The DOI matches its Crossref record; 120 of the 123 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; 4 of the 105 sources its claims cite were checked for support.
Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation.
Open accessAbstract
Mental time travel (MTT) is defined as projecting the self into the past and the future. Despite growing evidence of the similarities of remembering past and imagining future events, dominant theories conceive of these as distinct capacities. I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process – constructive episodic simulation – and demonstrate that the ‘simulation system’ meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system. Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation system: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world; (2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf. predictive coding); and (3) is subserved by the same brain system. I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus. Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience. This proposal has some important implications for the construct of ‘MTT’, suggesting that ‘time’ and ‘travel’ may not be defining, or even essential, features. Rather, it is the ‘mental’ rendering of experience that is the most fundamental function of this simulation system, enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.
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73 Own interpretation · 67 Not checked yet · 6 No basis given · 3 Partly supported · 1 Own result · accuracy not yet measured
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(3) is subserved by the same brain system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
In the paper
“I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process -constructive episodic simulation -and demonstrate that the 'simulation system' meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“Moreover, this reconceptualisation meets Schacter and Tulving's (1994) critieria for a single, shared neurocognitive system: irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Schacter and Tulving's (1994)
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Furthermore, neuroimaging has provided evidence that, for instance, episodic retrieval involves synchronous reactivation of activation patterns in the cortical areas that initially processed the elements of the original experience, thereby reconstructing the originally-encoded representation of the experience (Fuster, 1997;Schacter et al., 1998).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.1 MTT into the past: Episodic and semantic memory
What the sources say
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Irrespective of whether one is remembering or imagining, the simulation process: (1) acts on the same information, drawing on elements of experience ranging from fine-grained perceptual details to coarser-grained conceptual information and schemas about the world;”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
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In the paper
“Episodic memory is primarily conceived of as being a constructive process.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.1 MTT into the past: Episodic and semantic memory
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“I propose that memory and imagination are fundamentally the same process -constructive episodic simulation -and demonstrate that the 'simulation system' meets the three criteria of a neurocognitive system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · hedged
“Instead of conceptualizing imagination as reliant on the episodic memory system, I suggest both memories and imaginings are instantations of the same neurocognitive process: constructive episodic simulation (Addis, 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis, 2018 source
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · hedged
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(2) is governed by the same rules of operation, including associative processes that facilitate construction of a schematic scaffold, the event representation itself, and the dynamic interplay between the two (cf.predictive coding);”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(2) I reformulate our hypothesis that remembering and imagining tax distinct types of associative processes, namely reintegration and recombination respectively, instead suggesting that simulations vary in 'associative strength' depending on the associative history of constituent details (i.e., whether details have been previously associated);”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
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None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Neuroimaging has revealed that memory and imagination engage the same brain networks, including the default mode network (DMN; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007;Okuda et al., 2003;Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007; see Figure 1).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
What the sources say
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In the paper
“As I recently argued (Addis, 2018), some apparent differences between past and future events likely reflect differences in proportional resolution rather than fundamental differences in content or mechanistic.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis, 2018 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(5) I suggest that constructive episodic simulation applies not only to remembering and imagining, but also to perceiving events;”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
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In the paper
“There is considerable evidence to support the claim that remembered and imagined events comprise similar content.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although these findings are difficult to explain within current theories of episodic memory, viewing memory and imagination as the same process removes this difficulty.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(3) I propose that associative schematic processes guide the construction of a simulation, providing a framework for the simulation and a means for iteratively refining it until an event boundary is reached;”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“While representations may vary in resolution, I posit that this variance likely reflects the resolution of the constituent elements.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
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- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
In the paper
“My contention is that, according to these criteria, memory and imagination are indeed one neurocognitive system.”
- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
“Moreover, this reconceptualisation meets Schacter and Tulving's (1994) critieria for a single, shared neurocognitive system: irrespective of whether a simulation is remembered or imagined in the past or the future, the same types of content is acted on by the same set of cognitive operations and mediated by the same brain system.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Schacter and Tulving's (1994)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Also stated in: § 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis · plain
In the paper
“Specifically, both forms of MTT engage aspects of the DMN (Figure 1), including medial prefrontal, medial and inferior lateral parietal, and anterolateral temporal cortices, and the medial temporal lobes (Addis et al., 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis et al., 2007 source
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In the paper
“There is, however, an asymmetry inherent in this account, in that the neurocognitive overlap between past and future events reflects a unidirectional contributory relationship whereby episodic memory supports future simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
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In the paper
“Additionally, differential deficits in future thinking have been reported in various disorders (de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, et al., 2012;Irish et al., 2012a).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites de Vito, Gamboz, Brandimonte, et al., 2012
- Not checked yetcites Irish et al., 2012a
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Irrespective of theme, simulations of past and future events contain the same types of details, as demonstrated in numerous studies utilizing the Autobiographical Interview to examine event transcripts.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
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In the paper
“Additionally, the relative numbers of different subtypes of episodic details is remarkably similar (see Figure 2; Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012b).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Irish, Addis, Hodges, & Piguet, 2012b
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Classifying details as either episodic or semantic according to the traditional definition (Tulving, 1972) is problematic.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Tulving, 1972
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“These activation patterns are evident whenever we are engaged in simulation, whether that simulation is spontaneous (e.g., mind-wandering; Christoff, Irving, Fox, Spreng, & Andrews-Hanna, 2016) or intentional, is focused on our own past and future, or someone else's (i.e., theory of mind; Buckner & Carroll, 2007), or entirely fictional worlds (Behrens et al., 2018;Hasson, Chen, & Honey, 2015;Mar,”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is likely that there is a 'minimal combination' of these three qualities required to give rise to MTT into the past and future: (1) in terms of complexity, that the simulation is nested at least within the selfschema; and (2) in terms of proportional resolution, that the simulation contain some proportion of highresolution elements.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
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In the paper
“(1) I emphasize the role of pre-existing knowledge, including semantic, conceptual and schematic content, in constructing both past and future events;”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
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In the paper
“Once these two requirements are met, the elaborateness of the simulation will not alter the presence or absence of MTT.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I suggest that during simulation, the contributions of both associative strength and associative schematic processes vary along continuums.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
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In the paper
“what is clear is that schemas are essential to their construction, irrespective of temporal orientation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
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In the paper
“While it has been suggested that conceptual knowledge may also play a direct role in integration (Irish & Piguet, 2013), it seems unlikely to be the case.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Irish & Piguet, 2013 source
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In the paper
“when simulating novel or unusual events, processes such as conceptual expansion and spreading activation through semantic networks may be required to expand the 'simulation space' so as to incorporate disparate ideas into a novel yet coherent simulation (Roberts & Addis, 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Roberts & Addis, 2018 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“Relevant schemas are activated on the basis of available information, such as incoming perceptual and/or internally-generated information (e.g., prediction; Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“I propose that schemas provide structure to event simulations in the same way irrespective of whether the event is perceived, remembered or imagined (Addis, 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis, 2018 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Rests on an assumption: Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
In the paper
“associative strength is the likely mechanism underlying the fluency of event simulations (cf.Michaelian, 2011).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Michaelian, 2011 source
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In the paper
“I propose that what has been referred to as scaffolding is relational reasoning.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
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In the paper
“the hippocampus mediates the associations between all elements comprising the simulation, whether scene-related or not.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
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In the paper
“associative processes during future simulation, specifically the recombination of details, as compared to the reintegration of the previously associated details comprising past events”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis & Schacter, 2012 source
- Not checked yetcites Schacter & Addis, 2007
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The degree to which associative strength and/or schemas contribute to a given simulation very much depends on the nature of that particular simulation and is perhaps most dependent on its selfrelevance.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
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In the paper
“These operations occur under the guidance of 'reasoning schemas' that reference current goals, contextual constraints and social norms, and rules for the reasoning process itself (e.g., cause-and-effect, preconditions, covariations; Hummel & Holyoak, 2003;Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Hummel & Holyoak, 2003 source
- Not checked yetcites Rumelhart & Ortony, 1977
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The modus operandi of the constructive simulation system is associative, with different associative processes occurring at different levels of the simulation process: between elements, within and between schemas, and between schemas and the emergent simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2 Associative processes underpin the constructive simulation of events
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the inherent complexity of the simulation likely also decreases because, for one, it is not nested within the self-schema -the most complex, multidimensional knowledge structure that humans possess.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“I recently reformulated this hypothesis (Addis, 2018), instead proposing that all simulations -whether remembered or imagined -vary along a continuum of 'associative strength' depending on the associative history of constituent elements”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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In the paper
“we have argued that the hippocampus plays a more general associative role, supporting the construction of both scenes and the events that play out within those scenes (Roberts, Schacter, & Addis, 2017).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Roberts, Schacter, & Addis, 2017 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“associative strength is likely lower for non-personal events, given that existing assemblages of pre-associated elements from one's prior experiences are less relevant, if at all.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“I conceive of simulation as an iterative, dynamic process that unfolds over seconds to minutes (Addis, 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.3 Associations between schemas, elements, and the simulation.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis, 2018 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“relational reasoning enables prediction, constraint and selection of possible elements (i.e., of the relevant elements specified in activated schemas) and the possible nature of their associations.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The net sum is that (in most cases) the coherence, plausibility, and relevance (to self and goals) of the simulation is enhanced.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.3 Associations between schemas, elements, and the simulation.
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“The simulation is held online and continually refined until an event boundary is reached (Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007); such boundaries include shifts in attention occurring both within the inner world (e.g., a change in an internally-generated event representation) and the external word”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.3 Associations between schemas, elements, and the simulation.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Zacks, Speer, Swallow, Braver, & Reynolds, 2007 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“During perception, various streams of incoming sensory information are processed and, with continual interactions with relevant schemas, are integrated together into an emerging simulation supported by the higher-level DMN regions.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“this conceptualization takes into account our increasing understanding of these whole brain networks as dynamic entities, with patterns of activity and connectivity (both within-network and with other networks) shifting as required by ever-changing situational demands (Cabral, Kringelbach, & Deco, 2014;Shine et al., 2016).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I would argue that the self is a cognitive space in its own right.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the 'self space' is likely the overarching cognitive space within which schemas of all self-relevant simulations are nested.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Increased schema-reliance has been associated with activity in and connectivity between anterior hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex (Gilboa & Marlatte, 2017;Gilboa & Moscovitch, 2017)”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“With lower reliance on self-schema, as well as reductions in complexity, associative strength, elaborateness and proportional resolution, it is not surprising that imagining non-personal events is associated with lower activity levels in many DMN regions relative to imagining personal events (including parahippocampal cortex, posterior cingulate, and cuneus; e.g., D' Argembeau et al., 2010;Szpunar”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“supporting the compelling prediction that simulations can be situated within multi-dimensional cognitive space(s).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“the proposal that simulations are situated within multi-dimensional cognitive spaces akin to cognitive maps (Tolman, 1948).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Tolman, 1948 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the presentinto the past, the future, or fictional worlds -might be only one instantiation of a general simulation capacity that also enables us to comprehend the present.”
- Also stated in: § 5. Summary and Conclusions · plain
“Indeed, projecting the self into the past, the future, and/or fictional worlds are only some instantiations of a general simulation capacity that also enables us to comprehend and respond to the ever-changing complexities of the present.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 5. Summary and Conclusions · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“associative strength has a non-linear, U-shaped relationship with DMN activity, increasing as associative strength decreases and constructive demands ramp up -but only to a point.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“When taken together, these two continuums can explain the complex patterns of findings yielded by cognitive neuroscience research on past and future MTT over the last decade, including the results of our programme of neuroimaging studies examining future simulation”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Importantly, schemas also guide the incorporation of pre-existing elements into the simulation of present experience, such as previously-perceived elements (depending on associative strength with activated elements) and conceptual knowledge, to fill in gaps in perception, provide deeper levels of meaning, and so on.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“The degree of schema-reliance has a positive linear association with the involvement of anterior aspects of the DMN and frontopartietal control network to support higher-level relational reasoning processes and activation of conceptual content (Roberts & Addis, 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Roberts & Addis, 2018 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“all forms of simulation involve self-schemas (e.g., personal goals, trait self-knowledge, life narratives, etc.) albeit to differing degrees”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites D'Argembeau & Van der Linden, 2012 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“One important implication of this hypothesis for the construct of MTT is the possibility that both 'travel' and 'time' are not essential to constructing a mental rendering of experience.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“imagining future events by recasting past events into the future is highly similar to remembering, again utilizing substantial chunks of content where elements are linked by strong associations.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“this proposal can also explain greater activity in anterior DMN regions, including the anterior hippocampus, during future relative to past events (Addis, 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis, 2018 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Essentially this simulation process is the same as that engaged during remembering and imagining, although the balance of incoming to pre-existing elements will likely differ.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“For instance, the simulation itselfas an emergent and transient mental construction -may be underpinned by small networks (or 'processspecific alliances') that assemble and disassemble as needed (Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Cabeza & Moscovitch, 2013 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Second, I argued that the same rules of operation govern memory and imagination.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I have argued that this simulation system is a general capacity that is leveraged in service of other forms of cognition, including the perception of ongoing experience, a proposal which has important implications for the concept of 'MTT'.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“It is likely that neural dynamics play an important role in supporting ongoing interactions between schemas and the emerging simulation to enable its iterative refinement.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“First, I have shown that this simulation system acts on the same information; schemas and elements at various levels of resolution (ranging from perceptual features to concepts) are used to construct simulations of past and future experiences.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Not only is 'time' a non-essential aspect of MTT given that simulations of perception reflect the present, it also obviates the need for 'travel' as simulating current experience does not remove one entirely from their present.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- Probably not a substantial claim. 30
- It may state two separate claims as one. 55
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“According to this view, because past and future representations themselves do not differ in structure or content, it is hypothesized that it is the fluency of the constructive process -an attribute of both memory and imagination -that indicates whether or not a given event was previously experienced (Perrin & Michaelian, 2017).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Perrin & Michaelian, 2017 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Conclusion (section 7; page unavailable) says that, on an attributionalist account, more fluent simulations tend to be attributed to past experience, while cautioning that fluency does not guarantee prior experience. The paper does not establish that past and future representations have identical structure or content; its discussion of discontinuism (section 4; page unavailable) reports differences in sensory detail and emotional valence. (LLM, conf=0.86)
hedgeddirect- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Partly supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“By the continuist view, failures of source/reality monitoring occur because remembered and imagined events are often very similar in content and phenomenology, for instance, when imagined events are elaborate, vivid, and plausible (Devitt, Monk-Fromont, Schacter, & Addis, 2016;Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996;Johnson et al., 1993).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Supportedcites Devitt, Monk-Fromont, Schacter, & Addis, 2016 source
Experiment 2 explains that source-monitoring errors can occur when the phenomenological characteristics of imagined and real events overlap. The General Discussion links vivid simulation and memory-like perceptual detail to greater source confusion, while Experiment 1 reports that more plausible imagined conjunction events were more likely to be accepted as real. (LLM, conf=0.88)
- Partly supportedcites Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The passage labeled Abstract says imagined and experienced childhood memories can have few qualitative differences, making their sources hard to distinguish. The Procedure asks participants to imagine events clearly and completely, and another passage says imagined events may seem more plausible. The paper does not establish that elaborate, vivid imagined events are what cause source-monitoring failures; its childhood-memory explanation instead suggests that even imagined and genuine memories containing diffuse information may be confused. Page numbers are unavailable in our copy. (LLM, conf=0.85)
- Not checked yetcites Johnson et al., 1993 source
plaindirect- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Supported
The cited sources support only part of this claim — read each source’s verdict below.
In the paper
“The overall proportional resolution of non-personal simulations is also likely lower, with a greater proportion of lower-resolution elements such as general semantic knowledge (Szpunar et al., 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Partly supportedcites Szpunar et al., 2007 sourceExperimental — accuracy not yet measured
The Discussion (page not provided) says participants relied more on semantic knowledge when imagining Bill Clinton than when envisioning their personal futures. It does not assess the overall proportional resolution of simulations, and its nonpersonal comparison is limited to imagining that familiar individual. (LLM, conf=0.84)
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Partly supported
A result the paper reports from its own data — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Our neuroimaging studies suggest that the threshold sits somewhere between the simulation of plausible future events and high novel or implausible events, and once reached, DMN activity decreases, while activity in anterior DMN and frontoparietal network increase.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“We observed this phenomenon during simulation of future events involving incongruent (relative to congruent) details (Roberts, Wiebels, et al., 2017), as have others during tasks involving simulation of events in unfamiliar (versus familiar) contexts (Szpunar, Chan, & McDermott, 2009).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Finally, I suggest that simulation is a general capacity that underpins other domains of cognition, such as the perception of ongoing experience.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
“Finally, I will suggest that simulation may be a general cognitive capacity underpinning other forms of cognition, including perception (Section 6).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Psychological research has demonstrated that episodic memory and imagination emerge at similar times during childhood (Atance & O'Neill, 2001), and that in adulthood, individual differences in emotion regulation and mental imagery abilities are correlated similarly with past and future events (D' Argembeau & van der Linden, 2006).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
What the sources say
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Rather, it is the 'mental' rendering of experience is the most fundamental function of this simulation system enabling humans to re-experience the past, pre-experience the future, and also comprehend the complexities of the present.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“Although this simulation system can be co-opted to mentally traverse time and space, it is the 'mental' rendering of experience that is the key function of this system and crucial to many aspects of higher cognition.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“I also propose that by forming associations between schemas, the simulation system constructs multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation is mapped by the hippocampus.”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
“I also propose that this 'simulation system' supports the construction of multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation can be mapped by the hippocampus (Section 5).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · plain
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This proposal has some important implications for the construct of 'MTT', suggesting that 'time' and 'travel' may not be defining, or even essential,”
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
“This view has some important implications for how we understand MTT, suggesting that 'time' and 'travel' may not be defining characteristics.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > Abstract
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 1. Introduction · hedged
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Since the seminal work of Bartlett (1932), numerous cognitive studies have demonstrated that a memory may be missing elements and/or may contain new information (information that is schema-relevant and/or was newly encountered since the original experience; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.1 MTT into the past: Episodic and semantic memory
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bartlett (1932)
- Not checked yetcites Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998 source
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“However, it is becoming increasingly apparent that the brain's default network is not only involved in MTT into the past and future but also engaged other forms of MTT such as counterfactual thinking (De Brigard, Addis, Ford, Schacter, & Giovanello, 2013), and other forms of cognition, including creativity (Roberts & Addis, 2018), theory of mind (Frith & Frith, 2003), narrative comprehension (Mar,”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 1. Introduction
What the sources say
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Because episodic retrieval involves reactivating the elements of a past experience, the exact brain regions involved in a given memory will vary depending on the representational content.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.1 MTT into the past: Episodic and semantic memory
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“The episodic memory system supports the cognitive processes that are utilized during future simulation: episodic retrieval to reactivate details and relational processing to integrate details into a novel event representation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“If people actually retain as few details about their experiences as suggested by the results of a recent study (Misra, Marconi, Peterson, & Kreiman, 2018), then it is not surprising that remembered past events involve some degee of imagination, such as filling in missing details with internallygenerated content including details from related experiences, conceptual information fleshing out aspects”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As discussed in Section 2.1, most contemporary researchers appear to consider memory as a cognitive faculty distinct from other cognitive domains.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.1 Discontinuist views
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Episodic memory provides the raw materials for future imagination, and the distributed storage of episodic memories as elements heightens the accessibility of episodic details.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“For instance, conjunction errors (i.e., the integration of erroneous details into a memory) involve recombinations of details, and there is no reason to suggest this would be any different from the recombination process argued to underlie future imagination (Addis & Schacter, 2012;Schacter & Addis, 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis & Schacter, 2012 source
- Not checked yetcites Schacter & Addis, 2007
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(4) Continuums of associative strength and schema-reliance provide a continuist framework that clarifies the involvement of the DMN and related networks, and accommodates both similarities and differences between past and future events;”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The central tenet of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis is that although the constructive nature of episodic memory results in relatively frequently distortions during retrieval, thereby reducing the veracity of memory, it is nevertheless an adaptive 'design feature' that facilitates the flexible simulation of future events (Schacter & Addis, 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 2.2 MTT into the future: Constructive episodic simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Schacter & Addis, 2007
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Past and future events tend to centre on similar themes, such as social/leisure activities, relationship episodes, successes/failures, illnesses/accidents of the self/others (D' Argembeau & van der Linden, 2004), and feature events from the individual's cultural life script (e.g., in Western societies, typical events include graduating, getting a job, getting married, etc.; Rasmussen & Berntsen,”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Interestingly, the prevailing models of episodic memory as a distinct faculty typically characterize memory as constructive, thus also implying memory is modifiable in ways akin to 'imagination'.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
In the paper
“Much of the literature to date has focused on whether constituent details are episodic or semantic in nature, finding that across past and future events the numbers of episodic details is strongly correlated, as are the numbers of non-episodic details (e.g., Addis et al., 2008).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis et al., 2008 source
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“(6) I hypothesize that, as a way of interpreting, predicting, and interacting with the world, simulations are situated within complex cognitive 'spaces' that code for multiple dimensions of experience.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4. Continuist reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis
hedged- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“If memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system, then the operational rules of simulation should be the same irrespective of whether the simulation being constructed is a remembered or imagined event”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2 Associative processes underpin the constructive simulation of events
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
- Rests on an assumption: Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“However, it is difficult (if not impossible) to determine whether any one detail is represented perceptually or conceptually on the basis of verbal descriptions alone, and neuroimaging profiles have not (as of yet) resolved the issue given that episodic and semantic memory engage overlapping DMN regions (Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009;Burianova & Grady, 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.1 Content similarities across remembered and imagined events
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Binder, Desai, Graves, & Conant, 2009 source
- Not checked yetcites Burianova & Grady, 2007
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Furthermore, just as schemas facilitate the reconstruction of memories, schemas also modify memories to fit with our general understanding of the world (e.g., cultural schemas; Bartlett, 1932) and ourselves (e.g., self schema; Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000), again bringing memories into the domain of imagination.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Bartlett, 1932
- Not checked yetcites Conway & Pleydell-Pearce, 2000
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Thus it may be that one of the only consistent differences between a memory and a vivid imagining is a relative difference in the fluency of construction (Michaelian, 2011), although even fluency differences can dissipate with repeated imaginings (Wiebels et al., 2019).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.2 Continuist views
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Michaelian, 2011 source
- Not checked yetcites Wiebels et al., 2019
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Memory scientists have, by-and-large, focused on the ability to remember the ground truth of experience, thus emphasizing a direct causal link to the past that imagined events cannot possess.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.1 Discontinuist views
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Most cognitive neuroscience theories sit somewhere between moderate discontinuism to moderate continuism.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 3.1 Discontinuist views
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“As a template, the schema provides predictions about the elements that are/were/will be likely experienced in the past/present/future event, and if those details not readily available (i.e., not currently perceived or activated), the schema guides the addition of relevant conceptual content to the simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the schema provides a structure in the form of predicted relations between elements; with respect to simulations, it is likely that temporal, spatial and causal associations predominate given that events that unfold over time and in space.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds. It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“the hippocampus is critical for mediating the (re)creation of associations at encoding and retrieval.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Schacter et al., 1998 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“As internallygenerated and/or externally-perceived multimodal information is accumulated and integrated with the event schema, the emerging simulation is held online in working memory (cf.episodic buffer; Baddeley, 2000) enabling it to be successively modified and refined.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.3 Associations between schemas, elements, and the simulation.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Baddeley, 2000 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Although concepts and categories bear resemblances to schemas (e.g., being acquired gradually and organised in associative networks), their relative fixedness is a direct result of inter-relationships being based on fixed definitions (i.e., the defining features of a category; Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014) and thus they lack the adaptability necessary for higher-level associative processes such as rel”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ghosh & Gilboa, 2014 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
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- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
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It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Associative strength reflects a change in the weights between elements that occurs simply by virtue of those elements occuring together (cf.Hebb, 1949).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Hebb, 1949
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“episodic memories are sets of associated elements that are reconstructed at retrieval (Schacter et al., 1998)”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Schacter et al., 1998 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“associative strength can explain findings that past events are constructed more fluently and quickly than imagined events (Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012;Wiebels et al., 2019), given that associative strength is higher for remembered events.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Anderson, Dewhurst, & Nash, 2012 source
- Not checked yetcites Wiebels et al., 2019
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“while some regions of the hippocampus are commonly engaged by remembering and imagining, the anterior hippocampus has been found to be more active when imagining versus remembering (Addis & Schacter, 2012).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis & Schacter, 2012 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Multiple schema will be activated including relevant 'event' schemas, each specifying elements and relations to be incorporated in the simulation, other relevant schemas (e.g., higher-order schemas, such as the self-schema, in which the event schema is nested), as well as 'reasoning schemas' that guide how other activated schemas are (consciously or unconsciously) adjusted, biased and/or integrate”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the cognitive flexibility afforded by schema and relational reasoning may be the key to the adaptive nature of simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Higher-level forms of relational reasoning, such as analogy and inference, involve mapping correspondences and creating higher-order relations between schemas (i.e., relations between relations; Gentner, 1983;Holyoak, 2012).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“schemas not only shape the content of simulations, but also how we reason about the past, present, and future, and how we situate events more broadly with respect to our self and our lives”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This effect is more apparent when the future simulations are specific (Addis, Cheng, Roberts, & Schacter, 2011), are constructed de novo (van Mulukom, Schacter, Corballis, & Addis, 2013) and are especially novel (e.g., implausible future events; Weiler, Suchan, & Daum, 2010).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.1 Associations between elements.
What the sources say
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“the iterative nature of the simulation process enables associative schematic processes to play out: it allows schemas to be modified or created in response to the emerging simulation, and for schemas to fill-in, adjust, reorganize, or completely rework the simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.3 Associations between schemas, elements, and the simulation.
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“When imagining non-personal events (i.e., events that do not feature the self), the involvement of self-schemas decreases linearly with psychological closeness to the protagonist (de Vito, Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012) as does the engagement of ventromedial prefrontal regions mediating self-schemas (e.g., D' Argembeau et al., 2010;Szpunar et al., 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“relational reasoning facilitates the flexible reorganization of schemas and elements to construct new schemas (Holyoak, 2012;Hummel & Holyoak, 2003), and provides structure and coherence (e.g., temporal structure, causal structure, etc.) to our experience.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Rumelhart and Ortony (1977) suggest that elements within schemas are distributions of all possible values of that detail (based on cumulative experience), enabling generation of the most likely or typical 'default' value when necessary”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Rumelhart and Ortony (1977)
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“differing levels of reliance on schemas may explain some of the apparent differences between different types of simulation”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.2.2 Associative schematic processes.
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although speculative, I hypothesize that the role of the hippocampus is the localization of a given past or future simulation in relevant multi-dimensional cognitive space(s).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
hedgeddirect- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: The hippocampus has reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This hypothesis therefore implies that cells that appear to be spatial in nature (e.g., place cells, etc.) may have putative mapping functions that can be utilized within any activated cognitive space(s).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
hedgedconditional- Asserted: fails — The authors may not put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The authors may not put it forward as true. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
In the paper
“In their Levels of Processing theory, Craik and Lockhart (1972) proposed that what we think of as memory is actually the processing of information, including the perception of incoming information.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Craik and Lockhart (1972) source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“this nesting is one of the necessary conditions of MTT I suggest in Section 4.1 (along with the simulation having a sufficient proportion of high resolution elements).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
plainconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although the contribution of schemas during remembering is at the lower end of the continuum, schemas nevertheless play a number of roles, including (but not limited to) organizing activated elements, the identification of inaccurate, irrelevant, or missing content, guiding corrections or the filling of gaps, and relational reasoning between the event schema and other relevant schemas such as the”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“although the DMN is active, it is not maximally so, as indicated by studies showing activity during future simulation exceeds that during remembering (e.g., Addis et al., 2007).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis et al., 2007 source
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“it may be that higher-level DMN regions (e.g., angular gyrus, posterior cingulate) accumulate activated elements and hold the emerging simulation online, while iterative interactions with schemas serve to refine the simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“although schema-reliance and associative strength vary across this spectrum of simulation tasks, from past events through to novel or implausible future events, neither process is unique to the simulation of past or future events, and both remembering and imagining is associated with coupling of the DMN and frontoparietal control network (Dixon et al., 2018).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Dixon et al., 2018 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“By this account, the hippocampus does not construct simulations per se, but rather contextualizes the emergent simulation within broader knowledge structures.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
- Rests on an assumption: The hippocampus has reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain.
In the paper
“I have previously suggested that perception is associated with the schema-guided construction of an internal simulation of experience -a process that is fundamentally no different to remembering or imagining events (Addis, 2018).”
- Also stated in: § 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity · plain
“In other words, perception is underpinned by the same neurocognitive system as memory and imagination.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Addis, 2018 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- Also stated in: § 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity · plain
In the paper
“Neisser (1976) also viewed memory as non-distinct from other aspects of cognition and perception.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Neisser (1976)
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“These continuums have been constructed on the basis of findings that reflect the average of multiple simulations, but individual simulations can diverge from this pattern.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“this idea could help to reduce the tension between spatial/relational, and mnemonic/prospective accounts of hippocampal function.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Such findings fit with the notion that brain networks functionally couple and uncouple as required by task demands, and a number of studies report connectivity between DMN and frontoparietal control network as the need for flexible or creative thinking increases (e.g., Beaty, Benedek, Barry Kaufman, & Silvia, 2015;Roberts & Addis, 2018;Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Their results demonstrate that pre-experiencing vivid future events (i.e., future MTT) is not sufficient to convey the sense that the event will actually occur in one's future without this contextualization with autobiographical knowledge; similar findings are reported for remembered past events (Scoboria et al., 2014).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ernst, Scoboria, and D'Argembeau (2019)
- Not checked yetcites Scoboria et al., 2014 source
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“past events will, on average, contain a higher proportion of strongly-associated elements than most future events and are therefore constructed more fluently.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Over a lifetime of experience and reflection, we construct and continually refine distributions of various aspects of the self (e.g., one's life story, trait self-knowledge, etc.), meaning that the self is the most elaborate knowledge structure we possess.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“holding a larger collection of singular elements online (as is more likely the case with future events) is a more intensive operation than holding a few chunks of associated elements (as is more likely for past events), thus placing greater demands on the DMN.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“To my knowledge, no neuroimaging study has directly examined recast events, however, this phenomenon has been observed in patients with semantic dementia who can recall past events and recast past events into the future, but are unable to imagine future events (Irish et al., 2012a), exemplifying the similarity of remembering and recasting.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.3 Continuums of associative processes in simulation
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Irish et al., 2012a
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, as the simulation is iteratively constructed, each version would need to be situated in relevant cognitive spaces by the hippocampus if latent inferences are to be leveraged in refining the simulation.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, 'predictive error' signals when a schema fails to provide an adequate model and is then either switched or modified via relational reasoning processes.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Interestingly, Neisser's (1976) approach, and my own proposal herein, can also be considered variants of predictive coding theory.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Third, memory and imagination are subserved by the same neurocognitive system: the DMN, with the dynamic involvement of the frontoparietal control network (with the salience network interfacing the two) as required.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Simulation is the ongoing process of interpreting and understanding our own realities; each individual's unique experiential history modifies their schemas as well as their idiosyncratic corpus of previouslyencountered elements (including the associative strength between said elements), and moulds the multidimensional cognitive spaces in which these simulations are situated.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“My proposal is built on predictive coding principles: an ongoing, dynamic bidirectional interactivity between schemas (models of prior experience) and the emergent simulation whereby schemas shape the simulation of experience, and the simulation modifies schemas.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Not only is 'time' a non-essential aspect of MTT given that simulations of perception reflect the present, it also obviates the need for 'travel' as simulating current experience does not remove one entirely from their present.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“My reformulation of the constructive episodic simulation hypothesis argues for a more continuist position than we have done previously by arguing that memory and imagination are the same process underpinned by the same neurocognitive system.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Predictive coding proposes interactions between an internal model of experience and actual experience, with the difference between the two ('prediction error') used to revise the model thus improving its predictive power during subsequent experiences.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Dayan, Hinton, & Neal, 1995 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Simulation is an inherently constructive process governed by associative processes operating at different scales: associations (of varying strength) between elements; associative schematic processes that enable construction of a suitable schema (e.g., relational reasoning), as well as the dynamic interplay between schemas and the simulation itself (cf.predictive coding)”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: unclear — It is unclear whether it could be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Simulations vary in proportional resolution (i.e., the balance of elements at various resolutions), elaborateness, and complexity.”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 5. Summary and Conclusions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The paper relies on this without support.
Memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system.
“If memory and imagination are manifestations of the same neurocognitive system”
The paper relies on this without support.
The hippocampus has reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain.
“Indeed, the hippocampus has the reciprocal connectivity with most areas of the brain, positioning it anatomically to play such a role.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
The source backs part of the claim, not all of it — or backs it for a different population, condition or comparison.
In the citing paper
“This suggests that dreams leverage fragments of past memory in constructing imagined scenarios that anticipate future events, much as described in the case of waking cognition [2, 3, 6].”
From Constructive episodic simulation in dreams (2022) · cites this paper as [2]
Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
Each contradiction between two passages listed here was confirmed by an independent check.
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 1. Introduction
“I also propose that this 'simulation system' supports the construction of multi-dimensional cognitive spaces, within which any given simulation can be mapped by the hippocampus (Section 5).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces
“## 4.4 Situating simulations within cognitive spaces”
Rated minor: it would not touch a result — a value no result rests on, a p-value that stays on the same side of the significance level, or a conflict that is clerical, resolved elsewhere in the paper, or outside its own findings.
In the paper
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 1. Introduction
“Finally, I will suggest that simulation may be a general cognitive capacity underpinning other forms of cognition, including perception (Section 6).”
§ Mental Time Travel? A Neurocognitive Model of Event Simulation > 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity
“## 4.5 Simulation as a general cognitive capacity”
Citations
Cites
Levels of processing: A framework for memory research
Craik, F. I. M., & Lockhart, R. S. (1972) · Journal of Verbal Learning and Verbal Behavior · doi:10.1016/s0022-5371(72)80001-x · Cited by 9,566
(1978) · UA Campus Repository (The University of Arizona) · Cited by 8,010
The episodic buffer: a new component of working memory?
Baddeley, A. (2000) · Trends in Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1016/s1364-6613(00)01538-2 · Cited by 7,359
Cognitive maps in rats and men
Tolman, E. C. (1948) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/h0061626 · Cited by 6,641
Saliency, switching, attention and control: a network model of insula function
Menon, V., & Uddin, L. Q. (2010) · Brain Structure and Function · doi:10.1007/s00429-010-0262-0 · Cited by 5,592
The Organization of Behavior; A Neuropsychological Theory.
Attneave, F., B., M., & Hebb, D. O. (1950) · The American Journal of Psychology · doi:10.2307/1418888 · Cited by 5,146
Neisser, U. (1976) · Cited by 4,903
Tulving, E. (1985) · Canadian Psychology / Psychologie canadienne · doi:10.1037/h0080017 · Cited by 4,638
The Organization of Behavior: A Neuropsychological Theory
(1950) · JAMA · doi:10.1001/jama.1950.02910470083028 · Cited by 4,272
The construction of autobiographical memories in the self-memory system
Conway, M. A., & Pleydell-Pearce, C. W. (2000) · Psychological Review · doi:10.1037/0033-295x.107.2.261 · Cited by 4,089
Research works printed but not linked: 1
- Bartlett, F.C. 1932. Remembering. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Cited by
Sorted by citations
Why the COVID-19 pandemic is a traumatic stressor
Bridgland, V. M. E., Moeck, E. K., Green, D. M., Swain, T. L., Nayda, D. M., Matson, L. A., Hutchison, N. P., & Takarangi, M. K. T. (2021) · PLOS ONE · doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0240146 · Cited by 501
Moscovitch, M., & Gilboa, A. (2021) · PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) · doi:10.31234/osf.io/yxbrs · Cited by 68
Mapping the Imaginative Mind: Charting New Paths Forward
Andrews‐Hanna, J. R., & Grilli, M. D. (2021) · Current Directions in Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/0963721420980753 · Cited by 60
McCarroll, C. J., Michaelian, K., & Nánay, B. (2022) · Erkenntnis · doi:10.1007/s10670-022-00629-4 · Cited by 61
Mnemicity: A Cognitive Gadget?
Mahr, J. B., Bergen, P. V., Sutton, J. D., Schacter, D. L., & Heyes, C. M. (2023) · Perspectives on Psychological Science · doi:10.1177/17456916221141352 · Cited by 48
Metadata
- Authors
- Addis, D. R.
- Affiliations
- University of Auckland (NZ)
- Corresponding author
- Addis, Donna Rose
- ORCID
- Addis, Donna Rose
- Venue
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
- Published
- 2020-04-30
- Volume
- 11
- Issue
- 2
- Pages
- 233-259
- ISSN
- 1878-5158 (ISSN-L)
- 1878-5166
- OpenAlex
- W3022976905
- Semantic Scholar
- e34e3c84cb89095da12f0b5771f58be049f83055
- Cited by
- 225
- References
- 123
- Citations by year
- 2026: 37 · 2025: 59 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 28 · 2022: 28 · 2021: 18 · 2020: 5
- FWCI
- 10.62
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- doi.org
- Locations
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology (publishedVersion)
- TSpace (University of Toronto) (submittedVersion)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion, cc-by)
- PsyArXiv (OSF Preprints) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Canadian Network for Research and Innovation in Machining Technology, Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada
- Topics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory Processes and Influences
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Memory and Neural Mechanisms
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Philosophy and Theoretical Science
- Keywords
- mental time travel, event simulation, episodic memory, mental imagery, simulation theory, schemas, predictive coding, hippocampus, time perception, neurocognitive model
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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