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Cited by 737

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 145 of the 145 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Practical challenges in quantum key distribution

Open access
Diamanti, Eleni, Lo, Hoi-Kwong, Qi, Bing, Yuan, Zhiliang · 2016 · npj Quantum Information

Abstract

Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditional security in data communication and is currently being deployed in commercial applications. Nonetheless, before QKD can be widely adopted, it faces a number of important challenges such as secret key rate, distance, size, cost and practical security. Here, we survey those key challenges and the approaches that are currently being taken to address them.

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Crossref · 10.1038/npjqi.2016.25

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Citations

Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 34

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Metadata

Authors
Diamanti, E., Lo, H.-K., Qi, B., & Yuan, Z.
Venue
npj Quantum Information
Published
2016-11-08
Volume
2
Issue
1
ISSN
2056-6387 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2473315843
Cited by
737
References
145
FWCI
35.96
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold
Licence

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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.