Evolution of the Social Contract
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Abstract
In this new edition of Evolution of the Social Contract, Brian Skyrms uses evolutionary game theory to analyze the genesis of social contracts and investigates social phenomena including justice, communication, altruism, and bargaining. Featuring new material on evolution and information transfer, and including recent developments in game theory and evolution literature, his book introduces and applies appropriate concepts of equilibrium and evolutionary dynamics, showing how key issues can be modeled as games and considering the ways in which evolution sometimes supports, and sometimes does not support, rational choice. He discusses topics including how bargaining with neighbors promotes sharing of resources, the diversity of behavior in ultimatum bargaining in small societies, the Prisoner's Dilemma, and an investigation into signaling games and the spontaneous emergence of meaningful communication. His book will be of great interest to readers in philosophy of science, social science, evolutionary biology, game and decision theory, and political theory.
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“Theoretical extensions of this approach have argued that purely local interactions taking place on social networks can lead to population-wide, or “global,” coordinated behavior (1, 2, 6, 45).”
From Emergent social conventions and collective bias in LLM populations (2025) · cites this paper as [45]
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Fagen, R. M. (1980) · The American Naturalist · doi:10.1086/283604 · Cited by 62
A Further Test of Noncooperative Bargaining Theory: Reply
Binmore, K., Shaked, A., & Sutton, J. R. (1988) · American Economic Review · Cited by 62
Contractarianism and Rational Choice
Morton, A. (1993) · Philosophical Books · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0149.1993.tb00521.x · Cited by 59
Evolution in the finitely repeated prisoner's dilemma
Nachbar, J. H. (1992) · Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization · doi:10.1016/0167-2681(92)90040-i · Cited by 59
The evolution of altruism: Correlation, cost, and benefit
Sober, E. R. (1992) · Biology & Philosophy · doi:10.1007/bf00129882 · Cited by 59
THE THEORETICAL GENETICS OF THE SEX RATIO
Shaw, R. F. (1958) · Genetics · doi:10.1093/genetics/43.2.149 · Cited by 53
Gauthier, D. (1985) · Social Philosophy and Policy · doi:10.1017/s0265052500003204 · Cited by 48
Harsanyi, J. C. (1982) · Springer eBooks · doi:10.1007/978-94-017-2527-9 · Cited by 44
Common Sense and Nuclear Warfare
Russell, B. (2013) · Routledge eBooks · doi:10.4324/9780203714744 · Cited by 43
Learning and mixed-strategy equilibria in evolutionary games
Crawford, V. P. (1989) · Journal of Theoretical Biology · doi:10.1016/s0022-5193(89)80113-4 · Cited by 43
Skyrms, B. (1992) · Journal of Logic Language and Information · doi:10.1007/bf00171693 · Cited by 36
Self-citationMetatickles and the dynamics of deliberation
Eells, E. (1984) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf00140057 · Cited by 35
Weakly self-ratifying strategies: Comments on McClennen
Gibbard, A. (1992) · Philosophical Studies · doi:10.1007/bf00571325 · Cited by 27
Skyrms, B. (1992) · PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association · doi:10.1086/psaprocbienmeetp.1992.2.192851 · Cited by 27
Self-citationEvolutionary Foundations of Solution Concepts for Finite, Two-Player, Normal-Form Games
Samuelson, L. (1988) · Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge · Cited by 24
Thinking About the Unthinkable in the 1980s, by Herman Kahn
Beres, L. R. (1985) · Political Science Quarterly · doi:10.2307/2150662 · Cited by 24
The primacy of truth-telling and the evolution of lying
Sober, E. R. (1994) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511624940.005 · Cited by 23
Norms, Discussion, and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles
Gibbard, A. (1990) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/293234 · Cited by 20
:Ideal Landscape: Annibale Carracci, Nicolas Poussin and Claude Lorrain
Weil, M. S. (1992) · Sixteenth Century Journal · doi:10.2307/2542087 · Cited by 18
Ratifiability and the Logic of Decision
Skyrms, B. (1990) · Midwest Studies in Philosophy · doi:10.1111/j.1475-4975.1990.tb00204.x · Cited by 17
Self-citationEVOLUTION AND ULTIMATUM BARGAINING
Harms, W. F. (1997) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1023/a:1004919326873 · Cited by 14
Max Und Moritz: Eine Bubengeschichte in Sieben Streichen
Busch, W. (1969) · Cited by 13
Endogenous correlated equilibria in noncooperative games
Vanderschraaf, P. (1995) · Theory and Decision · doi:10.1007/bf01083169 · Cited by 12
Moral Judgment and the Acceptance of Norms
Gibbard, A. (1985) · Ethics · doi:10.1086/292714 · Cited by 10
Deliberational Correlated Equilibria
Vanderschraaf, P., & Skyrms, B. (1993) · Philosophical Topics · doi:10.5840/philtopics19932115 · Cited by 7
Self-citationInductive Learning, Knowledge Asymmetries and Convention
Vanderschraaf, P. (1994) · Elsevier eBooks · doi:10.1016/b978-1-4832-1453-5.50024-6 · Cited by 1
Joravsky, D. (1977) · Science · doi:10.1126/science.197.4300.246 · Cited by 1
(1982)
Cited by
How Children Learn the Meanings of Words
Bloom, P. (2000) · The MIT Press eBooks · doi:10.7551/mitpress/3577.001.0001 · Cited by 1,922
The Grammar of Society: The Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms
Bicchieri, C. (2005) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511616037 · Cited by 1,991
(2002) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.40-1460 · Cited by 1,617
The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social Structure
Skyrms, B. (2003) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9781139165228 · Cited by 1,524
Self-citationFoundations of Social Evolution
Frank, S. A. (1998) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9780691206820 · Cited by 1,299
Metadata
- Authors
- Skyrms, B.
- Affiliations
- University of California, Irvine (US)
- Corresponding author
- Skyrms, Brian
- ORCID
- Skyrms, Brian
- Venue
- Cambridge University Press eBooks
- Publisher
- Cambridge University Press
- Published
- 2014-10-30
- OpenAlex
- W1936969358
- Cited by
- 743
- References
- 196
- Citations by year
- 2026: 4 · 2025: 40 · 2024: 12 · 2023: 10 · 2022: 17 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 21 · 2019: 29 · 2018: 24 · 2017: 33 · 2016: 39 · 2015: 25 · 2014: 44
- FWCI
- 44.75
- Type
- book
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Locations
- Cambridge University Press eBooks (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Evolutionary Game Theory and Cooperation
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › Management Science and Operations Research › Game Theory and Applications
- Social Sciences › Economics, Econometrics and Finance › Economics and Econometrics › Experimental Behavioral Economics Studies
- Keywords
- social contract, evolutionary game theory, justice, communication, altruism, ultimatum game, bargaining, prisoner's dilemma, signaling games, emergence of communication, rational choice, evolution of cooperation, information transmission, evolutionary dynamics
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