riders (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003) or reward cooperators (Rand, Dreber, Ellingsen, Fudenberg, & Nowak, 2009), but it is not clear to what extent…”
BackgroundLanguage Acquisition Meets Language Evolution
Chater, N., & Christiansen, M. H. (2010) · Cognitive Science · doi:10.1111/j.1551-6709.2009.01049.x · Cited by 221
“…(de Ruiter & Levinson, 2008), social aspects of the emotions (Frank, 1988), basic principles of cooperation, reciprocation, and punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Olson & Spelke, 2008) Language, including syntax, phonology, word learning, and semantics (Smith, this issue), linguistic…”
BackgroundEvolutionary game theory using agent-based methods
Adami, C., Schossau, J., & Hintze, A. (2016) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2016.08.015 · Cited by 221
Evolving the Psychological Mechanisms for Cooperation
Stevens, J. R., Cushman, F. A., & Hauser, M. D. (2005) · Annual Review of Ecology, Evolution, and Systematics · doi:10.1146/annurev.ecolsys.36.113004.083814 · Cited by 222
“In summary, although ample evidence of cooperation exists in the animal kingdom, reciprocity and punishment rarely occur in animals, especially when contrasted with humans (Fehr & Gächter 2002, Ostrom & Walker 2003).”
BackgroundCooperation and Punishment, Especially in Humans
Gardner, A., & West, S. A. (2004) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/425623 · Cited by 220
Leadership solves collective action problems in small-scale societies
Glowacki, L., & von Rueden, C. (2015) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2015.0010 · Cited by 220
“These mechanisms include reciprocity [18], punitive sanctions [19–21], private incentives [22,23] and asymmetric benefits [6,7], among others.”
Fehr, E. (2004) · Nature · doi:10.1038/432449a · Cited by 219
Self-citationTo Detect and Correct: Norm Violations and Their Enforcement
Montague, P. R., & Lohrenz, T. (2007) · Neuron · doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2007.09.020 · Cited by 218
“Alternatively, an individual can also be coerced through signals from other agents like institutions or individuals around them (Fehr and Gachter, 2002).”
BackgroundFree to punish: A motivated account of free will belief.
Clark, C. J., Luguri, J. B., Ditto, P. H., Knobe, J., Shariff, A. F., & Baumeister, R. F. (2014) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/a0035880 · Cited by 204
Punishment and spite, the dark side of cooperation
Jensen, K. (2010) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2010.0146 · Cited by 215
Perceptions of the appropriate response to norm violation in 57 societies
Eriksson, K., Strimling, P., Gelfand, M., Wu, J., Abernathy, J., Akotia, C. S., Aldashev, A., Andersson, P. A., Andrighetto, G., Anum, A., et al. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-21602-9 · Cited by 216
Kinship and altruism: A cross‐cultural experimental study
Madsen, E. A., Tunney, R. J., Fieldman, G., Plotkin, H. C., Dunbar, R. I. M., Richardson, J., & McFarland, D. (2007) · British Journal of Psychology · doi:10.1348/000712606x129213 · Cited by 216
“…in ‘altruistic punishment’ (punishment that incurs a benefit to the community as a whole, but at a cost to the punishing individual: Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr, Fischbacher, & Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr & Ga¨chter, 2000, 2002; Gintis, Bowles, Boyd, & Fehr, 2003; Orstrom, Gardner, & Walker, 1994).”
BackgroundResultThe role of physical formidability in human social status allocation.
Lukaszewski, A. W., Simmons, Z. L., Anderson, C., & Roney, J. R. (2016) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000042 · Cited by 216
“…and rule violators, whose existence can disincentivize individual contribution and disfavor cooperation (Boyd & Richerson, 1992; Delton et al., 2012; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Hooper et al., 2010; Krasnow et al., 2015; Panchanathan & Boyd, 2004; Price et al., 2002; Willer, 2009; Yamagishi, 1986).”
BackgroundThe Origin of Politics: An Evolutionary Theory of Political Behavior
Alford, J. R., & Hibbing, J. R. (2004) · Perspectives on Politics · doi:10.1017/s1537592704040460 · Cited by 215
“28 See Maynard Smith 1982; Axelrod 1984; Brewer 2000; Hammond 2000; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Rauch 2002.”
BackgroundFeng, C., Luo, Y., & Krueger, F. (2015) · Human Brain Mapping · doi:10.1002/hbm.22649 · Cited by 212
“Humans comply with social norms (e.g., equity and fairness pertaining to resource distribution) and they are willing to punish norm violators at the expense of personal costs [Fehr and Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr and G€achter, 2002].”
BackgroundThe Power of Reciprocity: Fairness, Reciprocity, and Stakes in Variants of the Dictator Game
Diekmann, A. (2004) · Journal of Conflict Resolution · doi:10.1177/0022002704265948 · Cited by 211
Leadership in an Egalitarian Society
von Rueden, C., Gurven, M., Kaplan, H., & Stieglitz, J. (2014) · Human Nature · doi:10.1007/s12110-014-9213-4 · Cited by 209
“Solutions to free-rider problems include punishment of defectors (Fehr and Gächter 2002; Ostrom et al. 1992; Yamagishi 1986) and/or rewarding of high contributors (Rand et al. 2009).”
The Ethical Dangers of Deliberative Decision Making
Zhong, C.-B. (2011) · Administrative Science Quarterly · doi:10.2189/asqu.2011.56.1.001 · Cited by 209
“This is consistent with previous research showing that anger toward defectors in a social dilemma game motivated people to punish the defectors even though the punisher had to sacrifice his or her self-gain in doing so (Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
ResultFirst carrot, then stick: how the adaptive hybridization of incentives promotes cooperation
Chen, X., Sasaki, T., Brännström, Å., & Dieckmann, U. (2015) · Journal of The Royal Society Interface · doi:10.1098/rsif.2014.0935 · Cited by 210
“…the challenges of implementing positive and negative incentives are separately well known [2,3] and weight has traditionally been given to peer-to-peer punishment [6–8], no study to date has established how such incentives should best be combined at an institutional level to promote cooperation.”
Young children attribute normativity to novel actions without pedagogy or normative language
Schmidt, M. F. H., Rakoczy, H., & Tomasello, M. (2011) · Developmental Science · doi:10.1111/j.1467-7687.2010.01000.x · Cited by 210
Kroneberg, C., & Kalter, F. (2012) · Annual Review of Sociology · doi:10.1146/annurev-soc-071811-145441 · Cited by 210
Social exclusion and punishment of excluders: Neural correlates and developmental trajectories
Gunther Moor, B., Güroğlu, B., Op de Macks, Z. A., Rombouts, S. A. R. B., Van der Molen, M. W., & Crone, E. A. (2012) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.07.028 · Cited by 207
“It should be noted that the current study does not provide an answer to the question whether participants would be willing to punish the excluders to their own cost (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
Heritability of ultimatum game responder behavior
Wallace, B., Cesarini, D., Lichtenstein, P., & Johannesson, M. (2007) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0706642104 · Cited by 209
Theory of mind enhances preference for fairness
Takagishi, H., Kameshima, S., Schug, J., Koizumi, M., & Yamagishi, T. (2010) · Journal of Experimental Child Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.jecp.2009.09.005 · Cited by 208
“…of others (anticipating others’ social preferences), since punishments constitute an incentive only when the potential targets are able to anticipate how others will react to their behaviors and respond accordingly (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Spitzer, Fischbacher, Herrnberger, Grön, & Fehr, 2007).”
BackgroundBergmüller, R., & Taborsky, M. (2005) · Animal Behaviour · doi:10.1016/j.anbehav.2004.05.009 · Cited by 208
“Although solutions to the question of when punishment should occur have been modelled recently (Kokko et al. 2002; Hamilton 2004), empirical studies addressing this issue in animal societies are scarce (Clutton-Brock & Parker 1995; but see Fehr & Gächter 2002 for an example in humans).”
BackgroundReappraising the Ultimatum: an fMRI Study of Emotion Regulation and Decision Making
Grecucci, A., Giorgetta, C., van't Wout, M., Bonini, N., & Sanfey, A. G. (2013) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhs028 · Cited by 207
“Consistent with previous studies (Pillutla and Murnighan 1996; Fehr and Gächter 2002; Camerer 2003; Xiao and Houser 2005), postscanning debriefing demonstrated that anger was the primary emotion elicited by the unfair proposals.”
Punishing and abstaining for public goods
Brandt, H., Hauert, C., & Sigmund, K. (2006) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.0507229103 · Cited by 204
No third-party punishment in chimpanzees
Riedl, K., Jensen, K., Call, J., & Tomasello, M. (2012) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1203179109 · Cited by 204
“Secondparty punishment may be moralistic aggression (43) and it might result in altruistic punishment (44), such that others benefit, but it is difficult to ascertain the motives (goals) and motivations (emotional drives) of the punisher in dyadic encounters.”
BackgroundThe puzzle of human cooperation
Johnson, D. D. P., Stopka, P., & Knights, S. (2003) · Nature · doi:10.1038/421911b · Cited by 203
Altruism in insect societies and beyond: voluntary or enforced?
RATNIEKS, F., & WENSELEERS, T. (2008) · Trends in Ecology & Evolution · doi:10.1016/j.tree.2007.09.013 · Cited by 204
“In an experimental setting, the presence of punishment increased levels of cooperation [ 67 ].”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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