Conscious Processing and the Global Neuronal Workspace Hypothesis

In the paper

“In humans, the so-called concept cells in the anterior temporal lobe, which fire after 300 to 400 ms to specific pictures and words such as “Bill Clinton” or “the World Trade Center,” do so with stronger and longer-lasting firing rates when the corresponding stimulus is consciously perceived”

What the sources say

• Disputed

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

  cites Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Disputed

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

  cites Kreiman et al., 2002 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Disputed

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 1 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  Checked by a reasoning model — may be wrong.

  cites Quiroga et al., 2008 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The difference, however, is that subliminal stimuli do not evoke a sudden ignition but rather a slowing, decaying wave of activity.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites King et al., 2016 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Soto and Silvanto, 2014 source
• Supported

  The Results section on conscious perception identifies a sudden increase in activity (‘ignition’) on seen trials. The Discussion describes unseen trials as showing transient non-conscious activity and an initial period of activity with slowly decaying amplitude, supporting the citing sentence’s contrast. The paper does not use the word ‘wave,’ but the substantive distinction is consistent with its account. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites Trübutschek et al., 2017 source

In the paper

“The simulations showed that, if feedforward connections are carefully balanced by local inhibitory influences, incoming stimuli elicit a stable cascade of activity characterized by a late and sudden ignition.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Joglekar et al., 2018 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Dehaene et al., 2003 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The latency for conscious access can in fact be delayed by much more than 300 ms when attention is temporarily distracted by a secondary task (dual-task conditions)”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Marti et al., 2012, 2015
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Sergent et al., 2013 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Thibault et al., 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“In this framework, ignition is seen as a sudden, high-speed divergence of the trajectories on trials reported as consciously perceived, generating a series of metastable activity states”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Baria et al., 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites He, 2018
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites King et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“The GNW proposes that, in the conscious state, a non-linear network ignition associated with recurrent processing amplifies and sustains a neural representation, allowing the corresponding information to be globally accessed by local processors.”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Theoretical Premises describes sudden, all-or-none activation of a globally interconnected workspace, and Computer Simulation describes mutually reinforcing connections that sustain activity and amplify processor responses. These support much of the paraphrase, though the paper does not call the process “network ignition.” Its Conclusions explicitly limit the model to features of effortful tasks rather than an exhaustive account of conscious processing, so the claim's generalization to the conscious state goes beyond this source. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  cites Dehaene et al., 1998 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The first 200 ms of brain activity, corresponding to early perceptual processing, can be fully preserved on trials without conscious perception, particularly under inattention conditions”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Marti and Dehaene, 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Marti et al., 2015 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Sergent et al., 2005 source

In the paper

“simulations show that the GNW is subject to a continuous stream of stochastic spontaneous activity”

• Also stated in: § Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis of the GNW Theory · plain

  “This property of the model fits with the constant variations in fMRI and electroencephalogram (EEG) functional connectivity that are observed in the awake resting brain and that vanish during anesthesia or in patients with disorders of consciousness”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2005 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Barttfeld et al., 2015 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Demertzi et al., 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“GNW neurons, lying at the top of a deep feedforward network, provide a compressed, high-level symbolic model of an aspect of the external world; top-down signals broadcast the predictions that this model makes to lower-level areas; and bottom-up signals convey sensory signals and may either amplify the signals predicted by top-down input”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Keller and Mrsic-Flogel, 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Kersten et al., 2004 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rao and Ballard, 1999 source

In the paper

“This proposal received support but also criticism, because an earlier negative event (variably called N2, N3, or even “visual awareness negativity” [VAN]) peaking at ∼260 ms and with a total duration of ∼200 ms is also often observed when contrasting conscious to unconscious stimuli”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Eklund and Wiens, 2018 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010 source

In the paper

“These investigations reported the existence of a sudden divergence in brain activity, around 200 to 300 ms after stimulus onset, between trials with or without conscious perception, with an intense propagation of additional activity, particularly toward the prefrontal and parietal cortex, on conscious trials”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Section V identifies sudden, all-or-none ignition of prefronto-parietal networks as a measure of conscious access, supporting the reported divergence and propagation. Section IV places global ignition around 200–300 ms, but also says its timing may vary with the experimental paradigm; Section II reports a 300–500 ms window in one study. The claim’s ‘regardless of stimulus modality or paradigm’ qualification is therefore not supported. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Addition of layer-specific connectivity in simulations (Mejias et al., 2016) leads to the emergence of frequency-band-specific patterns of causality (bottom-up gamma arising primarily in supragranular layers versus top-down alpha-beta arising primarily from bottom layers)”

What the sources say

• Supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Mejias et al., 2016 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Bastos et al., 2015 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Michalareas et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“Ignition may be triggered by an external stimulus, as part of a cognitive task, or it may occur spontaneously and stochastically at rest.”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Results sections “Spontaneous Ignition” and “Extinction of External Stimuli by Spontaneous Ignition” describe both stimulus-evoked ignition and ignition without external stimulation; the former also says spontaneous ignitions can visit assemblies in random order. The copy does not establish the separate claim that ignition is triggered as part of a cognitive task. It also describes the simulation as deterministic, so “stochastically” should be understood as describing its observed variability rather than a random simulation mechanism. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2005 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“This framework predicts that, while some signals within modular pathways may persist under non-conscious conditions, global top-down signals related to the content of working memory depend on the availability of a conscious model.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bekinschtein et al., 2009 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Chao et al., 2018 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Charles et al., 2013 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“the GNW is not a localizationist theory of conscious access, nor is conscious access posited to exist solely in a given node of the GNW”

• Also stated in: § Central Tenets and Neuroanatomical Basis of the GNW Theory · plain

  “Rather, the GNW acts as a distributed “router” associated with millions of neurons distributed in many brain regions through which information can be amplified, sustained, and made available to specialized sensory processors and thalamocortical loops.”

What the sources say

• ?Could not verify

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 2 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Boly et al., 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Odegaard et al., 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“In a second stage, assumed to be mediated by the slower NMDA-mediated feedback connections, the advancing feedfor-ward wave amplified its own inputs in a cascading manner, quickly leading the whole stimulus-relevant network into a global, self-sustained, reverberating, or ignited state.”

• Also stated in: § Simulations of the Global Workspace · plain

  “This ignition was characterized by an increased power of local corticothalamic oscillations in the gamma band and their synchrony across areas (Dehaene et al., 2003).”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2005 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Dehaene et al., 2003 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Irrespective of the precise interpretation of these experiments, the final result of attentional selection enters consciousness, where it can use the GNW to activate all features that belong to the same object even if they are represented in different cortical areas (Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011), allowing conscious perception to be occupied by coherent, multifeature, and multimodal objects (”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Roelfsema and Houtkamp, 2011 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Such recurrent circuits permit ignition and persistent neuronal firing and can either be built from local cortical circuits or include neurons in different cortical areas (Wang, 2001).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Wang, 2001 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Self et al., 2013 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites van Kerkoerle et al., 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“For example, if subjects learn an ordered list of concepts, neurons in the medial temporal lobe start to activate if they are tuned to an upcoming item in the list (Reddy et al., 2015) and similar “prospective coding” effects have been observed in the frontal cortex of monkeys (Rainer et al., 1999).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Abstract reports that participants learned an ordered image sequence and that MTL neurons began firing in anticipation of their preferred image. The Results (‘Learning procedure and behaviour’) confirm that subjects learned the order of the images. The monkey frontal-cortex finding is attached to a different citation, not Reddy et al. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites Reddy et al., 2015 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Rainer et al., 1999 source

In the paper

“The van Vugt et al. (2018) results revealed that a minimum amount of activity needs to reach PFC before it elicits ignition, thereby establishing a relationship between the GNW and the classic signal detection theory (SDT)”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites van Vugt et al., 2018 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites King and Dehaene, 2014 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“This delayed response enhancement is thought to be caused by feedback from higher visual areas to V1 (Christophel et al., 2017; Klink et al., 2017; Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000).”

What the sources say

• ?Could not verify

  The Different Levels of Abstraction section discusses a possible bias signal from prefrontal cortex to early visual cortex during working memory, not delayed V1 response enhancement during figure–ground perception. Searches for figure–ground perception and feedback from higher visual areas to V1 found no passage in our copy addressing that claim. (LLM, conf=0.75)

  cites Christophel et al., 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Klink et al., 2017 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000 source

In the paper

“Several studies have dissociated attention from awareness, for example, by demonstrating that attention can be summoned to a location by a subliminal cue so that the perception of stimuli at that location is improved (for reviews and discussions, see Dehaene and Changeux, 2011; Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007).”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  In “Selective Attention versus Conscious Access” (section I; page unavailable), the review says conscious access must be distinguished from attention and describes them as separate processes. The passages retrieved do not establish the cited example: that a subliminal cue draws attention to a location and improves perception of stimuli there. (LLM, conf=0.78)

  cites Dehaene and Changeux, 2011 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Koch and Tsuchiya, 2007 source

In the paper

“A central finding is that concept cells fire when concepts are held in working memory (Kamiński et al., 2017; Kornblith et al., 2017) and become active when these concepts are retrieved from long-term memory (Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Results section ('Activity of concept cells during working memory maintenance') reports that concept cells remained active when their preferred image was held in working memory. The long-term-memory retrieval clause is cited to a different source, so it is not part of the claim assessed here. (LLM, conf=0.94)

  cites Kamiński et al., 2017 source
• Supported

  Kornblith et al. is cited for the working-memory part of the sentence, not the long-term-memory retrieval part. The Results (Maintenance Period Activity) report that 8% of visually selective neurons were modulated by stimuli held in working memory, and the Discussion says MTL neurons represented previously presented images during maintenance. (LLM, conf=0.92)

  cites Kornblith et al., 2017 source
• Supported

  The cited paper supports the long-term-memory retrieval clause, not the working-memory clause, which is attributed to other sources. Its Abstract reports that hippocampal and entorhinal neurons selective for viewed video episodes became active again during free recall of those episodes, before participants reported remembering them. The demonstrated material was specific episodes rather than concepts in general. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites Gelbard-Sagiv et al., 2008 source

In the paper

“Attentional signals select a particular piece of information by amplifying its activity and reducing that of other competing stimuli, whereas persistent neuronal activity keeps information online in working memory (Roelfsema, 2005; Roelfsema et al., 2000; Zylberberg et al., 2011).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Roelfsema, 2005 source
• Partly supported

  Sections 3.4.1 and 6.2 link attentional selection to enhanced neuronal firing, and section 3.5.2 describes a spatial signal that persists across a delay as a form of working memory. The paper also describes inhibition among competing object representations, but section 3.5.1 says it cannot distinguish active suppression of items losing relevance from passive decay. It therefore does not fully support the claim that attentional signals reduce competing stimuli’s activity. (LLM, conf=0.85)

  cites Roelfsema et al., 2000 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Partly supported

  The ‘Single decision making by evidence accumulation’ section says sustained neuronal firing stores temporary, task-relevant information, and the ‘Opinion’ section describes attentional modulation as enhanced activity for selected visual information. The copy does not say that attention reduces the activity of competing stimuli; its discussion of mutual inhibition concerns competing productions instead. Page numbers were not provided for these passages. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites Zylberberg et al., 2011 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Simultaneous EEG and fMRI investigations in humans have confirmed the functional disconnection of the prefrontal cortex from the posterior cortex during propofol and sevoflurane anesthesia by fMRI, with a concomitant reduction of feedback connectivity identified using symbolic transfer entropy based on EEG signals (Jordan et al., 2013; Ranft et al., 2016).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Jordan et al., 2013 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 1 confirmed, 1 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Ranft et al., 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Still, it is important to note that the anesthetized brain is not just in a fixed state; recent observations found it to be more dynamic than previously considered, with metastable oscillations or connectivity patterns that appear to reflect intrinsic dynamics rather than pharmacokinetic instability or external stimuli (Hudson et al., 2014; Li et al., 2019; Vlisides et al., 2019).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hudson et al., 2014 source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Li et al., 2019
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Vlisides et al., 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“However, persistent firing for these items is weaker than that of the attended item (Konecky et al., 2017), which may explain why they are more difficult to pick up with non-invasive methods, such as fMRI and MEG (Stokes, 2015; Trübutschek et al., 2017; Trübutschek et al., 2018).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Konecky et al., 2017 source
• Supported

  In “Implications for cognitive models” (page not provided), Stokes reports that brain imaging finds discriminable activity patterns for attended working-memory items, while unattended items are effectively activity silent. The section also says activity-silent memory challenges tools designed to measure activity states. Together, these support the cited suggestion that unattended items may be harder to detect non-invasively; the separate claim about weaker persistent firing is attributed to Konecky et al. (LLM, conf=0.90)

  cites Stokes, 2015 source
• Partly supported

  The Results section (‘Contents of conscious and non-conscious working memory can be tracked transiently’; page not provided) reports that MEG tracked seen target locations but found no statistically significant decoding of unseen locations. This supports the narrower point that some memory contents are difficult to detect with MEG. The paper does not establish that weaker persistent firing in accessory items explains the difficulty, or address their detection with fMRI. (LLM, conf=0.83)

  cites Trübutschek et al., 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Maintenance in working memory gave rise to similar MEG signatures as conscious ignition (Trübutschek et al., 2017), supporting the view that conscious ignition is a first step leading to the entry of information into working memory.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Results section, “Similarity of conscious perception and conscious working memory” (page unavailable), reports comparable MEG responses associated with conscious perception in the perception and working-memory tasks. It also says the same neural codes were recruited at the beginning of maintenance. The statement about ignition being a first step is the citing authors’ interpretation following the citation, not a separate finding attributed to this source. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites Trübutschek et al., 2017 source

In the paper

“Electrocorticography during propofol (Malekmohammadi et al., 2018) and ketamine (Schroeder et al., 2016) anesthesia in human and non-human primates, respectively, reveals disrupted functional connectivity across the S1 and M1 cortex, as well as altered beta oscillations, which are typically associated with feedback processing (Bastos et al., 2015).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Malekmohammadi et al., 2018 source
• Partly supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 0 confirmed, 2 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Schroeder et al., 2016 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Bastos et al., 2015 source

In the paper

“This dynamic signature of conscious processing was initially discovered in fMRI studies of awake versus anesthetized monkeys (Barttfeld et al., 2015) and later found to generalize to humans in vegetative or minimally conscious states (Demertzi et al., 2019).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Results describe resting-state fMRI comparisons of awake and propofol-sedated macaques. The paper’s opening section identifies the richer, more flexible dynamics during wakefulness as a signature of consciousness. The later finding in humans is attributed to Demertzi et al. (2019), not to this source. (LLM, conf=0.92)

  cites Barttfeld et al., 2015 source
• Supported

  The citation to Demertzi et al. supports the human portion of the sentence; the earlier monkey finding is attributed to Barttfeld et al. In the Results (Fig. 3), Demertzi et al. report that coordination patterns vary with preserved or diminished consciousness in patients with unresponsive wakefulness syndrome (vegetative state) and minimally conscious state. (LLM, conf=0.92)

  cites Demertzi et al., 2019 source

In the paper

“Subsequent investigation revealed that the perturbational complexity index might be useful in stratifying patients with pathologic disorders of conscious access (Casarotto et al., 2016).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Abstract (Interpretation) states that PCI offers an independently validated stratification of unresponsive patients. The Discussion (PCI-Based Assessment of VS Patients) also describes its potential place in a diagnostic approach to disorders of consciousness, supporting the citing sentence’s hedged claim. (LLM, conf=0.94)

  cites Casarotto et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“Furthermore, some surrogate measures of Φ have been successfully applied to altered levels of consciousness in humans (Kim et al., 2018) and also shown to relate to network factors such as topological modularity (Kim et al., 2018) or critical dynamics (Kim and Lee, 2019).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Conclusion says the EEG-based Φ estimate was applied to human states of consciousness altered by anesthesia. The Results section, “Relationship between Φ¯ and functional brain network structure,” reports a strong negative correlation between Φ¯ and the number of network modules. The critical-dynamics point is attributed to a different citation, not to this paper. (LLM, conf=0.93)

  cites Kim et al., 2018 source
• Supported

  The citation to Kim and Lee (2019) supports the critical-dynamics clause, not the separate topological-modularity clause cited to Kim et al. (2018). In Section 5, the paper reports that changes in its surrogate measure of Φ correlate with changes in a measure of criticality in human EEG during general anesthesia. (LLM, conf=0.93)

  cites Kim and Lee, 2019 source

In the paper

“IIT’s Φ cannot be easily computed from large-scale data, making it difficult to test the theory (for attempts, see Oizumi et al., 2016 and Tajima et al., 2015).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Results section says the original Φ is difficult to apply to experimental data because estimating the required transition probabilities for all possible states is nearly impossible in an actual neural system. It also explains that computational costs grow exponentially with system size and presents Φ* with a Gaussian approximation as a practical attempt to address that difficulty. (LLM, conf=0.90)

  cites Oizumi et al., 2016 source
• ?Could not verify

  The Introduction discusses challenges in characterizing brain-wide dynamics, and the Discussion relates the cross-embedding findings to theories of consciousness. Neither passage says that IIT’s Φ is difficult to compute from large-scale data or that this makes IIT difficult to test. Searches for Φ, integrated information, and computational difficulty found no passage addressing that specific claim. (LLM, conf=0.70)

  cites Tajima et al., 2015 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“Given that lucid dreaming is considered a hybrid of REM sleep and waking (Voss et al., 2009), studies demonstrating a causal role for the prefrontal cortex in lucid dreaming thus also support a role for the prefrontal cortex in waking consciousness.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Abstract describes lucid dreaming as a hybrid state with measurable differences from both waking and REM sleep. The Regional Differences section likewise says it has features of each. The cited paper supports the hybrid-state premise attributed to it; the subsequent inference about the prefrontal cortex is the citing authors’ own argument. (LLM, conf=0.94)

  cites Voss et al., 2009 source

In the paper

“Indeed, electrical stimulation of the central thalamus has recently been shown to reverse the anesthetized state in non-human primates, in association with a return of corticocortical connectivity (Donoghue et al., 2019; Redinbaugh et al., 2020; J. Tasserie et al., 2019, Soc. Neurosci., conference).).”

What the sources say

• Partly supported

  The Abstract (page not specified) reports that central-thalamus stimulation awakened propofol-anesthetized non-human primates and restored awake-like cortical activity. The paper discusses corticocortical coherence when comparing awake and unconscious states, but the passages on stimulation do not show that corticocortical connectivity returned during stimulation. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites Donoghue et al., 2019 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
• Supported

  The Results section, “Gamma-frequency CL stimulation increased consciousness level,” reports that electrical stimulation of the central lateral thalamus roused anesthetized macaques. The Results section, “Thalamocortical and corticocortical interactions showed pathway-specific NCC,” reports that effective stimulation restored frontoparietal coherence, a measure of corticocortical connectivity. Page numbers were not available in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.94)

  cites Redinbaugh et al., 2020 source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites J. Tasserie et al., 2019

In the paper

“Similarly, surrogate measures, such as the perturbational complexity index that have shown promise (Casali et al., 2013), might have originated in one theory (in this case, IIT), but, as noted earlier, the results are consistent with other theories, e.g., the GNW, which also proposes that conscious processing critically depends on the integration of differentiated processors across a network.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  Split into 2 atoms — 2 confirmed, 0 partially supported, 0 disputed, 0 misattributed, 0 unverifiable. Expand the claim to see per-atom verdicts.

  cites Casali et al., 2013 source

In the paper

“Nevertheless, IIT has served as a theoretical framework for more practical measures, such as the perturbational complexity index, which has been successful in differentiating levels of consciousness in the setting of physiological, pharmacological, and pathological perturbations (Casali et al., 2013).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Introduction describes the theoretical principle that consciousness requires both integration and differentiation, and the Discussion says PCI is calculated from principles derived from theoretical neuroscience. The Discussion reports that PCI discriminated levels of consciousness across sleep, anesthetic sedation, and brain-injured patient states. Page numbers are not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.90)

  cites Casali et al., 2013 source

In the paper

“At birth, all major long-distance fiber tracts are already in place (Dubois et al., 2016), although still immature in terms of both their terminal connectivity and their myelination.”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Introduction (page not provided) states that all major long-distance fibers are observed by the end of the late preterm period, supporting the claim that they are in place at birth. The qualification about immature connectivity and myelination is not directly attached to this citation, but the Introduction also describes postnatal refinement and ongoing myelination. (LLM, conf=0.94)

  cites Dubois et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“Importantly, the baby brain is not a miniature adult brain; regional changes of brain connectivity and differential myelination take place that are asynchronous and protracted (Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015; Dubois et al., 2016).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015 source
• Supported

  The Introduction describes connections forming sequentially, being refined after birth, and myelination continuing during development. It explicitly says maturation is asynchronous across brain areas: sensory regions develop early, while associative regions develop into adolescence. The Conclusion likewise says these mechanisms occur at different times and speeds across regions. Page numbers are not provided in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.91)

  cites Dubois et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“Such recursion is absent or very limited in other animals; although they may acquire some language-like symbolic abilities, they do so at a very slow pace and up to a limited level (Jiang et al., 2018; Yang, 2013).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The Introduction says attempts to teach nonhuman animals nested or recursive sequences had mostly produced negative results. The Results and Discussion show the important qualification: macaques did learn two supra-regular grammars, but only after thousands of trials, whereas preschoolers learned them within a handful. The source supports the claim’s “very limited” alternative, not an absolute absence of recursion. (LLM, conf=0.86)

  cites Jiang et al., 2018 source
• Partly supported

  The Results report that Nim learned about 125 signs but lacked the combinatorial range of a rule-based grammar. The Discussion says chimpanzees showed patterns of imitation even after years of training. This supports limited language-like abilities in the primates discussed, but the paper does not establish that recursion is absent or limited in other animals generally, or measure the pace at which they acquire symbolic abilities. (LLM, conf=0.84)

  cites Yang, 2013 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The data are insufficient to determine whether those processes correspond to the type of sensory processing that is known to be preserved in coma patients or whether a lowest level of minimal consciousness, as characterized in adult disorders of consciousness (Chennu et al., 2017), may already exist in preterm infants (Lagercrantz et al., 2010).”

What the sources say

• Supported

  The citation is attached to the characterization of minimal consciousness in adult disorders of consciousness, not to the claim about insufficient data in preterm infants. The Results distinguish minimally conscious minus (MCS−) from unresponsive patients and from minimally conscious plus (MCS+) patients, supporting that characterization. (LLM, conf=0.88)

  cites Chennu et al., 2017 source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Lagercrantz et al., 2010

In the paper

“Social relationships, which appear altered in autism and autism spectrum disorder, are thought to affect the GNW architectures for conscious processing (Bourgeron, 2015; Graziano and Kast-ner, 2011).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bourgeron, 2015 source
• Partly supported

  In “Awareness as a product of social perception” (page unavailable), the paper proposes that social-perception machinery contributes awareness to information in a global workspace. It does not say that social relationships alter GNW architecture or address autism or autism spectrum disorder in the passages found (searched: GNW, global workspace, autism, social relationships). (LLM, conf=0.83)

  cites Graziano and Kast-ner, 2011 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured

In the paper

“The early recurrent loops occur in lower areas (Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000) and may correspond to VAN (Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010). As later recurrent loops involve higher areas, including the frontal-parietal network, global recurrent processing ensues.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Lamme and Roelfsema, 2000 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Koivisto and Revonsuo, 2010 source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Koivisto and Grassini, 2016

In the paper

“These convergent findings indicate that conscious access is not attached to early sensory processing but instead relates to a late stage whose timing is often decoupled from the timing of the actual stimulus.”

In the paper

“At the neuronal level, the GNW hypothesis postulates a key role for large pyramidal cells in cortical layer II/III (Figure 1B) but also a contribution of pyramidal cells in deeper layer V, as illustrated by recent studies (see below).”

In the paper

“This simulation showed that workspace activation increased during the acquisition of a novel task, its effortful execution, and after errors.”

In the paper

“Note that these areas are neither identical nor redundant: each has their own functional specificity and connectivity pattern, yet the communication between them is so extensive and rapid that any information available to one is quickly made available to others.”

In the paper

“Both perceived and unperceived stimuli caused activity in V1 and V4, but only the perceived ones elicited a sudden, strong, and sustained activity in the frontal cortex akin to ignition.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites van Vugt et al., 2018 source

In the paper

“Multivariate decoders trained to classify perceived versus unperceived stimuli identified a late sudden ignition (>200 ms) that generalized across modalities.”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Sanchez et al., 2019

In the paper

“In many experiments, the N2 simply precedes the P3, and their succession may index the spread of global ignition as reflected in intracranial and MEG signals.”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Pitts et al., 2012, 2014
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Pitts et al., 2018 source

In the paper

“This observation is important because tampering with NMDA receptors, by using ketamine, for instance, may selectively affect ignition and conscious perception, mimicking the impairment of conscious perception observed in schizophrenia (Berkovitch et al., 2017).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Berkovitch et al., 2017 source

In the paper

“Thus, models of attentional feature integration share the GNW’s aim to integrate information across distributed cortical processors.”

In the paper

“The van Vugt et al. (2018) data were explained well by a late difference in PFC activity between stimuli that were and were not reported, with only modest (but significant) differences in the late recurrent activation of visual cortex”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites van Vugt et al. (2018) source

In the paper

“The binding mechanisms co-select distributed feature representations that are part of a single object and explain why the object representations that become part of conscious experience are usually coherent and integrated.”

In the paper

“Although most experiments on conscious perception are correlational in nature and merely observe neural “correlates” or “signatures” of conscious perception, some studies (Manita et al., 2015; Sachidhanandam et al., 2013) provide evidence for a causal role of top-down inputs in perception.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Manita et al., 2015 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Sachidhanandam et al., 2013 source

In the paper

“Pharmacological studies indicate that, in agreement with the GNW hypothesis (Dehaene and Changeux, 2005), the initial feedforward sweep predominantly relies on AMPA glutamate receptors, whereas NMDA receptors play a dominant role in the later feedback effects (Self et al., 2012).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Self et al., 2012 source

In the paper

“However, we note that the spatial location that was attended to in some of these experiments differed from the feature for which consciousness was established (e.g., a grating at that location), implying that the dissociation was incomplete: subjects presumably could not direct feature-based attention to features that failed to enter consciousness, and conversely, they were most likely aware of”

In the paper

“These cells are found in the medial temporal lobe of humans and activate when subjects perceive or think about specific concepts.”

In the paper

“Working memory operations can thereby execute the successive mental steps required to solve a task and permit mental simulations; i.e., subjects can navigate through sequences of working memory states to explore the future consequences of actions (Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Pezzulo and Cisek, 2016 source

In the paper

“Taken together, these findings suggest that the critical brain regions engaging in the recurrent interactions for conscious perception may be task and stimulus dependent: whereas recurrent, metastable activity in the PFC and interconnected associative areas may be systematically present during conscious perception, recurrent interactions with primary sensory areas may play a role or not, depending”

In the paper

“In tasks that rely on recurrent interactions between V1 and higher areas, V1 neurons become part of the GNW, and the fine-grained visual percepts can enter into conscious awareness.”

In the paper

“It should be recognized that what we call “attention” is actually a diverse set of temporal, spatial, and cognitive filters; thus, many of these filters may operate non-consciously, with only the final one gating entry in the global workspace.”

In the paper

“Feedback from the frontal cortex thereby amplifies neuronal activity elicited by tactile stimuli in the somatosensory cortex, and this amplification predicts successful perception (Sachidhanandam et al., 2013; Takahashi et al., 2016).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Sachidhanandam et al., 2013 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Takahashi et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“Thus, our experience builds associative memory networks, in which activity can spread from one concept to the next, a function that resembles the spread of activity for attentional operations described above.”

In the paper

“Together, these results suggest that conscious access depends on recurrent interactions between higher cortical areas (e.g., the frontal and parietal cortex) that can maintain a representation of a weak stimulus as persistent activity until a behavioral response is required by the task.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites van Vugt et al., 2018 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Joglekar et al., 2018 source

In the paper

“The initial feedforward activity elicited in the visual cortex was driven by the texture elements in the neurons’ receptive fields, whereas later activity reflected successful figure-ground perception; figures that reached awareness elicited more V1 activity than the background, but figures that stayed subliminal did not.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Supèr et al., 2001 source

In the paper

“studies that examined tactile perception in mice revealed that it is associated with the reverberation of activity between the frontal cortex and somatosensory cortex that is accompanied by NDMA-receptor-driven calcium events in the distal dendrites of sensory neurons (Larkum, 2013).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Larkum, 2013 source

In the paper

“If the feedback from a higher cortical area, the mouse secondary motor cortex, back to somatosensory cortex is silenced optogenetically, the late amplification in the somatosensory cortex is selectively attenuated and perception is prevented (Manita et al., 2015).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Manita et al., 2015 source

In the paper

“In the clinical setting, for example, it is well known that long-latency-evoked potentials are preferentially susceptible to general anesthesia, whereas short-latency potentials are preserved (Banoub et al., 2003).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Banoub et al., 2003 source

In the paper

“Recent experiments support this view; whenever the information in working memory must be transformed, an active form of working memory is reinstated, and a decodable state of activity reemerges, accompanied by classical signatures of conscious access (Trübutschek et al., 2019).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Trübutschek et al., 2019 source

In the paper

“We propose that the attended working memory item is conscious and uses the GNW for broadcasting.”

In the paper

“For example, Ma et al., (2019) found hypersynchrony, also a mechanism that would restrict information transfer, between frontal eye fields and the lateral intraparietal area in monkeys anesthetized with propofol.”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Ma et al., (2019)

In the paper

“Mongillo and colleagues proposed that the additional working memory items can also be stored as short-term changes in synaptic weights so that their representation can be quickly reinstalled when useful (Mongillo et al., 2008), a form of working memory that is called “activity-silent.””

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Mongillo et al., 2008 source

In the paper

“Thus, we propose that working memory is conscious only when it is coded by global, highly distributed persistent neural firing, as occurs during both initial encoding, during the later refresh stage, and when the memory item influences other mental processing steps.”

In the paper

“Such periodic refreshing may correspond to early psychological conceptions of working memory as a decaying buffer that requires regular rehearsal to be refreshed (Baddeley, 2012).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Baddeley, 2012 source

In the paper

“The disruption of functional interactions of the GNW during general anesthesia may, in part, be mediated by effects on the thalamus, which is depressed by virtually all sedative-hypnotic drugs (with the exception of ketamine) (Mashour and Alkire, 2013a).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Mashour and Alkire, 2013a

In the paper

“Such a disruption would reduce the probability of information being available to other cognitive systems, including working memory, which may comprehensively account for the functional outcome of general anesthesia in routine clinical care.”

In the paper

“On one end of the spectrum, anesthetics can render the brain persistently isoelectric, thereby completely disrupting information processing.”

In the paper

“Crucially, this view predicts that activity-silent working memories, although capable of bridging over delays, differ in an important way: only active neural states can be mentally transformed, e.g., by mental rotation, whereas activity-silent states merely store previously computed states (and thus should be more appropriately termed short-term memory).”

In the paper

“Clinically, the two major therapeutic traits of the anesthetized state are hypnosis and amnesia.”

In the paper

“Thus, a key correlate of REM-sleep dreaming involves structures of the GNW, and, importantly, this correlation happens in the absence of report (which occurs only after waking).”

In the paper

“IIT, on the other hand, minimizes the relevance of the prefrontal cortex and, based on anatomical considerations, considers a posterior complex—the so-called posterior cortical “hot zone”—to be sufficient for conscious experience.”

In the paper

“The GNW theory is representational in nature and views consciousness as an evolved neurocomputational system that enables the global sharing of representations.”

In the paper

“For example, the effects of general anesthetics in suppressing recurrent processing (both locally and globally) are broadly consistent with all four theories.”

In the paper

“The GNW relies upon well-defined neuronal architectures, including cellular and molecular mechanisms of information processing that extract, represent, and manipulate information originating from both outside the brain (from interactions with the environment) and inside the brain (from spontaneous activity patterns).”

In the paper

“Indeed, it is dreaming during REM sleep that has been argued to represent “proto-consciousness,” a building block for conscious experience during wakefulness (Hobson, 2009).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Hobson, 2009 source

In the paper

“For HOTs, the role of the prefrontal cortex is to generate a second-order, metacognitive representation of a first-order state (e.g., one generated by primary sensory cortex).”

In the paper

“During sleep, the brain not only loses its normal level or state of conscious processing (and occasionally gains access to internally generated dreams), but also loses the capacity to access specific sensory contents.”

In the paper

“Furthermore, IIT is ostensibly a theory of phenomenal consciousness, whereas the GNW theory is focused on conscious access and processing and, furthermore, brings into question the very distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness.”

In the paper

“By contrast, the GNW proposes that conscious access requires a more extensive architecture of reverberant loops, including frontal-parietal regions that enable access of a given representation to a wider array of modular processors.”

In the paper

“Although there is an abundance of neuroimaging studies focused on pathologic disorders of consciousness, it remains difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding support for specific theories of conscious processing because of the heterogeneity of lesions and the possibility of covert consciousness in the setting of behavioral unresponsiveness.”

In the paper

“The RPT of consciousness (Lamme, 2006, 2010) also shares with the GNW the postulate that, given a hierarchically ordered neurocognitive architecture, feedforward processing is not sufficient for conscious processing, whereas feedback from higher-order to lower-order areas is critical.”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Lamme, 2006, 2010

In the paper

“By contrast, there is no clear function assigned to consciousness according to HOT.”

In the paper

“Although this experiment was inspired by an alternative theory of consciousness (integrated information theory [IIT], discussed further below), the results are fully compatible with the GNW, which predicts that the conscious state leads to a deeper and more prolonged propagation of activation through long-distance connections compared to the unconscious state.”

In the paper

“As noted, REM-sleep dreaming, during which there is a metabolic deactivation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Maquet et al., 1996), is still associated with high-frequency activity in the prefrontal cortex.”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Maquet et al., 1996 source

In the paper

“Furthermore, global broadcasting is an important function associated with consciousness according to the GNW theory.”

In the paper

“In addition to its role in transmitting arousal and sensory signals, non-sensory nuclei of the thalamus are thought to play a role in working memory (outlined above) and to facilitate the coordination of cortical communication (Saalmann et al., 2012, 2014), which is important to a functional GNW.”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Saalmann et al., 2012, 2014

In the paper

“Since, for higher-order theory, the meta-representation is the mechanism by which a first-order representation becomes conscious, the prefrontal cortex is the ultimate source of consciousness.”

In the paper

“In RPT, which has focused primarily on the visual modality, re-entrant or feedback processes within sensory processing pathways are considered sufficient for phenomenal experience.”

In the paper

“Although the GNW and IIT are superficially aligned regarding certain aspects of how conscious processes are generated—e.g., both require integrated neural processing beyond the level of primary sensory cortex—these two theories are grounded in foundationally different perspectives of brain function.”

In the paper

“Both the GNW and IIT ascribe importance to neural activity beyond early sensory cortices, neural information sharing, and recurrent connections as a mechanism of integration.”

In the paper

“As noted, the prefrontal cortex is one of the nodes of the highly distributed GNW network.”

In the paper

“Transcranial direct-current stimulation of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex may also transiently enhance the level of consciousness in some patients in a minimally conscious state (Thibaut et al., 2014, 2015), and similar observations exist in normal subjects (Douglas et al., 2015).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Thibaut et al., 2014, 2015
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Douglas et al., 2015 source

In the paper

“Indeed, an elevated threshold for conscious perception has been reported in patients with frontal-lobe syndrome, neglect, multiple sclerosis, or schizophrenia and related to abnormal long-distance fiber tracts, as measured by diffusion tensor imaging (Del Cul et al., 2009; Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011; Reuter et al., 2007, 2009; Thiebaut de Schotten et al., 2005).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Del Cul et al., 2009 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Pettersson-Yeo et al., 2011 source
• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Reuter et al., 2007, 2009

In the paper

“By contrast, IIT proposes that the system (e.g., the brain, in a biological instantiation) is closed and non-representational; information is abstractly generated by the system and for the system.”

In the paper

“These results therefore reveal that the elementary mechanisms underlying ignition are already present in infancy—although they undoubtedly undergo a maturation and an acceleration during development, in addition to the development of more elaborate higher-order processes.”

In the paper

“Indeed, the GNW hypothesis is bringing considerable coherence to otherwise distant fields of research.”

In the paper

“25- to 30-week preterm babies can already process tactile and painful stimuli in the sensory cortex (Bartocci et al., 2006), discriminate sounds (Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013), and perceive pain (Bembich et al., 2016).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bartocci et al., 2006 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Mahmoudzadeh et al., 2013 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Bembich et al., 2016 source

In the paper

“There is currently no good theory of how the brain achieves such meta-representations, although algorithmic models are beginning to be formulated within the abstract framework of lambda calculus (Goodman and Frank, 2016).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Goodman and Frank, 2016 source

In the paper

“Primary sensorimotor areas develop earlier than adjacent unimodal associative cortices, whereas higher-order associative regions and their long-range connectivity further develop later and slowly over decades (Dubois et al., 2014; Lebenberg et al., 2019).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Dubois et al., 2014 source
• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Lebenberg et al., 2019 source

In the paper

“The GNW hypothesis—even in its simple and limited original formulation—has thus far received substantial experimental support.”

In the paper

“Interestingly, the same regions appear to be involved during self-consciousness and during the representation of other people’s thoughts (theory of mind).”

In the paper

“Furthermore, intracranial recordings indicate that the early ERN is not predic-tive of whether subjects will react more slowly on the next trial but rather that such bridging across time, putatively associated with error awareness, relies on late sustained, integrative, and synchronous neural firing (Fu et al., 2019).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Fu et al., 2019

In the paper

“As in sensory access, the first ∼200 ms of firing, corresponding to the ERN, can occur even for non-conscious errors, whereas the late ignition occurs only when the error is consciously detected (Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Nieuwenhuis et al., 2001 source

In the paper

“When the conscious intention and the actual ongoing response diverge, as may occur due to differential noise or conflicting stimuli, an error is detected (Charles et al., 2013, 2014).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Charles et al., 2013, 2014

In the paper

“For instance, the human brain may also host an internal model of its own attention, an “attention schema” similar to the “body schema,” that serves as a basis for our subjective sense of awareness (Graziano et al., 2019).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Graziano et al., 2019

In the paper

“Within the first year of life, all GNW areas quickly become active, including the prefrontal cortex, although their lack of myelination renders them very slow to process information (Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Dehaene-Lambertz and Spelke, 2015 source

In the paper

“In simple motor tasks, erroneous responses elicit an early error-related negativity (ERN) arising from the pre-supplementary motor area and the dorsal anterior cingulated cortex (Fu et al., 2019), followed by a later igni-tion of a late positive response (the error-positivity [PE], similar to the P3 wave).”

What the sources say

• ?Not matched

  Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.

  cites Fu et al., 2019

In the paper

“A multisite, preregistered, adversarial collaboration testing the main predictions of the GNW versus IIT using fMRI, MEG, and intracranial recordings during passive viewing and active dual-tasking is currently underway (Reardon, 2019).”

What the sources say

• ?Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites Reardon, 2019 source

In the paper

“The current hypothesis is that of a simple consistency check between two simultaneous processes: a fast, non-conscious route linking perception to action and a slower, conscious route that computes the intended response.”