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Detrimental effects of sanctions on human altruism
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Rockenbach, B.
- Venue
- Nature
- Published
- 2003-03
- Volume
- 422
- Issue
- 6928
- Pages
- 137-140
- ISSN
- 0028-0836 (ISSN-L)
- 1476-4687
- OpenAlex
- W1518436165
- Cited by
- 795
- References
- 17
- FWCI
- 106.26
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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