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A World Unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference

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Vasil, Jared, Badcock, Paul B., Constant, Axel, Friston, Karl, Ramstead, Maxwell J. D. · 2020 · Frontiers in Psychology
Cited by 94

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 105 of the 105 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Abstract

Recent theoretical work in developmental psychology suggests that humans are predisposed to align their mental states with those of other individuals. One way this manifests is in cooperative communication; that is, intentional communication aimed at aligning individuals’ mental states with respect to events in their shared environment. This idea has received strong empirical support. The purpose of this paper is to extend this account by proposing an integrative model of the biobehavioral dynamics of cooperative communication. Our formulation is based on active inference. Active inference suggests that action-perception cycles operate to minimize uncertainty and optimize an individual’s internal model of the world. We propose that humans are characterized by an evolved adaptive prior belief that their mental states are aligned with, or similar to, those of conspecifics (i.e., that ‘we are the same sort of creature, inhabiting the same sort of niche’). The use of cooperative communication emerges as the principal means to gather evidence for this belief, allowing for the development of a shared narrative that is used to disambiguate interactants’ (hidden and inferred) mental states. Thus, by using cooperative communication, individuals effectively attune to a hermeneutic niche composed, in part, of others’ mental states; and, reciprocally, attune the niche to their own ends via epistemic niche construction. This means that niche construction enables features of the niche to encode precise, reliable cues about the deontic or shared value of certain action policies (e.g., the utility of using communicative constructions to disambiguate mental states, given expectations about shared prior beliefs). In turn, the alignment of mental states (prior beliefs) enables the emergence of a novel, contextualizing scale of cultural dynamics that encompasses the actions and mental states of the ensemble of interactants and their shared environment. The dynamics of this contextualizing layer of cultural organization feedback, across scales, to constrain the variability of the prior expectations of the individuals who constitute it. Our theory additionally builds upon the active inference literature by introducing a new set of neurobiologically plausible computational hypotheses for cooperative communication. We conclude with directions for future research.

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Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.00417

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Citations

Cites

Cited by

  • Epistemic Communities under Active Inference

    Albarracin, M., Demekas, D., Ramstead, M. J. D., & Heins, C. (2022) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e24040476 · Cited by 60

    “We systematically 1128 varied both epistemic confirmation bias (15 values of γ tiling the range [3, 9]) and network 1129 connectivity (15 values of p tiling the range [0.”
    BackgroundInfluentialSelf-citation
  • An Active Inference Model of Collective Intelligence

    Kaufmann, R., Gupta, P., & Taylor, J. (2021) · Entropy · doi:10.3390/e23070830 · Cited by 35

    “We build upon these accounts by using AIF to first posit the minimal information-theoretical patterns (or “adaptive priors”; see [32]) that would likely emerge at the level of the individual agent to allow that agent to persist and flourish in an environment populated by other AIF agents [53].”
    BackgroundMethod
  • Federated inference and belief sharing

    Friston, K. J., Parr, T., Heins, C., Constant, A., Friedman, D., Isomura, T., Fields, C., Verbelen, T., Ramstead, M., Clippinger, J., et al. (2024) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2023.105500 · Cited by 30

    “…by experience-dependent plasticity of a (neuro) developmental sort — could be read in terms of niche construction and evolutionary developmental biology (Ghazanfar and Takahashi, 2014; Hauser et al., 2002; Heyes, 2018; Laland et al., 1999; Lehmann, 2008; Vasil et al., 2020; Veissiere et al., 2019).”
    BackgroundSelf-citation
  • Science-Driven Societal Transformation, Part I: Worldview

    (2020) · doi:10.3390/su12176881 · Cited by 13

See all 94

Metadata

Authors
Vasil, J., Badcock, P. B., Constant, A., Friston, K., & Ramstead, M. J. D.
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2020-03-25
Volume
11
Pages
417-417
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2953867108
Cited by
94
References
105
FWCI
6.76
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
gold

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