Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
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“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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BackgroundHilbig, B. E., Zettler, I., & Heydasch, T. (2011) · European Journal of Personality · doi:10.1002/per.830 · Cited by 154
“Determinants of free riding versus cooperation One of the most consistently replicated determinants of PGG contributions is the presence versus absence of sanctions or punishment (Fehr & Gächter, 2000, 2002).”
BackgroundMethodCaliendo, M., Fossen, F. M., & Kritikos, A. S. (2011) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2011.01.005 · Cited by 181
Stouten, J., Cremer, D. D., & van Dijk, E. (2006) · Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin · doi:10.1177/0146167206287538 · Cited by 141
“Punishing a group member is a known strategy to increase cooperation (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2002; McCusker & Carnevale, 1995; Yamagishi, 1986).”
Backgroundvan Doorn, J., Zeelenberg, M., & Breugelmans, S. M. (2014) · Emotion Review · doi:10.1177/1754073914523794 · Cited by 133
“For example, anger has been proposed to be the proximate mechanism underlying third-party punishment (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Nelissen & Zeelenberg, 2009).”
BackgroundFrom inconsistency to hypocrisy: When does “saying one thing but doing another” invite condemnation?
Effron, D. A., O'Connor, K. S., Leroy, H., & Lucas, B. J. (2018) · Research in Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.riob.2018.10.003 · Cited by 161
“It also resembles free riding – seeking to enjoy a benefit without paying the cost – which people are highly motivated to detect and punish (see Cosmides, 1989; Cosmides & Tooby, 2013; Delton, Cosmides, Guemo, Robertson, & Tooby, 2012; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand, 2017).”
BackgroundThe Role of Compassion in Altruistic Helping and Punishment Behavior
Weng, H. Y., Fox, A. S., Hessenthaler, H. C., Stodola, D. E., & Davidson, R. J. (2015) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0143794 · Cited by 132
“Typically, emotions such as empathy and compassion have been studied as antecedents of helping behavior [4,5,25], and negative emotions such as anger and annoyance has been studied as antecedents of punishment behavior [18,19].”
InfluentialWeibull, J. W. (2004) · Palgrave Macmillan UK eBooks · doi:10.1057/9780230523371_6 · Cited by 131
“EB [a] = G · (1 + λ) (y − x− yq) y − x+ (100− y) q − λθ̄ ̧ , (13)”
BackgroundBeyond Good and Evil: What Motivations Underlie Children’s Prosocial Behavior?
Martin, A., & Olson, K. R. (2015) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/1745691615568998 · Cited by 163
“Adults are selectively prosocial depending on how others have treated not only themselves but also third parties (Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Krebs, 2008; Milinski, Semmann, & Krambeck, 2002a, 2002b), demonstrating a at Harvard Libraries on April 8, 2015pps.sagepub.comDownloaded from concern with…”
BackgroundIndirect Punishment and Generosity Toward Strangers
Ule, A., Schram, A., Riedl, A., & Cason, T. N. (2009) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.1178883 · Cited by 132
Collective Action in Action: Prosocial Behavior in and out of the Laboratory
GURVEN, M., & WINKING, J. (2008) · American Anthropologist · doi:10.1111/j.1548-1433.2008.00024.x · Cited by 130
“10 This conclusion is consistent with the observation that social institutions sometimes make it too costly for cooperators to cooperate or conversely for defectors to not cooperate (Fehr and Gächter 2002).”
BackgroundResultFor Members Only: Ingroup Punishment of Fairness Norm Violations in the Ultimatum Game
Mendoza, S. A., Lane, S. P., & Amodio, D. M. (2014) · Social Psychological and Personality Science · doi:10.1177/1948550614527115 · Cited by 155
“This should be particularly true within intragroup negotiations where adherence to fairness/ cooperation norms is vital to the collective’s prosperity (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011; Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Tajfel et al., 1971).”
BackgroundWinning a competition predicts dishonest behavior
Schurr, A., & Ritov, I. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1515102113 · Cited by 138
“Indeed, the literature offers important insights regarding the propensity of contestants to behave in prosocial or asocial manners before and during competitions (1, 2).”
BackgroundPunishment: one tool, many uses
Raihani, N., & Bshary, R. (2019) · Evolutionary Human Sciences · doi:10.1017/ehs.2019.12 · Cited by 157
“These laboratory games have emphasised people’s willingness to punish others for transgressions (Fehr and Gächter 2000, 2002a; Yamagishi 1986), including when they were not the victim (‘third-party punishment’; Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).”
BackgroundInfluentialFoss, N. J. (2009) · European Management Review · doi:10.1057/emr.2009.2 · Cited by 159
“…in evolutionary psychology that the cognitive and motivational apparatus of human beings is adapted to deal with the subtleties of the coordination of intelligent effort of many individuals for a common goal, but that behaving in solidary ways is by no means guaranteed (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundRicherson, P., & Henrich, J. (2012) · Cliodynamics: The Journal of Quantitative History and Cultural Evolution · doi:10.21237/c7clio3112453 · Cited by 131
Social Learning and Norms in a Public Goods Experiment with Inter-Generational Advice1
CHAUDHURI, A., GRAZIANO, S., & MAITRA, P. (2006) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2006.0379.x · Cited by 131
“Fehr and Gächter (2000, 2002), Gächter, Hermann and Thöni (2003), and Masclet, Noussair, Tucker and Villeval (2003) show that conditional cooperators are willing to punish non-cooperators even if such punishment has pecuniary costs.”
Kerschbamer, R. (2015) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2015.01.008 · Cited by 170
“A second – related – critique is that a list of archetypes similar to the one presented in Table 1 could also be obtained by working off the possible sign combinations of the two parameters in the piecewise linear model originally introduced by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) as a description of self-centred inequality aversi…”
BackgroundExperiencing a Natural Disaster Alters Children’s Altruistic Giving
Li, Y., Li, H., Decety, J., & Lee, K. (2013) · Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0956797613479975 · Cited by 154
“Humans are strongly inclined to act altruistically (Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Fehr & Gächter, 2002; Warneken & Tomasello, 2006, 2009).”
BackgroundDo ‘watching eyes’ influence antisocial behavior? A systematic review & meta-analysis
Dear, K., Dutton, K., & Fox, E. (2019) · Evolution and Human Behavior · doi:10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2019.01.006 · Cited by 166
Human large-scale cooperation as a product of competition between cultural groups
Handley, C., & Mathew, S. (2020) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-020-14416-8 · Cited by 129
The Normalization of the Radical Right: A Norms Theory of Political Supply and Demand
Valentim, V. (2024) · doi:10.1093/9780198926740.001.0001 · Cited by 172
Simple Heuristics in a Social World
(2012) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195388435.001.0001 · Cited by 113
The effects of induced emotions on pro-social behaviour
Drouvelis, M., & Grosskopf, B. (2016) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2015.12.012 · Cited by 163
An investment game with third-party intervention
Charness, G., Cobo‐Reyes, R., & Jiménez, N. (2008) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/j.jebo.2008.02.006 · Cited by 182
“Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) show that third-party sanctions are driven by negative emotions and negative fairness judgments towards norms violators. Gintis, Bowles, Boyd and Fehr (2003) and Fehr, Fischbacher and Gächter (2002) give empirical evidence of what they call “strong reciprocity”, the predisposition to cooper…”
BackgroundThe coevolution of altruism and punishment: Role of the selfish punisher
Nakamaru, M., & Iwasa, Y. (2005) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.10.011 · Cited by 145
Liu, L., Chen, X., & Szolnoki, A. (2019) · Mathematical Models and Methods in Applied Sciences · doi:10.1142/s0218202519500428 · Cited by 128
“The former refers to that group individuals can impose fines on the violators directly and its additional cost.(54,46,55) The latter means that players can decide whether to contribute to a punishment pool before contributing to the common pool of the basic game and sanctioning defection is organized centrally.”
BackgroundNational parochialism is ubiquitous across 42 nations around the world
Romano, A., Sutter, M., Liu, J. H.-F., Yamagishi, T., & Balliet, D. P. (2021) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-021-24787-1 · Cited by 148
Self‐interest: defining and understanding a human motive
Cropanzano, R., Goldman, B. M., & Folger, R. G. (2005) · Journal of Organizational Behavior · doi:10.1002/job.353 · Cited by 156
Nonlinear effects of group size on collective action and resource outcomes
Yang, W., Liu, W., Viña, A., Tuanmu, M.-N., He, G., Dietz, T., & Liu, J. (2013) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1301733110 · Cited by 127
The emergence of human prosociality: aligning with others through feelings, concerns, and norms
Jensen, K., Vaish, A., & Schmidt, M. F. H. (2014) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00822 · Cited by 161
“…in terms of contributions to a public good – declines quickly with repeated rounds, but with the addition of a punishment option – which is costly for the punisher but provides a benefit for everyone – cooperation can be sustained at a high level (Fehr and Gächter, 2000, 2002; Gürerk et al., 2006).”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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