Altruistic punishment in humans
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Abstract
Human cooperation is an evolutionary puzzle. Unlike other creatures, people frequently cooperate with genetically unrelated strangers, often in large groups, with people they will never meet again, and when reputation gains are small or absent. These patterns of cooperation cannot be explained by the nepotistic motives associated with the evolutionary theory of kin selection and the selfish motives associated with signalling theory or the theory of reciprocal altruism. Here we show experimentally that the altruistic punishment of defectors is a key motive for the explanation of cooperation. Altruistic punishment means that individuals punish, although the punishment is costly for them and yields no material gain. We show that cooperation flourishes if altruistic punishment is possible, and breaks down if it is ruled out. The evidence indicates that negative emotions towards defectors are the proximate mechanism behind altruistic punishment. These results suggest that future study of the evolution of human cooperation should include a strong focus on explaining altruistic punishment.
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“Given existing work illustrating that people punish norm violators both as a second-party victim or third-party juror 19 , 20 , 33 , we then tested whether an individual’s susceptibility to group influence hinges on whether they are a wronged victim or an unaffected juror (Experiments 3–4).”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
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“Understanding the malleability of punitive preferences is especially important given that punishment of norm violators is a pervasive part of human social life 19 – 21 .”
From Crowdsourcing punishment: Individuals reference group preferences to inform their own punitive decisions (2019) · cites this paper as [20]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“It has been shown that people reward others for cooperative behaviour but punish violations of social fairness even at a personal cost15,16, an effect likely to be mediated by neural mechanisms that provide intrinsic motivation (that is, satisfaction) from punishing violators21.”
From Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others (2006) · cites this paper as [15]
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“The fact that costly punishment plays an undisputed role in other contexts, such as public goods games, ultimatum games and trust games 43-46 , shows that this form of discrimination is highly plausible.”
From Evolution of indirect reciprocity (2005) · cites this paper as [45]
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“which theory and experimentation shows is a more effective means of preserving cooperation than individual-level punishment (Fehr & Gachter, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher 2003)”
From The origins of language in teaching (2017) · cites this paper as Fehr & Gachter, 2002
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Choi, J.-K., & Ahn, T. K. (2013) · Journal of Economic Psychology · doi:10.1016/j.joep.2013.01.001 · Cited by 99
Quality versus quantity of social ties in experimental cooperative networks
Shirado, H., Fu, F., Fowler, J. H., & Christakis, N. A. (2013) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/ncomms3814 · Cited by 89
“Allowing individuals to punish defectors (even when it is costly to the punisher) can promote cooperation 31–36 , but it reduces the payoffs of both parties and can be used against cooperators as well as defectors 37–43 .”
Bruneau, E. G., Dufour, N., & Saxe, R. (2012) · Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences · doi:10.1098/rstb.2011.0293 · Cited by 89
A Comparative Statics Analysis of Punishment in Public-Good ExperimentsPreprint
Nikiforakis, N., & Normann, H. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.747144 · Cited by 89
Punishment and Counter-Punishment in Public Good Games: Can We Still Govern Ourselves?Preprint
Nikiforakis, N. (2005) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.764185 · Cited by 104
“[Fehr and Gaechter (2000)] that punishment alone can force people to cooperate and, though it comes with a cost (i.”
Behavioral Norms: Variants and Their Identification
Anderson, J. E., & Dunning, D. A. (2014) · Social and Personality Psychology Compass · doi:10.1111/spc3.12146 · Cited by 114
“Sanctions have also been demonstrated experimentally: In the public goods game described above, group members will punish free-riders by levying fines, even if doing so costs them money (Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundWhy leaders punish: A power perspective.
Mooijman, M., DIJK, W. W. V., Ellemers, N., & van Dijk, E. (2015) · Journal of Personality and Social Psychology · doi:10.1037/pspi0000021 · Cited by 104
“Previous research has demonstrated that there exists a strong rule (e.g., norm) to cooperate in such dilemma situations (Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004; Fehr & Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundCoordination vs. voluntarism and enforcement in sustaining international environmental cooperation
Barrett, S. A. (2016) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1604989113 · Cited by 109
“People will punish others for violating a norm, even when doing so harms their direct self-interests, provided that the punishments are highly efficient in the sense that they are much more costly to the players on the receiving end than the players who impose them (24).”
BackgroundHumanistic Management: Protecting Dignity and Promoting Well-Being
Pirson, M. A. (2017) · Cited by 98
Reciprocity of social influence
Mahmoodi, A., Bahrami, B., & Mehring, C. (2018) · Nature Communications · doi:10.1038/s41467-018-04925-y · Cited by 85
Reward and punishment in climate change dilemmas
Góis, A. R., Santos, F. P., Pacheco, J. M., & Santos, F. C. (2019) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/s41598-019-52524-8 · Cited by 90
Heyes, C. M. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221112075 · Cited by 120
“…are willing to pay a price to punish norm violators both when the violation reduces the payoff of the pun-isher (costly second-party punishment; Fehr & Gächter, 2002) and when it reduces the payoffs of other players (costly third-party punishment; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2004), that is, when the…”
BackgroundBig Questions in Ecology and Evolution
Sherratt, T. N., & Wilkinson, D. M. (2009) · Oxford University Press eBooks · doi:10.1093/oso/9780199548606.001.0001 · Cited by 104
Inducing Peer Pressure to Promote Cooperation
Mani, A., Rahwan, I., & Pentland, A. (2013) · Scientific Reports · doi:10.1038/srep01735 · Cited by 106
On the Institutional Foundations of Law: The Insufficiency of Custom and Private Ordering
Hodgson, G. M. (2009) · Journal of Economic Issues · doi:10.2753/jei0021-3624430107 · Cited by 112
“See for example Andreoni (1995), Boyd and Richerson (1992), Boyd et al. (2003), De Waal (1996), Fehr and Gächter (2000a; 2000b; 2002), Fehr and Gintis (2007), Gintis (2000), Field (2001), Gintis et al. (2005), Guzmán, Rodriguez-Sicken and Rowthorn ( 2007), Price, Cosmides and Tooby ( 2002) .”
BackgroundAnother Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement
Fuster, A., & Meier, S. (2010) · Management Science · doi:10.1287/mnsc.1090.1081 · Cited by 87
Evolution of cooperation and altruistic punishment when retaliation is possible
Janssen, M. A., & Bushman, C. (2008) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2008.06.017 · Cited by 85
“Laboratory experiments on public goods and common pool resources have shown that participants are willing to give up monetary returns to punish noncooperators (Yamagishi, 1986; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr and Gächter, 2002).”
BackgroundEvolutionary precursors of social norms in chimpanzees: a new approach
von Rohr, C. R., Burkart, J. M., & van Schaik, C. P. (2010) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/s10539-010-9240-4 · Cited by 110
“Notably, negative reactions are not only shown by the victims of a violation, the second parties (Fehr and Gächter 2002), but most importantly also by uninvolved bystanders, the third-parties (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004).”
BackgroundInnovation Commons: The Origin of Economic Growth
Potts, J. (2019) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780190937492.001.0001 · Cited by 159
Schuster, R. H., & Perelberg, A. (2004) · Behavioural Processes · doi:10.1016/j.beproc.2004.03.008 · Cited by 96
“, 1995) and humans (e.g., Baker and Rachlin, 2002a; Colman, 2003; Fehr and Gachter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003; Rapoport and Chammah, 1965).”
BackgroundMethodMa, Y., Wang, C., & Han, S. (2011) · NeuroImage · doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2011.05.003 · Cited by 93
“…uncover different forms of human altruism (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003) such as direct and indirect reciprocal altruism (Boyd et al., 2003; Nowak and Sigmund, 2005), altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; de Quervain et al., 2004), and reputation-based altruism (Milinski et al., 2002).”
BackgroundSinger, T., & Steinbeis, N. (2009) · Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1111/j.1749-6632.2009.04733.x · Cited by 86
Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Gächter, S.
- Affiliations
- University of Zurich (CH)
- University of St.Gallen (CH)
- Corresponding author
- Fehr, Ernst
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 415
- Issue
- 6868
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W2129135549
- Cited by
- 5,616
- References
- 29
- Citations by year
- 2026: 174 · 2025: 246 · 2024: 250 · 2023: 258 · 2022: 238 · 2021: 293 · 2020: 338 · 2019: 270 · 2018: 294 · 2017: 268 · 2016: 249 · 2015: 284 · 2014: 301 · 2013: 262 · 2012: 284
- FWCI
- 459.06
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- www.springer.com/tdm (unspecified)
- Locations
- Nature (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics (submittedVersion)
- Économie publique/Public economics (submittedVersion)
- Alexandria (UniSG) (University of St.Gallen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
- Keywords
- altruistic punishment, human cooperation, evolution of cooperation, costly punishment, defectors, negative emotions, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, signaling theory, reputation
- MeSH terms
- Altruism, Cooperative Behavior, Emotions, Biological Evolution, Female, Games, Experimental, Humans, Male, Punishment
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