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Cited by 64Action Observation and SynchronizationChild and Animal Learning DevelopmentSocial Robot Interaction and HRI

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 236 of the 241 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

What makes the dorsomedial frontal cortex active during reading the mental states of others?

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Isoda, Masaki, Noritake, Atsushi·2013·Frontiers in Neuroscience
DOI 10.3389/fnins.2013.00232PMC PMC3852025
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Abstract

The dorsomedial frontal part of the cerebral cortex is consistently activated when people read the mental states of others, such as their beliefs, desires, and intentions, the ability known as having a theory of mind (ToM) or mentalizing. This ubiquitous finding has led many researchers to conclude that the dorsomedial frontal cortex (DMFC) constitutes a core component in mentalizing networks. Despite this, it remains unclear why the DMFC becomes active during ToM tasks. We argue that key psychological and behavioral aspects in mentalizing are closely associated with DMFC functions. These include executive inhibition, distinction between self and others, prediction under uncertainty, and perception of intentions, all of which are important for predicting others' intention and behavior. We review the literature supporting this claim, ranging in fields from developmental psychology to human neuroimaging and macaque electrophysiology. Because perceiving intentions in others' actions initiates mentalizing and forms the basis of virtually all types of social interaction, the fundamental issue in social neuroscience is to determine the aspects of physical entities that make an observer perceive that they are intentional beings and to clarify the neurobiological underpinnings of the perception of intentionality in others' actions.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fnins.2013.00232

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Figures

Figure 1 Involvement of DMFC in executive inhibition. (A) When the animal successfully switched to a now-valid action by inhibiting a pre-potent, no-longer-valid action, pre-SMA “switch neurons” fired phasically before movement onset (red). Switching was unsuccessful when the initiation of activity increase was delayed (blue). (B) The contrast between inhibition vs. action trials revealed activation in the dorsal frontomedial cortex (BA 9). Reprinted with permission from Brass and Haggard (2007).
Figure 1 Involvement of DMFC in executive inhibition. (A) When the animal successfully switched to a now-valid action by inhibiting a pre-potent, no-longer-valid action, pre-SMA “switch neurons” fired phasically before movement onset (red). Switching was unsuccessful when the initiation of activity increase was delayed (blue). (B) The contrast between inhibition vs. action trials revealed activation in the dorsal frontomedial cortex (BA 9). Reprinted with permission from Brass and Haggard (2007).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 2 Involvement of DMFC in self-other distinction. A group of DMFC neurons (“partner-type neurons”) were preferentially activated when the recorded monkey observed another monkey making an action (blue), while another group of DMFC neurons (“self-type neurons”) were preferentially activated when the recorded monkey executed an action (red).
Figure 2 Involvement of DMFC in self-other distinction. A group of DMFC neurons (“partner-type neurons”) were preferentially activated when the recorded monkey observed another monkey making an action (blue), while another group of DMFC neurons (“self-type neurons”) were preferentially activated when the recorded monkey executed an action (red).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 3 Involvement of DMFC in prediction under uncertainty. The contrast between prediction under uncertainty vs. control conditions revealed activation in several brain regions including the frontomedian cortex (BA 8). vST, ventral striatum; Tha, thalamus; VTA, midbrain area; Cu, cuneus; Ce, cerebellum. Reprinted with permission from Volz et al. (2003).
Figure 3 Involvement of DMFC in prediction under uncertainty. The contrast between prediction under uncertainty vs. control conditions revealed activation in several brain regions including the frontomedian cortex (BA 8). vST, ventral striatum; Tha, thalamus; VTA, midbrain area; Cu, cuneus; Ce, cerebellum. Reprinted with permission from Volz et al. (2003).CC BY · PubMed Central
Figure 4 Involvement of DMFC in attention to and perception of intention. (A) Activation of the pre-SMA associated with attention to intention as compared to attention to movement. The time course of the hemodynamic response is shown on the right. Reprinted with permission from Lau et al. (2004). (B) Activation of BA 9 associated with anticipation of third-person actions as compared to non-biological agent (i.e., computer) actions. Reprinted with permission from Ramnani and Miall (2004). *P < 0.005. (one-tailed paired t-test).
Figure 4 Involvement of DMFC in attention to and perception of intention. (A) Activation of the pre-SMA associated with attention to intention as compared to attention to movement. The time course of the hemodynamic response is shown on the right. Reprinted with permission from Lau et al. (2004). (B) Activation of BA 9 associated with anticipation of third-person actions as compared to non-biological agent (i.e., computer) actions. Reprinted with permission from Ramnani and Miall (2004). *P < 0.005. (one-tailed paired t-test).CC BY · PubMed Central

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Cites

Research works printed but not linked: 1

  1. Bates E. (1990). Language about me and you: pronominal reference and the emerging concept of self, in The Self in Transition: Infancy to Childhood, eds Cicchetti D. Beeghly M. (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press), 165– 182

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Metadata

Authors
Isoda, M., & Noritake, A.
Affiliations
Kansai Medical University (JP)
Corresponding author
Isoda, Masaki
ORCID
Venue
Frontiers in Neuroscience
Publisher
Frontiers Media SA
Published
2013
Volume
7
Pages
232-232
ISSN
1662-453X (ISSN-L)
DOI
10.3389/fnins.2013.00232
PMC
PMC3852025
OpenAlex
W1988828685
Cited by
64
References
241
Citations by year
2026: 1 · 2025: 3 · 2024: 3 · 2023: 4 · 2022: 3 · 2021: 10 · 2020: 4 · 2019: 6 · 2018: 11 · 2017: 7 · 2016: 4 · 2015: 4 · 2014: 4
FWCI
0.52
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Licence
cc-by
Locations
  • Frontiers in Neuroscience (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (24300125)
  • Precursory Research for Embryonic Science and Technology
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Action Observation and Synchronization
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Child and Animal Learning Development
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Social Robot Interaction and HRI
Keywords
dorsomedial frontal cortex, theory of mind, mentalization, intention perception, self-other distinction, prediction under uncertainty, social cognition

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