The DOI matches its Crossref record; 214 of the 221 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 20 of the 86 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Emotional states of consciousness, or what are typically called emotional feelings, are traditionally viewed as being innately programmed in subcortical areas of the brain, and are often treated as different from cognitive states of consciousness, such as those related to the perception of external stimuli. We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain. In this view, what differs in emotional and nonemotional states are the kinds of inputs that are processed by a general cortical network of cognition, a network essential for conscious experiences. Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences. In building the case for this proposal, we defend a modified version of what is known as the higher-order theory of consciousness.
Overview
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
The paper proposes a higher-order account of emotional consciousness, arguing that feelings are not produced by dedicated subcortical emotion circuits but by the same cortical cognitive networks that support other conscious experiences. Subcortical defensive survival circuits, such as amygdala-centered circuits, supply nonconscious inputs that shape but do not constitute emotional feelings.
Key findings
- Conscious emotional experiences, including fear, are proposed to arise from higher-order representations in a cortical general network of cognition involving lateral and medial prefrontal, posterior parietal, and insular cortex; subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for feelings.
- The theory modifies higher-order thought into HOROR and self-HOROR: a nonconscious higher-order representation is re-represented, and when self-information is included, an autonoetic, self-aware emotional experience results. The authors argue that self-involvement is necessary for emotion.
- Evidence cited includes weak correlations between fear feelings and behavioral/physiological threat responses; subliminal threat studies showing amygdala activation and bodily responses without reported fear; blindsight patients showing threat responses without fear; and amygdala damage disrupting threat responses but not fear experience.
- The paper notes that English has over three dozen words for fear-related experiences, and proposes that emotion schemas and language shape emotional experience. It also claims emotions cannot be unconscious and that one cannot be mistaken about which emotion one is feeling.
Methods
- Theoretical/conceptual paper: develops and defends a modified higher-order theory of consciousness and extends it to emotion, using fear as the primary illustrative case.
- Synthesizes prior philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience findings on consciousness, amygdala function, defensive survival circuits, memory, self, and emotion; no new experimental data, sample, or statistical analysis are reported.
- Main analysis is argumentative: contrasts first-order versus higher-order theories, reviews evidence for nonconscious threat processing, and derives predictions, such as that damage to first-order subcortical circuits should mute but not eliminate fear.
Limitations
- The authors state that their conclusions may not apply equally to all emotions and that fear is used as a starting point; they also state that whether fear experiences differ quantitatively or qualitatively when amygdala inputs are absent is unknown.
- The paper is theoretical and relies on interpretation of existing evidence; it does not directly test HOTEC or self-HOROR, and the text acknowledges that consciousness in animals cannot be measured directly.
- The text makes evident that the account depends on contested claims about nonconscious working memory and introspection, and that the evidence for subcortical phenomenal feelings is considered unconvincing by the authors rather than definitively settled.
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Claims the paper makes
53 Own interpretation · 9 No full text of the sources · 8 Not checked yet · 6 Partly supported · 6 Sources not found · 4 Couldn’t confirm · 3 Supported so far · 3 No basis given · 1 Supported · accuracy not yet measured
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“A great deal of research has shown that damage to the amygdala disrupts the ability of animals and people to respond to threats behaviorally and physiologically (13-15, 17, 19, 20).”
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [13] 13. Davis M (1992) The role of the amygdala in conditioned fear. The Amygdala: Neurobiological Aspects of Emotion, Memory, and Mental Dysfunction, ed Aggleton JP (Wiley-Liss, New York), pp 255-306.
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [14] 14. Fanselow MS, Poulos AM (2005) The neuroscience of mammalian associative learn- ing. Annu Rev Psychol 56:207-234. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [15] 15. Maren S (2005) Synaptic mechanisms of associative memory in the amygdala. Neuron 47(6):783-786. source
- Partly supportedcites [17] 17. Adolphs R (2013) The biology of fear. Curr Biol 23(2):R79-R93. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “Fear and the Amygdala” (page not available), the paper describes the amygdala as regulating fear responses, including freezing and cortical arousal, and says its role in fear processing is conserved across humans and other animals. It also implicates the human amygdala in the expression of fear. These passages support its role in behavioral and physiological responses, but do not establish that damage disrupts both kinds of threat response in animals and people. (LLM, conf=0.79)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [19] 19. Gross CT, Canteras NS (2012) The many paths to fear. Nat Rev Neurosci 13(9): 651-658. source
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“These GNC have been implicated in attention, working memory, and metacognition (72-75), which-as discussed-are viewed as essential to consciousness in most cognitive theories.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > SI Appendix, Box 6).
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [72] 72. Miller EK, Cohen JD (2001) An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex function. Annu Rev Neurosci 24:167-202. source
- Not matchedcites [73] 73. Goldman-Rakic PS (1999) Working memory, neural basis. MIT Encyclopedia of Cognitive Sciences, eds Wilson RA, Keil FC (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites [74] 74. Fuster JM (2003) Cortex and Mind: Unifying Cognition (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Partly supportedcites [75] 75. Fleming SM, Huijgen J, Dolan RJ (2012) Prefrontal contributions to metacognition in perceptual decision making. J Neurosci 32(18):6117-6125. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Introduction reports that prefrontal regions are implicated in metacognitive accuracy, and the Results identify right rostrolateral prefrontal activity associated with metacognitive reports. The cited paper does not establish the sentence’s additional claims about attention or working memory. Section labels are available in our copy, but page numbers are not. (LLM, conf=0.85)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“However, because not all cognitive processing leads to conscious experience (52, 58-62), cognitive capacities indicated by nonverbal behavior alone are generally not sufficient to demonstrate conscious awareness”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Measuring Conscious Experiences.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [52] 52. Smith JD (2009) The study of animal metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 13(9):389-396. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [58] 58. Kihlstrom JF (1987) The cognitive unconscious. Science 237(4821):1445-1452. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [59] 59. Jacobs C, Silvanto J (2015) How is working memory content consciously experienced? The 'conscious copy' model of WM introspection. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 55:510-519. source
- Supportedcites [60] 60. Jacob J, Jacobs C, Silvanto J (2015) Attention, working memory, and phenomenal experience of WM content: memory levels determined by different types of top- down modulation. Front Psychol 6:1603. source
The “Nonconscious Items Can be Attended” section reports above-chance discrimination and working-memory performance despite participants reporting no awareness. These behavioral examples support the claim that nonverbal evidence of cognitive processing alone does not demonstrate conscious awareness. (LLM, conf=0.86)
- Supportedcites [61] 61. Bergström F, Eriksson J (2014) Maintenance of non-consciously presented in- formation engages the prefrontal cortex. Front Hum Neurosci 8:938. source
The citation is attached to the premise that not all cognitive processing leads to conscious experience. The Introduction says people consciously experience only a fraction of their perceptual processes, and the Discussion describes working-memory processing of non-consciously presented information. The paper is not being cited as a direct study of nonverbal behavior. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Supportedcites [62] 62. Kiefer M (2012) Executive control over unconscious cognition: Attentional sensiti- zation of unconscious information processing. Front Hum Neurosci 6:61. source
The citation supports the premise that cognitive processing can occur without conscious experience; the conclusion about nonverbal behavior is the citing authors’ inference. The Introduction (page unavailable) says that stimuli not consciously perceived can trigger cognitive processes and influence decisions and actions. (LLM, conf=0.92)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“the plausibility of our hypothesis is supported by results from recent studies indicating that nonconscious processing within working memory is more robust than previously observed (79, 101, 108, 127)”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [79] 79. Del Cul A, Dehaene S, Reyes P, Bravo E, Slachevsky A (2009) Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness. Brain 132(Pt 9):2531-2540. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [101] 101. Baddeley A (2000) The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends Cogn Sci 4(11):417-423. 104. Schacter DL (1989) On the relation between memory and consciousness: Dissociable interactions and conscious experience. Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving, eds Roediger HLI, Craik FIM (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ), pp 355-389. 105. Prinz JJ (2012) The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience (Oxford Univ Press, New York). 106. source
- Could not verifycites [108] 108. Ergorul C, Eichenbaum H (2004) The hippocampus and memory for "what," "where," and "when". Learn Mem 11(4):397-405. 141. Block N (2009) Comparing the major theories of consciousness. The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, ed Gazzaniga MS (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), 4th Ed, pp 1111-1122. 142. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion addresses hippocampal and parahippocampal contributions to object memory, not nonconscious processing within working memory. Searches for that phrase and for implicit or unconscious working-memory processing found no passage assessing whether such processing is more robust than previously observed. (LLM, conf=0.76)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Panksepp's (5, 114) emotion theory described above can be reconceived as a first-order emotion theory.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A B
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [5] 5. Panksepp J (1998) Affective Neuroscience (Oxford Univ Press, New York). source
- Could not verifycites [114] 114. Sui J, Humphreys GW (2015) The integrative self: How self-reference integrates perception and memory. Trends Cogn Sci 19(12):719-728. 157. Frith U, Happé F (1999) Theory of mind and self-consciousness: What is it like to be autistic? Mind Lang 14(1):82-89. 158. Frith CD (2012) The role of metacognition in human social interactions. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 367(1599):2213-2223. 159. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper’s Conclusion discusses how self-reference integrates perception and memory, not Panksepp’s emotion theory. Searches for “Panksepp” and “first-order emotion theory” found no passage in our copy addressing the claimed reconception. The available passages have no page numbers. (LLM, conf=0.76)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“HOROR theory is supported by empirical cases where phenomenal consciousness plausibly outstrips first-order representations.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [91] 91. Lau H, Rosenthal D (2011) Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends Cogn Sci 15(8):365-373. source
- Supportedcites [96] 96. Brown R (2012) The brain and its states. Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience, eds Edelman S, Fekete T, Zach N (John Benjamins, Philadelphia), pp 211-238. source
In §6, “Phenomenal consciousness” (page not provided), Brown describes empirical cases that seem to suggest phenomenal experience can occur without first-order representations. He presents them as a line of evidence for a higher-order theory while acknowledging that some cases do not rule out first-order representations elsewhere in the brain. (LLM, conf=0.93)
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Specifically, these cases suggest that there is more that is phenomenally experienced than can be accounted for in terms of first-order representations.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [91] 91. Lau H, Rosenthal D (2011) Empirical support for higher-order theories of conscious awareness. Trends Cogn Sci 15(8):365-373. source
- Partly supportedcites [96] 96. Brown R (2012) The brain and its states. Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience, eds Edelman S, Fekete T, Zach N (John Benjamins, Philadelphia), pp 211-238. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 6 argues that the unattended-stimulus experiments suggest differences in conscious phenomenology without differences in first-order representations. But it says the Charles Bonnet syndrome case rules out only a particular account of first-order representations; representations in other brain areas remain possible. The claim therefore overextends what the paper says about that case. (LLM, conf=0.88)
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The cognitive functions (working memory, attention, metacognition, and so forth) and neural circuits (especially prefrontal circuits) that underlie HORs are also required for conscious experiences involving the self, including emotional states involving the self (145, 156-162).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [145] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
Section 2 links medial prefrontal and other paralimbic regions to self-awareness, including its emotional aspects; Section 3 says the network is instrumental in self-awareness. But the copy does not establish that working memory, attention, or the functions and circuits underlying higher-order representations are required for self-related conscious experiences. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Partly supportedcites [156] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The section 'Self-Reference Enhances the Coupling Between Brain Regions' (page unavailable) links prefrontal circuits and attention-related regions to self-processing and suggests that changes in their connectivity may play a causal role in self-awareness. It does not establish that working memory, attention, metacognition, or circuits underlying HORs are required for conscious experiences of the self, including self-related emotional states. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [157] source
- Partly supportedcites [158] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
In “The neural basis of metacognition” (page unavailable), Frith links metacognition with working memory and prefrontal executive control, and associates thinking about one’s own mental states with medial prefrontal activity. The passage also says emotional regulation has metacognitive aspects. It does not establish that these functions or circuits are required for conscious self-related experiences, including emotional states. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Partly supportedcites [159] sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The neural-basis discussion preceding §6 links self-reflection and metacognitive deficits to medial prefrontal cortex activity. Section 6 discusses links between metacognition, higher-order thought and conscious awareness, but treats their relationship as unsettled. The paper does not establish that these functions and circuits are required for self-related conscious experience, including emotional states. (LLM, conf=0.84)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [160] source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [161] source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [162] source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Partly supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our thesis is that the brain mechanisms that give rise to conscious emotional feelings are not fundamentally different from those that give rise to perceptual conscious experiences.”
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We argue that conscious experiences, regardless of their content, arise from one system in the brain.”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 22
- Probably not a substantial claim. 20
Every source the paper cites for this claim was checked and supports it.
In the paper
“Defensive survival circuits are evolutionarily wired to detect and respond to innate threats and to respond to novel threats that have been learned about in the past (35,36).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Significance
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [35] 35. LeDoux JE (2014) Coming to terms with fear. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 111(8): 2871-2878. source
The section “Survival Circuits and Global Organismic States” says defensive survival circuits respond to conditioned and innate threats. It also says their detection circuits are prewired for species-typical threats or wired through experience to detect novel stimuli that predict harm. (LLM, conf=0.93)
- Supportedcites [36] 36. LeDoux J (2012) Rethinking the emotional brain. Neuron 73(4):653-676. source
In “Nature and Nurture in Survival Circuits,” the paper says defense systems are wired to detect innate triggers and that novel sensory events can become learned triggers. “Defense as an Example” also describes defense circuits processing both innate and learned threats. (LLM, conf=0.94)
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“Fourth, although damage to the amygdala interferes with bodily responses to threats, it does not interfere with conscious experience of emotions such as fear (43,44).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Significance
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [43] 43. Feinstein JS, et al. (2013) Fear and panic in humans with bilateral amygdala damage. Nat Neurosci 16(3):270-272. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper (section labeled Abstract; page not available) reports deficient anticipatory heart-rate and skin-conductance responses in patients with amygdala lesions, while those patients consciously experienced fear and panic during CO2 inhalation. The claim is too broad: the paper also reports a marked absence of fear in response to external threats and heightened physiological responses after CO2 inhalation. (LLM, conf=0.90)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [44] 44. Anderson AK, Phelps EA (2002) Is the human amygdala critical for the subjective experience of emotion? Evidence of intact dispositional affect in patients with amygdala lesions. J Cogn Neurosci 14(5):709-720. source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“When the stimulus is in the part of space they can see and report on, cortical areas of the GNC are activated, but when it is in the blind area these areas are not activated (65,77).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Neural Correlates of Reportable Conscious Experiences.
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites [65] 65. Lau HC, Passingham RE (2006) Relative blindsight in normal observers and the neural correlate of visual consciousness. Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 103(49):18763-18768. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (page not provided) reports significant activation in Brodmann’s area 46 when stimuli were presented to one blindsight subject’s unimpaired field, and no significant activation for slow, unseen stimuli in his blind field. But it also reports significant area 46 activation for faster stimuli in that blind field when he reported awareness. The evidence concerns one cortical area in one subject, not cortical areas generally across blindsight patients. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [77] 77. Persaud N, et al. (2011) Awareness-related activity in prefrontal and parietal cortices in blindsight reflects more than superior visual performance. Neuroimage 58(2): 605-611. source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Partly supported
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Our hypothesis is that the nonconscious HOR, and the HOROR that instantiates the awareness of ourselves as being in the HOR, both occur within working memory.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [79] 79. Del Cul A, Dehaene S, Reyes P, Bravo E, Slachevsky A (2009) Causal role of prefrontal cortex in the threshold for access to consciousness. Brain 132(Pt 9):2531-2540. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [101] 101. Baddeley A (2000) The episodic buffer: A new component of working memory? Trends Cogn Sci 4(11):417-423. 104. Schacter DL (1989) On the relation between memory and consciousness: Dissociable interactions and conscious experience. Varieties of Memory and Consciousness: Essays in Honour of Endel Tulving, eds Roediger HLI, Craik FIM (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ), pp 355-389. 105. Prinz JJ (2012) The Conscious Brain: How Attention Engenders Experience (Oxford Univ Press, New York). 106. source
- Could not verifycites [108] 108. Ergorul C, Eichenbaum H (2004) The hippocampus and memory for "what," "where," and "when". Learn Mem 11(4):397-405. 141. Block N (2009) Comparing the major theories of consciousness. The Cognitive Neurosciences IV, ed Gazzaniga MS (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA), 4th Ed, pp 1111-1122. 142. sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The paper’s Discussion addresses hippocampal memory for episodes and stimulus familiarity, while its introductory passage discusses the difficulty of assessing subjective consciousness in animals. Neither addresses nonconscious HORs, HORORs, or whether they occur in working memory (searched those terms and awareness in working memory). The citing sentence also presents this as the citing authors’ own hypothesis. (LLM, conf=0.78)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
The cited sources that could be checked couldn’t confirm or dispute this claim.
In the paper
“Findings from patients with autonomic failure and alexithymia (119), although superficially supportive, primarily show quantitative changes in subjective experience, more consistent with a modulatory role of body feedback.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A B
What the sources say
- Could not verifycites [119] 119. Schiller D, Delgado MR (2010) Overlapping neural systems mediating extinction, reversal and regulation of fear. Trends Cogn Sci 14(6):268-276. 169. Rolls ET (2008) Emotion, higher-order syntactic thoughts, and consciousness. Frontiers of Consciousness: Chichele Lectures, eds Weiskrantz L, Davies M (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford), pp 131-167. 170. Berridge KC, Kringelbach ML (2011) Building a neuroscience of pleasure and well- being. Psychol Well Being 1(1):1-3. 171. Schachter S (1975) Cognition and centralist-peripheralist controversies in motivation and emotion. Handbook of Psychobiology, ed sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Regulation of fear section discusses cognitive strategies and changes in emotional responses, while the Fear reversal section mentions physiological measures of fear. Neither addresses patients with autonomic failure or alexithymia, quantitative changes in their subjective experience, or a modulatory role for body feedback. Searches for those terms found no relevant passage in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.75)
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Could not verify
The sources with a verdict support this claim; the rest weren’t checked yet, have no full text we could read, or their verdicts aren’t rated yet.
In the paper
“To account for this limitation a version that does not depend on a relation between the higher-order state and a sensory representation has been proposed (96,124).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Supportedcites [96] 96. Brown R (2012) The brain and its states. Being in Time: Dynamical Models of Phenomenal Experience, eds Edelman S, Fekete T, Zach N (John Benjamins, Philadelphia), pp 211-238. source
In §6 (Phenomenal consciousness), Brown presents the HOROR theory as a response to cases with no first-order state and says phenomenal consciousness does not require a relation between that state and higher-order awareness. The Introduction identifies HOROR as a variant of traditional higher-order thought theory. (LLM, conf=0.94)
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [124] 124. Forsyth JP, Eifert GH (1996) The language of feeling and the feeling of anxiety: Contributions of the behaviorisms toward understanding the function-altering ef- fects of language. Psychol Rec 46:607-649. 182. Schacter DL, Buckner RL, Koutstaal W (1998) Memory, consciousness and neuro- imaging. Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci 353(1377):1861-1878. 183. source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Supported
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although subcortical circuits are not directly responsible for conscious feelings, they provide nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences.”
- Also stated in: § A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness · plain
“Thus, subcortical circuits are not responsible for feelings, but instead provide lower-order, nonconscious inputs that coalesce with other kinds of neural signals in the cognitive assembly of conscious emotional experiences by cortical circuits”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Both, we propose, involve higher-order representations (HORs) of lowerorder information by cortically based general networks of cognition (GNC).”
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Most consistently implicated are various areas of the lateral and medial prefrontal cortex, but activations are also reported in the parietal cortex and insular cortex (Fig. 2).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Neural Correlates of Reportable Conscious Experiences.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As viewed here, defensive survival circuits indirectly contribute to the feeling of fear, but their activity does not constitute fear.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Significance
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“Second, studies using subliminal stimulus presentation methods (e.g., backward masking or continuous flash suppression) to prevent or reduce awareness of visual stimuli show that visual threats activate the amygdala and elicit body responses despite the fact that participants deny seeing the stimulus (21)(22)(23)(24)(25)(26)(27)(28)(29)(30).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Significance
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [21] 21. Phelps EA (2006) Emotion and cognition: Insights from studies of the human amygdala. Annu Rev Psychol 57:27-53. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [22] 22. Dolan RJ, Vuilleumier P (2003) Amygdala automaticity in emotional processing. Ann N Y Acad Sci 985:348-355. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [23] 23. Taylor JM, Whalen PJ (2015) Neuroimaging and anxiety: The neural substrates of pathological and non-pathological anxiety. Curr Psychiatry Rep 17(6):49. source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“For example, when self-reports of the stimulus are compromised by using subliminal stimulation procedures, such as masking (63), areas of the visual cortex (including primary and secondary areas) are functionally active, but when participants are able to consciously report seeing a visual stimulus, additional cortical areas become active (47,54,(64)(65)(66)(67)(68)(69)(70)(71).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Neural Correlates of Reportable Conscious Experiences.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [63] 63. Breitmeyer BG, Ogmen H (2006) Visual Masking: Time Slices Through Conscious and Unconscious Vision (Oxford Univ Press, Oxford). source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [47] 47. Frith C, Perry R, Lumer E (1999) The neural correlates of conscious experience: An experimental framework. Trends Cogn Sci 3(3):105-114. source
- Not matchedcites [54] 54. Dehaene S (2014) Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts (Penguin, New York).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Introspection, in turn, is believed to involve such cognitive processes as attention, working memory, and metacognition (51-53), processes that are called upon in cognitive theories of consciousness (47,(54)(55)(56)(57).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Measuring Conscious Experiences.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [51] 51. Terrace H, Metcalfe J (2004) The Missing Link in Cognition: Origins of Self-Reflective Consciousness (Oxford Univ Press, New York). source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [52] 52. Smith JD (2009) The study of animal metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 13(9):389-396. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [53] 53. Overgaard M, Sandberg K (2014) Kinds of access: Different methods for report re- veal different kinds of metacognitive access. The Cognitive Neuroscience of Metacognition, eds Fleming SM, Frith CD (Springer, Berlin), pp 67-86. source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [47] 47. Frith C, Perry R, Lumer E (1999) The neural correlates of conscious experience: An experimental framework. Trends Cogn Sci 3(3):105-114. source
- Not matchedcites [54] 54. Dehaene S (2014) Consciousness and the Brain: Deciphering How the Brain Codes Our Thoughts (Penguin, New York).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Nonverbal behavior is satisfactory for demonstrating that a human or other animal is conscious in the sense of being awake and responsive to stimuli, and for demonstrating cognitive capacities underlying working memory, attention, metacognition, problemsolving ability, and other indicators of intelligent behavior (52).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Measuring Conscious Experiences.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [52] 52. Smith JD (2009) The study of animal metacognition. Trends Cogn Sci 13(9):389-396. source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This does not mean that defensive survival circuits play no role in conscious fear: they modulate the experience of fear, but are not directly responsible for the conscious experience itself.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Significance
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, these circuits process different inputs in emotional vs. nonemotional conscious experiences, and in different kinds of emotional experiences.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Significance
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Traditional HOT needs to be modified before using it as the foundation for a theory of emotional consciousness.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“For example, Rosenthal uses introspection to refer to situations when one is attentively and deliberately focused on one's conscious experiences.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“However, this representation is not of the conscious self (113) and can be construed as being implicit or nonconscious (134).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [113] 113. Conway MA (2005) Memory and the self. J Mem Lang 53(4):594-628. 150. Marsh EJ, Roediger HL (2013) Episodic and autobiographical memory. Handbook of Psychology: Volume 4, Experimental Psychology, eds Healy AF, Proctor RW (John Wiley & Sons, New York), 2nd Ed, pp 472-494. 151. Piaget J (1971) Biology and Knowledge (Edinburgh Univ Press, Edinburgh). 152. Mandler JM (1984) Stories, Scripts, and Scenes: Aspects of Schema Theory (Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Hillsdale, NJ). 153. O'Sullivan CS, Durso FT (1984) Effect of schema-incongruent information on memory for stereotypical attributes. J Per source
- Not checked — no full text of the sourcecites [134] source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We propose a more inclusive view of introspection, in which the term indicates the process by which phenomenally experienced states result.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Only when the self is explicitly integrated into the episode does autonoetic awareness occur.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“According to HOT, one is not typically conscious of the higher-order state itself, but instead is conscious of the first-order state by virtue of the HOR of it.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“To be aware of the higher-order state (to be conscious that you are in that state) requires yet another HOR.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Specifically needed are changes to its treatment of introspection, of higherorder states that lack an external source, and of the self.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Both kinds of introspection, in our view, lead to phenomenal experience.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Modified Higher-Order Theory
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In this sense, animals may have episodic (what, where, when) memory, and maybe even noetic awareness, but may nevertheless lack autonoetic awareness.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, a distinction between self and other that includes body sensations or mental states, but that does not explicitly represent the conscious self, is not a state of self-awareness.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If HOROR is correct, the nonconscious events that contribute to consciousness are not sensory cortex events but instead are HORs of sensory events (the first HOR).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“A key criticism of HOT is that it relies on the existence of a relation between the higher-order state and the state which it represents (121).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [121] 121. Gentner D, Goldin-Meadow S, eds (2003) Language in Mind: Advances in the Study of Language and Thought (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA). 177. Marks I (1987) Fears, Phobias, and Rituals: Panic, Anxiety and Their Disorders (Oxford Univ Press, New York). 178.
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
- Not matched
A claim is checked only against the cited paper’s full text, never its abstract, and none is available for its sources.
In the paper
“We view the self as a set of autobiographical memories about who you are and what has happened to you in your life, and how you think, act, and feel in particular situations (149, 150).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
What the sources say
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“HOROR posits that phenomenal consciousness consists of having the appropriate HOR of lower-order information, where lower-order does not necessarily mean sensory, but instead refers to a prior higher-order state that is rerepresented (Fig. 4A).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Accounting for HORs of Absent Stimuli: HOROR Theory.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim could be matched to a paper in Crossref, so there is nothing to check it against.
In the paper
“One of us (J.E.L.) has long argued that emotional states of consciousness depend on the same fundamental neural mechanisms as any other state of consciousness, but that the inputs processed are different (8,9,20,165,166).”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness
What the sources say
- Not matchedcites [8] 8. LeDoux JE (1996) The Emotional Brain (Simon and Schuster, New York).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites [9] 9. LeDoux JE (2002) Synaptic Self: How Our Brains Become Who We Are (Viking, New York).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
- Not matchedcites [20] 20. LeDoux JE (2015) Anxious: Using the Brain to Understand and Treat Fear and Anxiety (Viking, New York).
Couldn’t be matched to a paper in Crossref, so it can’t be checked.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Not matched
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, as noted earlier, fear can occur when the defensive survival circuit is damaged.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If some event is not affecting you, then it is not producing an emotion.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“However, although self-HOROR is necessary it is not sufficient for an emotional experience.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“An emotion is the conscious experience that occurs when you are aware that you are in particular kind of situation that you have come, through your experiences, to think of as a fearful situation.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Unlike in traditional HOT, where there is somewhat of a hierarchical, or serial, relation between lower-and higher-order cortical circuits, in HOTEC the amygdala represents an additional lower-order circuit that can be activated in parallel with, and even independent of, the GNC.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional Consciousness
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“HOTEC extends HOT and HORROR theory to account for the self.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Conclusion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“A key aspect of our HOTEC is the HOR of the self; simply put, no self, no emotion.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Relation of HOTEC to Other Theories of Emotion
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although we have focused on fear, we believe that the basic principles involved can be leveraged to understand other emotions as well.”
§ A higher-order theory of emotional consciousness > Conclusion
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper relies on this without support.
Lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.
“Although our conclusions may not apply equally well to all emotions, we maintain that the lessons from fear provide general principles that can at least be used as a starting point for theorizing about many emotions.”
The paper relies on this without support.
It is possible to have the experience as of seeing something without it being there to be seen, as in hallucinations or dreams.
“However, it is possible to have the experience as of seeing something without it being there to be seen, as in the case of hallucinations or in dreams.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The subcortical representations proposed by Panksepp and Damasio occur in humans and other mammals.
“The subcortical representations proposed by Pankesepp and Damasio clearly occur in humans and other mammals.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Nonconscious HORs exist.
“HOROR thus depends on the existence of nonconscious HORs.”
The paper relies on this without support.
The amygdala has direct connections with the GNC.
“In addition, the amygdala has direct connections with the sensory cortex, allowing bottom-up attentional control over sensory processing and memory retrieval, and also has direct connections with the GNC.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“Recent accounts of higher-order theories (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;Brown et al., 2019;LeDoux, 2020a) have suggested that the ACC (like the OFC) contributes to more complex aspects of phenomenal consciousness (e.g., emotions, memories, sense of self, and so on), either independently or via interactions with the lateral PFC (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;Brown et al., 2019;LeDoux, 2020a).”
From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“While the specificity of the effects in the OFC and ACC does not suggest a general role for these regions in consciousness, stimulation of these regions does result in reproducible changes in emotional experience and may provide support for recent accounts of higher-order theories of emotional consciousness (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;LeDoux, 2020a).”
From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017
Experimental — accuracy not yet measuredThe cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“Importantly, this evidence may provide support for recent accounts of higher-order theories of emotional consciousness (LeDoux and Brown, 2017;LeDoux, 2020a), which postulate that subcortical circuits generate unconscious emotional content that is then rendered conscious in cortical networks involved in “higher” cognitive processing.”
From Does the Prefrontal Cortex Play an Essential Role in Consciousness? Insights from Intracranial Electrical Stimulation of the Human Brain (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017
The cited source says what the claim attributes to it.
In the citing paper
“In theoretical work on emotional consciousness, LeDoux and colleagues argue that lower-order responses can contribute to, but are not necessary for, the conscious experience of any emotional cognitive state (LeDoux & Brown, 2017;LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018).”
From Responding to uncertain threat: A potential mediator for the effect of mindfulness on anxiety (2021) · cites this paper as LeDoux & Brown, 2017
The check wasn’t confident either way, so it gives no verdict — never disputed.
In the citing paper
“subcortical memory traces cannot be retrieved in the form of images, for the simple reason that they do not consist in cortical mappings of the sensory-motor surface organs47.”
From The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Free Energy Principle (2019) · cites this paper as [47]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
In the citing paper
“Indeed, LeDoux and colleagues have emphasized the evidence that the human amygdala is rather little involved in subjective emotional experience (LeDoux and Pine, 2016; LeDoux and Brown, 2017; LeDoux et al., 2018).”
From The orbitofrontal cortex: reward, emotion and depression (2020) · cites this paper as LeDoux and Brown, 2017
Citations
Cites
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Metadata
- Authors
- LeDoux, J. E., & Brown, R.
- Affiliations
- Nathan Kline Institute for Psychiatric Research (US)
- LaGuardia Community College (US)
- Corresponding author
- LeDoux, Joseph E.
- Venue
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Publisher
- National Academy of Sciences
- Published
- 2017-02-15
- Volume
- 114
- Issue
- 10
- Pages
- E2016-E2025
- ISSN
- 0027-8424 (ISSN-L)
- 1091-6490
- PMC
- PMC5347624
- OpenAlex
- W2588736771
- Semantic Scholar
- 22592777ca31ac5db435214f6aef65bc88cabc9c
- Cited by
- 690
- References
- 221
- Citations by year
- 2026: 43 · 2025: 66 · 2024: 97 · 2023: 96 · 2022: 76 · 2021: 73 · 2020: 79 · 2019: 76 · 2018: 63 · 2017: 21
- FWCI
- 84.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- bronze
- doi.org
- Locations
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences (publishedVersion)
- PubMed Central (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- PhilPapers (PhilPapers Foundation) (submittedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Keywords
- emotional awareness, feelings, subjective experience, subcortical circuits, cortical networks, theory of mind
- MeSH terms
- Amygdala, Awareness, Cognition, Consciousness, Fear, Humans, Memory, Short-Term, Visual Cortex
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