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Pay without performance: the unfulfilled promise of executive compensation
Abstract
This book provides a detailed account of how structural flaws in corporate governance have enabled managers to influence their own pay and produced widespread distortions in pay arrangements. The book also examines how these flaws and distortions can best be addressed. Part I of the book (titled The Official View and its Limits) critically examines the arm's length contracting view, which underlies much of the academic research on executive compensation as well as the law's approach to it. We show that boards have not been operating at arm's length from the executives whose pay they set. While recent reforms can improve matters, they cannot be expected to eliminate significant deviations from arm's length contracting. We also show that the constraints imposed by market forces and shareholders' power to intervene are not tight enough to prevent such deviations. Part II of the book (titled Power and Pay) shows how an understanding of the role of managerial power can help explain executive compensation practices. We provide a framework for assessing whether pay arrangements are a product of managerial influence. We discuss managers' interest in camouflaging the amount and the performance-insensitivity of their pay. Applying our framework, we discuss how managerial influence can help explain, among other things, the evidence on the relationship between managerial pay and managerial power; the use of retirement benefits and other compensation arrangements to provide stealth compensation; and the ability of departing managers to obtain more than their contractual entitlement. Part III of the book (titled Decoupling Pay from Performance) examines how managerial influence has operated to reduce the performance-sensitivity of executive pay. Among other things, we examine the structure of non-equity compensation, the design of conventional option plans, the use of restricted stock grants, and managers' freedom to unload options and shares. Part IV of the book (titled Going Forward) discusses how executive compensation - and corporate governance more generally - can be improved. We examine the extent to which pay arrangements can be improved by adopting board process rules, imposing shareholder approval requirements, and making pay more transparent. We conclude that problems with compensation arrangements cannot be fully addressed without ensuring that directors focus on shareholder interests and operate at arm's length from the executives whose compensation they set. To achieve this result, we argue, it is not sufficient to make directors independent of executives as recent reforms has sought to do; it is also necessary to make directors dependent on shareholders by changing the legal arrangements that insulate boards from shareholders.
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Metadata
- Venue
- Choice Reviews Online
- Publisher
- American Library Association
- Published
- 2005-04-01
- Volume
- 42
- Issue
- 08
- Pages
- 42-4735-42-4735
- ISSN
- 0009-4978 (ISSN-L)
- 1523-8253
- OpenAlex
- W3124379587
- Cited by
- 1,936
- References
- 111
- Type
- book review
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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