Misrepresenting consciousness
The DOI matches its Crossref record; 66 of the 72 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.
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Citations
Cites
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Cited by
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R. (2017) · Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences · doi:10.1073/pnas.1619316114 · Cited by 690
The Border Between Seeing and Thinking
Block, N. (2023) · doi:10.1093/oso/9780197622223.001.0001 · Cited by 367
The higher order approach to consciousness is defunct
Block, N. (2011) · Analysis · doi:10.1093/analys/anr037 · Cited by 144
The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness
Stoljar, D. (2016) · Mind · doi:10.1093/mind/fzv179 · Cited by 122
The HOROR theory of phenomenal consciousness
Brown, R. (2015) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/s11098-014-0388-7 · Cited by 83
“3 For instance Weisberg (2011) and Rosenthal (2011) seem to suggest that they are eliminativists about phenomenal consciousness.”
Background
Metadata
- Authors
- Weisberg, J.
- Affiliations
- University of Houston (US)
- Corresponding author
- Weisberg, Josh
- ORCID
- Weisberg, Josh
- Venue
- Philosophical Studies
- Published
- 2010-05-12
- Volume
- 154
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 409-433
- ISSN
- 0031-8116 (ISSN-L)
- 1573-0883
- OpenAlex
- W3189834954
- Cited by
- 83
- References
- 72
- Citations by year
- 2026: 19 · 2025: 1 · 2024: 1 · 2023: 19 · 2022: 6 · 2021: 3 · 2020: 3 · 2019: 12 · 2017: 4 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 3 · 2014: 2 · 2013: 1 · 2012: 2
- FWCI
- 2.51
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- www.springer.com/tdm (tdm)
- Locations
- Philosophical Studies (publishedVersion)
- Funders
- City University of New York
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Epistemology, Ethics, and Metaphysics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Keywords
- intrinsic characterization, phenomenal consciousness, philosophy of mind
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