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Is the desire for status a fundamental human motive? A review of the empirical literature.

Anderson, Cameron, Hildreth, John Angus D., Howland, Laura · 2015 · Psychological Bulletin

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 277 of the 278 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

The current review evaluates the status hypothesis, which states that that the desire for status is a fundamental motive. Status is defined as the respect, admiration, and voluntary deference individuals are afforded by others. It is distinct from related constructs such as power, financial success, and social belongingness. A review of diverse literatures lent support to the status hypothesis: People's subjective well-being, self-esteem, and mental and physical health appear to depend on the level of status they are accorded by others. People engage in a wide range of goal-directed activities to manage their status, aided by myriad cognitive, behavioral, and affective processes; for example, they vigilantly monitor the status dynamics in their social environment, strive to appear socially valuable, prefer and select social environments that offer them higher status, and react strongly when their status is threatened. The desire for status also does not appear to be a mere derivative of the need to belong, as some theorists have speculated. Finally, the importance of status was observed across individuals who differed in culture, gender, age, and personality, supporting the universality of the status motive. Therefore, taken as a whole, the relevant evidence suggests that the desire for status is indeed fundamental.

Overview

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Registry

Crossref · 10.1037/a0038781

Cites

277 of 277 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

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Citations

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Metadata

Authors
Anderson, C., Hildreth, J. A. D., & Howland, L.
Affiliations
University of California, Berkeley (US)
Venue
Psychological Bulletin
Published
2015-05
Volume
141
Issue
3
Pages
574-601
ISSN
  • 0033-2909 (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1455
OpenAlex
W2134133655
Cited by
1,133
References
278
Citations by year
2026: 113 · 2025: 130 · 2024: 117 · 2023: 145 · 2022: 140 · 2021: 104 · 2020: 98 · 2019: 102 · 2018: 96 · 2017: 44 · 2016: 34 · 2015: 6
FWCI
198.60
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Bulletin (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Sociology and Political Science › Social Power and Status Dynamics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Death Anxiety and Social Exclusion
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Evolutionary Psychology and Human Behavior
Keywords
status motives, social status, subjective well-being, self-esteem, social values, need to belong, status threat, cross-cultural comparison
MeSH terms
Group Processes, Humans, Interpersonal Relations, Models, Psychological, Motivation, Self Concept, Social Behavior, Social Dominance, Socioeconomic Factors

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.