The DOI matches its Crossref record; 147 of the 150 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 128 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.
Bodily ownership and self-location: Components of bodily self-consciousness
Open accessAbstract
Recent research on bodily self-consciousness has assumed that it consists of three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within the environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-centered, perspective on that environment (perspective). Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction. We examine these results and consider them in relation to clinical evidence from patients with altered body perception and work on a variety of multisensory, body-related illusions, such as the rubber hand illusion, the full body illusion, the body swap illusion and the enfacement illusion. We conclude by providing a preliminary synthesis of the data on bodily self-consciousness and its neural correlates.
Overview
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Written from the paper’s full text.
TL;DR
This review argues that bodily self-consciousness comprises at least two dissociable components—body ownership and self-location—with distinct neural correlates in ventral premotor/posterior parietal cortex and temporo-parietal junction, respectively. It synthesizes fMRI, clinical, and multisensory illusion evidence into a preliminary distributed model, while noting the model is not exhaustive and experimental double dissociation remains incomplete.
Key findings
- Body ownership and self-location can be experimentally dissociated in one direction: the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011) induced ownership for a mannequin without changing self-location, whereas the full body illusion (Ionta et al., 2011) altered self-location but also changed ownership, so only a single dissociation was experimentally demonstrated.
- Neural correlates differed: Petkova et al. found vPMc and PPc activity during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation, with vPMc activity correlated with illusory ownership; Ionta et al. found TPJ activity modulated by synchronous touch and varying with experienced self-location and visuo-spatial perspective, with no specific vPMc or PPc activation reported.
- Clinical and rubber-hand-illusion evidence supports a double dissociation: out-of-body experiences and heautoscopy can show preserved self-identification/ownership with disturbed self-location; Rohde et al. dissociated proprioceptive drift from ownership ratings, and Longo et al.’s principal component analysis found ownership and location to be independent components. Blackmore (1984) found 24% of subjects reporting OBEs claimed a connection between their disembodied self and the seen body.
- The paper focuses on the weaker claim that at least two components are distinct, and suggests the stronger three-component claim is false because perspective is not wholly distinct from self-location. It proposes a distributed model: unisensory body signals in SI/EBA, multisensory integration in PPc/vPMc/insula, and visual-tactile-proprioceptive-vestibular convergence at the TPJ for self-location and perspective.
Methods
- Narrative review, not a primary study. It compares two fMRI adaptations of multisensory body illusions: Ionta et al. (2011), using touch on the back with a third-person virtual body, and Petkova et al. (2011), using touch on the chest with a first-person mannequin.
- Integrates evidence from neuroimaging, monkey electrophysiology, TMS, lesion and clinical cases (out-of-body experiences, heautoscopy, somatoparaphrenia), and illusions including the rubber hand illusion, full body illusion, body swap illusion, out-of-body illusion, and enfacement illusion.
- Main analysis is qualitative synthesis and proposal of a distributed neural model; no systematic search or meta-analysis is described.
Limitations
- Stated: the model is not exhaustive and neglects at least three aspects—the body in movement and agency, peripersonal space and tool use, and social interaction.
- Stated: experimental evidence for a double dissociation is incomplete; a change in self-location without any change in body ownership has not yet been produced experimentally, and this is left as an open question.
- Evident: as a narrative review, conclusions are based on selected studies and are preliminary/tentative; no new data or formal quantitative synthesis are provided.
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Claims the paper makes
75 Not checked yet · 39 Own interpretation · 1 Own result · 1 No basis given
In the paper
“Taken together, they provide evidence that visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc appears critical for the experience of owning a body, whereas the integration of visual, tactile and vestibular signals at the TPJ reflects selflocation and visuo-spatial perspective.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Petkova et al., 2011 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
In the paper
“Neural activity in the vPMc, but not in the PPc, was correlated with the strength of illusory ownership for the virtual body, which was assessed by post-scan questionnaires.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 3. Neural bases of whole-body ownership and self-location
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Petkova et al., 2011 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“However, in some instances (about one third of the population), the disembodied self-location was associated with strong self-identification and some experience of ownership of the physical body”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Green, 1968
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Yet, clinical evidence and new research conducted on the RHI supports the stronger claim of a double dissociation.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Green, 1968
- Not checked yetcites Blackmore, 1984
- Not checked yetcites Devinsky et al., 1989 source
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
In the paper
“Taken together, they provide evidence that visuo-tactile integration in the vPMc appears critical for the experience of owning a body, whereas the integration of visual, tactile and vestibular signals at the TPJ reflects selflocation and visuo-spatial perspective.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Taken together, these two neuroimaging studies seem to provide a case for validating the assumption that there are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness, i.e., self-location and body ownership, that are distinct from one another.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 1. Introduction
What the sources say
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
In the paper
“Thus, TPJ activity reflected individual differences in experienced self-location and visuo-spatial perspective.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“They did not report any specific activation in the vPMc or the PPc, but showed that the right and left TPJ were critically involved in the FBI (see Figure 2; black dots).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
In the paper
“Devinsky et al. (Devinsky, Feldmann, Burrowes, & Bromfield, 1989) have reported several cases in which self-identification and connections with the physical body seem to be preserved during experience of disembodiment”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Devinsky et al., 1989 source
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Lesions or seizures in the TPJ may alter the experience of self-location, such as during what are often called out-of-body experiences.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
- It may state two separate claims as one. 39
- Probably not a substantial claim. 14
- The quote only partly states this claim. 1
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Here we review recent neuroimaging studies suggesting that at least two of these components-body ownership and self-location-are implemented in rather distinct neural substrates, located, respectively, in the premotor cortex and in the temporo-parietal junction.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > Abstract
What the sources say
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
In the paper
“Participants in Ionta's study reported a feeling that their bodily self shifted from the space occupied by their physical body to a spatial position closer to where they saw the virtual body, and some participants also reported a sense of ownership for the virtual body.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 2. Experimental manipulation of whole-body ownership and self-location
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Therefore, while it is possible to alter the experience of owning a body without any shift in experienced self-location (Petkova et al., 2011), it has not been shown experimentally that one can experience a change in self-location without a change in body ownership.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Petkova et al., 2011 source
hedged- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
In the paper
“Petkova's manipulation resulted in a sense of ownership for the virtual body, but did not modify the perceived location of the self in space.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 2. Experimental manipulation of whole-body ownership and self-location
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Petkova et al., 2011 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“During out-of-body experiences most people report a loss of connection between the self and their physical body, suggesting concomitant changes of selflocation and body ownership (e.g.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Green, 1968
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Accordingly, Ionta et al. (2011) claimed that multisensory integration at the TPJ underlies the subjective feeling of being located within a body, occupying a given location in space, and experiencing the world from that location.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“Given the relationship between the activity in the vPMc and the subjective feeling of whole-body ownership, Petkova et al. claimed that a multisensory integration mechanism in the vPMc is responsible for the experience of a whole body as one's own.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 3. Neural bases of whole-body ownership and self-location
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Petkova et al., 2011 source
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim.
In the paper
“For participants who felt themselves to be looking upwards at the virtual body (up-group), the estimated self-location was higher and TPJ activity was lower during synchronous compared with asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation.For participants who felt themselves at a lower location and to be looking downwards, the estimated self-location was lower and TPJ activity was higher during synchronous”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The FBI (Ionta et al., 2011) does not induce the converse pattern.Although the main aim of Ionta et al.'s study was to investigate the experience of self-location, they also induced some changes in body ownership, as shown by questionnaires and subjective reports”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ionta et al., 2011 source
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011), body ownership is manipulated, whilst self-location is unaffected.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Petkova et al., 2011 source
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We have argued that bodily self-consciousness is made up of, but is not limited to, two distinguishable components: body ownership and self-location.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5. Synthesising research on bodily self-consciousness
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.
In the paper
“Most patients report a strong selfidentification and affinity with the seen body while their sense of self-location is strongly disturbed (Heydrich & Blanke, 2013).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Heydrich & Blanke, 2013
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Indeed, although ownership is usually experienced for the autoscopic (double) body, self-location is ambiguous and often alternates between the physical body and the autoscopic body.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Heydrich & Blanke, 2013
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Although a change in self-location without any change in ownership has not yet been produced experimentally, clinical evidence and recent work on the RHI suggest that the two are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness with distinct neural correlates.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In conclusion, there is accumulating evidence suggesting that body ownership and selflocation are distinct aspects of bodily self-consciousness, whose neural correlates can be experimentally dissociated and identified, respectively, in the vPMc/PPc and in the TPJ.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 4. Are self-location and body ownership distinct components of selfconsciousness?
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.
In the paper
“For instance, a lesion to the somatosensory cortex results in hemianesthesia, i.e. a lack of tactile sensation from the controlesional side of the body, but it does not induce disturbances in bodily experience per se (Ronchi & Vallar, 2010).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.1 Unisensory body representations
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ronchi & Vallar, 2010
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“These regions are largely interconnected (Koch et al., 2010;Matelli & Luppino, 2001), but may still have partially dissociable functions.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.2 Multisensory body representations
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Koch et al., 2010 source
- Not checked yetcites Matelli & Luppino, 2001
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“First of all, usually lesions to unisensory cortices induce sensory specific deficits, but do not induce disturbances in bodily experience.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.1 Unisensory body representations
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Ronchi & Vallar, 2010
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“Patients with PPc lesions are strongly impaired when performing tasks requiring on-line coding of body posture (Schwoebel & Coslett, 2005), when attending to body parts on the left in the case of a right lesion (i.e.personal neglect; Committeri et al., 2007) and when describing the spatial relations between body parts in the case of a left lesion (i.e.autotopagnosia; Ogden, 1985).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.3 Multisensory integration in the PPc: reference frame transformations
What the sources say
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“However, this does not normally occur, since the RHI is not induced (or it is much weaker) when visuo-tactile stimulation is applied to a non-corporeal object (Armel & Ramachandran, 2003;Haans, Ijsselsteijn, & de Kort, 2008;Tsakiris, Carpenter, James, & Fotopoulou, 2010;Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005) or when the rubber hand is placed in a position that is anatomically incompatible with the subject's”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.5 Over and above multisensory integration
What the sources say
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“This mechanism might trigger an experience of ownership for the”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.4 Multisensory integration in the vPMc: triggering body ownership
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Tsakiris, 2010
- Not checked yetcites Tsakiris et al., 2006 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one. The quote only partly states this claim.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“The posterior insula has primarily been involved in interoceptive representations of the body (Critchley, Wiens, Rotshtein, Ohman, & Dolan, 2004), and the anterior insula has primarily been involved in integrating bodily signals with environmental, emotional and motivational representations (Berlucchi & Aglioti, 2010;Craig, 2009).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.6 Body ownership from the inside
What the sources say
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“Indeed, TMS applied over the TPJ facilitates the experience of ownership for non-corporeal objects, suggesting that interfering with sensory processing at the TPJ can disrupt the test-for-fit processes and increases the likelihood of selfattributing non-corporeal objects into one's body schema (Tsakiris, Costantini, & Haggard, 2008).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.5 Over and above multisensory integration
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Tsakiris et al., 2008 source
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Nevertheless, although multisensory integration at the vPMc might be necessary for the induction of an illusion of body ownership, the experience of ownership might result from activation elsewhere (see below).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.4 Multisensory integration in the vPMc: triggering body ownership
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“As noted above, activation of the vPMc has been related to the induction of the RHI (Ehrsson et al., 2005;Ehrsson et al., 2004) and the body swap illusion (Petkova et al., 2011): vPMc activity increases during synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (in particular at the beginning of the illusion) and is correlated with questionnaire responses.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.4 Multisensory integration in the vPMc: triggering body ownership
What the sources say
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“According to Tsakiris, these test-for-fit processes would be computed in the right TPJ, a region that could harbour a structural model of the body.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.5 Over and above multisensory integration
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Tsakiris, 2010
hedgeddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“As documented above, TPJ activity is necessary for computing self-location and visuo-spatial perspective, because it receives converging visual, tactile, proprioceptive and vestibular signals about body orientation with respect to the environment (Blanke & Arzy, 2005;Bottini et al., 2001;Lopez et al., 2008).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.7 The body in the world: self-location
What the sources say
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“This result suggests that subjects with high interoceptive awareness (linked to insula function) are less ready to experience ownership for other stimuli, probably because they have a stronger sense of ownership for their own body.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.6 Body ownership from the inside
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Finally, the body is experienced as occupying a given location in the world and as being the locus of one's perceptual perspective.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.8 Synthesis
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“A PET study by Tsakiris and colleagues (Tsakiris, Hesse, Boy, Haggard, & Fink, 2007) suggests that the insula also underpins bodily selfconsciousness during the RHI because activation of the right insula was positively correlated with the strength of the RHI.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.6 Body ownership from the inside
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Tsakiris et al., 2007 source
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
The paper states this without a source or data behind it here, so there is nothing to check it against. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We not only experience our bodies as our own, we also experience ourselves as occupying a given location in the world with a given perspective.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.7 The body in the world: self-location
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In particular, the vPMc contains neural populations which integrate multisensory cues (visual, tactile, auditory) among different body parts and are responsive when participants experience a part of their body or their whole body as their own.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.8 Synthesis
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Two sources of information seem critical for this: vestibular signals that code the orientation and movement of the body with respect to gravity, and visual signals related to external objects, which code the orientation and movement of the body with respect to the environment.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.7 The body in the world: self-location
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“In summary, bodily self-consciousness comprises the concurrent experience of (a) a body as one's own, and (b) this body as located in space.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.8 Synthesis
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“On the other hand, body self-consciousness ought to include a mechanism that continuously maps on-line where the different body parts are in space and in relationship to each other.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.8 Synthesis
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Such a process is probably implemented in the PPc because this area contains neural populations which respond to multisensory information as referenced to single body parts, and also transforms these body-part-centered signals in common reference frames.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.8 Synthesis
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“In this sense, the experience of self-location seems a minimally necessary condition for self-consciousness (Blanke & Metzinger, 2009), and also for awareness of external events.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.7 The body in the world: self-location
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Blanke & Metzinger, 2009 source
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“We are aware that the present model is not exhaustive, as it neglects at least two fundamental aspects of bodily experience.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Moreover, work on bodily self-consciousness has typically relied on several assumptions.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 6. Conclusions
plain- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: fails — The paper may give no reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. The paper may give no reason why it holds.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“The body is our interface with others (see e.g., Adolphs, 2009;Decety & Lamm, 2007;Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004;Saxe, 2006), and therefore it is possible that social interactions shape the experience we have of our body (Ambrosini, Blomberg, Mandrigin, & Costantini, 2013;Cardellicchio, Sinigaglia, & Costantini, 2012;Cardini, Tajadura-Jimenez, Serino, & Tsakiris, 2012;Costantini, Ambrosini,”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
What the sources say
hedgedconditional- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Thus, the different levels of body representations we reviewed here need to be integrated with other systems in order to support the motor and social functions of human cognitive systems.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: fails — It may be too vague to check against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. It may be too vague to check against evidence. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Concurrently, interoceptive and emotional signals are processed in the insular, constituting another fundamental component of self-awareness.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > Additional information
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
In the paper
“The notion of a distributed representation of the body might resemble the concept of the”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Melzack, 1990 source
hedgedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“An extensive literature has shown that body-related signals are integrated with information pertaining to external stimuli occurring in the space near the body to constitute a multisensory representation of peripersonal space (Graziano & Cooke, 2006;Ladavas, 2002;Rizzolatti et al., 1997).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
What the sources say
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Such multisensory integration mechanisms concur with experience of the body as a whole and experience of the body as one's own.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > Additional information
plaincorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: unclear — It is unclear why the paper says it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“More moderately, it is clear that body representations interface with the motor system and with the executive system, representing actions and goals (Andersen & Buneo, 2002;Dorris & Glimcher, 2004).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
What the sources say
- Not checked yetcites Andersen & Buneo, 2002 source
- Not checked yetcites Dorris & Glimcher, 2004
boostedcorrelational- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: unclear — It is unclear whether the paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“A prominent line of research has shown that using tools to interact with objects in the environment both shapes peripersonal space representation (see Ladavas & Serino, 2008;Maravita & Iriki, 2004 for reviews) and alters the perception of the body itself (Canzoneri et al., 2013;Cardinali et al., 2009;Longo & Serino, 2012 for comments).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
What the sources say
boosteddirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it. It may state two separate claims as one.
A conclusion the paper draws from its own results — it cites no other source for it, so there is none to check. The quote shows it is in the paper.
In the paper
“Taken together the processes listed above constitute a multi-componential model underlying the experience of the bodily self, in which the different components are processed by distinguishable, interacting, neural systems.”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > [INSERT FIGURE 3 HERE]
plaindirect- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: passes — The paper’s conclusions depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
It may state two separate claims as one.
- The authors state this as an assumption: Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.
None of the sources cited for this claim have been checked yet.
In the paper
“A long tradition in neuroscience supports the view that body representations as well as space representations are not simply sensory or motor, but rather both sensory and motor (Rizzolatti et al., 1997;Rizzolatti, Fogassi, & Gallese, 2002).”
§ Bodily ownership and self-location: components of bodily selfconsciousness > 5.9 Limits of the model
What the sources say
boosted- Asserted: passes — The authors put it forward as true.
- Checkable: passes — It can be checked against evidence.
- Load-bearing: fails — The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
- Based: passes — The paper gives a reason why it holds.
Probably not a substantial claim. The paper’s conclusions may not depend on it.
The authors state this as an assumption.
Bodily self-consciousness comprises at least three distinct components: body ownership, self-location, and perspective.
“Our aim in the following discussion is to provide some degree of validation for a third assumption driving this research, namely that bodily self-consciousness comprises at least three distinct components: the experience of owning a body (body ownership); the experience of being a body with a given location within our environment (self-location); and the experience of taking a first-person, body-”
The authors state this as an assumption.
There are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.
“Our discussion will focus on a weaker form of the assumption: that there are at least two components of bodily self-consciousness that are distinct from one another, namely body ownership and self-location.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
The behavioural effects of manipulating proprioceptive, interoceptive and exteroceptive signals can serve as implicit measures of phenomena described in explicit reports of subjective experience.
“The first is that the behavioural effects of manipulating proprioceptive, interoceptive and exteroceptive signals can serve as implicit measures of phenomena described in explicit reports of subjective experience.”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Global aspects of bodily self-consciousness can be studied by manipulating these sensory signals, despite the fact that their immediate processing is physiologically and computationally constrained to individual body parts.
“The second is that global aspects of bodily self-consciousness (pertaining to the experience of the body as a whole) can be studied by manipulating these sensory signals, despite the fact that their immediate processing is physiologically and computationally constrained to individual body parts”
The authors state this as an assumption.
Body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily self-consciousness.
“This cumulative evidence supports the (weaker) assumption that has driven research into bodily selfconsciousness-that body ownership and self-location are distinct components of the experience of oneself as a bodily subject.”
“we have made a case in support of one of these assumptions: that body ownership and self-location are distinct components of bodily selfconsciousness.”
Claims other papers make about this one
Each is checked against this paper’s own text: does it say what the citing paper says it does?
In the citing paper
“Data from this experiment revealed no memory improvement in the object condition, arguing against a visual or attentional account and further corroborating our proposal that the present recognition enhancement is due to multisensory-motor bodily stimulation that has been shown to be crucial for BSC [36,42,49,133] and characteristic of normal everyday experience.”
From First-person view of one’s body in immersive virtual reality: Influence on episodic memory (2019) · cites this paper as [133]
In the citing paper
“In line with previous findings, these effects were more weakly induced during asynchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (see Lenggenhager et al., 2007; Blanke et al., 2012; Serino et al., 2013).”
From Peripersonal space as the space of the bodily self (2015) · cites this paper as Serino et al., 2013
In the citing paper
“We suggest that this effect depends on a shift of multisensory receptive fields of PPS neurons (Blanke, 2012; Ehrsson et al., 2012; Serino et al., 2013), although we acknowledge that the present data cannot provide neurophysiological evidence to such a proposal.”
From Peripersonal space as the space of the bodily self (2015) · cites this paper as Serino et al., 2013
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Metadata
- Authors
- Serino, A., Alsmith, A., Costantini, M., Mandrigin, A., Tajadura-Jimenez, A., & Lopez, C.
- Affiliations
- École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (CH)
- University of Copenhagen (DK)
- University of Chieti-Pescara (IT)
- University of Edinburgh (GB)
- Corresponding author
- Serino, Andrea
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2013-12
- Volume
- 22
- Issue
- 4
- Pages
- 1239-1252
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2079829150
- Semantic Scholar
- 5ffb77377a192ce233cdb37fdb89dcbc2a5c68a0
- Cited by
- 259
- References
- 150
- Citations by year
- 2026: 8 · 2025: 25 · 2024: 20 · 2023: 23 · 2022: 14 · 2021: 25 · 2020: 24 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 22 · 2017: 22 · 2016: 13 · 2015: 24 · 2014: 9
- FWCI
- 5.56
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
- hal.science
- Locations
- Consciousness and Cognition (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Warwick Research Archive Portal (University of Warwick) (acceptedVersion)
- HAL (submittedVersion)
- Stirling Online Research Repository (University of Stirling) (submittedVersion)
- Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion, cc-by-nc-nd)
- UCL Discovery (University College London) (submittedVersion)
- Infoscience (Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne) (submittedVersion)
- Research at the University of Copenhagen (University of Copenhagen) (submittedVersion)
- Funders
- Volkswagen Foundation
- Economic and Social Research Council (ES/K001477/1)
- Topics
- Physical Sciences › Computer Science › Human-Computer Interaction › Virtual Reality Applications and Impacts
- Social Sciences › Arts and Humanities › Philosophy › Free Will and Agency
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Embodied and Extended Cognition
- Keywords
- bodily self-consciousness, body ownership, self-localization, first-person perspective, premotor cortex, temporoparietal junction, multisensory illusions, rubber hand illusion, full-body illusion, enfacement illusion, neural correlates
- MeSH terms
- Body Image, Humans, Illusions, Motor Cortex, Parietal Lobe, Proprioception, Self Concept, Space Perception, Temporal Lobe
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
A language model drew the claims from the paper on 2026-10-09, under version 3 of the claim definition (model deepseek-v4.1-flash, prompt extract-v3).
A second model labelled each claim on 2026-10-09 (model jev-1.13-20260917, definition revision gold-guideline-v0.2).
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
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