The DOI matches its Crossref record.
Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy
Abstract
What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis. Combining the best of three separate traditions -- the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science -- Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
Overview
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Integrity signals
Registry
Cites
Statistics
Verification
Claims the paper makes
The claims and statistics of this paper haven’t been checked yet.
Free: it reads the open-access text and checks the first 5 claims that cite a source we can check. Create a free account to check every claim.
Self-check
Percentages, sums and reported differences re-computed from the paper’s own numbers.
The self-check needs the paper’s full text.
Citations
Cited by
Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?
Ploeg, F. V. D. (2011) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.49.2.366 · Cited by 2,283
Botero, J. C., Djankov, S., Porta, R. L., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553042476215 · Cited by 2,124
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.2.703 · Cited by 1,319
IVERSEN, T., & SOSKICE, D. (2006) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055406062083 · Cited by 1,175
Economic Geography and Public Policy
Ottaviano, G., Robert-Nicoud, F., Baldwin, R., Forslid, R., & Martin, P. (2011) · Princeton University Press eBooks · doi:10.1515/9781400841233 · Cited by 987
Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2011) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.101.4.1274 · Cited by 975
Political budget cycles: Do they differ across countries and why?
Shi, M., & Svensson, J. (2006) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2005.09.009 · Cited by 969
The myth of the rational voter: why democracies choose bad policies
(2007) · Choice Reviews Online · doi:10.5860/choice.45-0962 · Cited by 925
The Politician and the Judge: Accountability in Government
Maskin, E., & Tirole, J. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828042002606 · Cited by 904
Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail—Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
Persson, A., Rothstein, B., & Teorell, J. (2013) · Governance · doi:10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01604.x · Cited by 877
The Provision of Public Goods Under Alternative Electoral Incentives
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2001) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.91.1.225 · Cited by 821
Press Coverage and Political Accountability
Snyder, J. M., & Strömberg, D. (2010) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/652903 · Cited by 786
Electoral Rules and Corruption
Persson, T., Tabellini, G., & Trebbi, F. (2003) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247603322493203 · Cited by 782
Self-citationThe Case for Restricting Fiscal Policy Discretion
Fatas, A., & Mihov, I. (2003) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355303322552838 · Cited by 766
Lizzeri, A., & Persico, N. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382175 · Cited by 757
Why Is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?
Alesina, A., Campante, F. R., & Tabellini, G. (2008) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/jeea.2008.6.5.1006 · Cited by 754
Self-citationGALOR, O., MOAV, O., & VOLLRATH, D. (2009) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2008.00506.x · Cited by 746
Second generation fiscal federalism: The implications of fiscal incentives
Weingast, B. R. (2009) · Journal of Urban Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jue.2008.12.005 · Cited by 710
Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment
Wright, J. (2008) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2008.00315.x · Cited by 708
La Porta, R., López‐de‐Silanes, F., Pop‐Eleches, C., & Shleifer, A. (2004) · Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1086/381480 · Cited by 678
Why not a political Coase theorem? Social conflict, commitment, and politics
Acemoglu, D. (2003) · Journal of Comparative Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jce.2003.09.003 · Cited by 666
Property Rights and Economic Development*
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2010) · Handbook of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-52944-2.00006-9 · Cited by 646
Brollo, F., Nannicini, T., Perotti, R., & Tabellini, G. (2013) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.103.5.1759 · Cited by 646
Self-citationCapitalism, Democracy, and Welfare
Iversen, T. (2005) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511758645 · Cited by 620
Oil, Nontax Revenue, and the Redistributional Foundations of Regime Stability
Morrison, K. M. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090043 · Cited by 594
POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE
Jia, R., Kudamatsu, M., & Seim, D. (2015) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1111/jeea.12124 · Cited by 589
Retailing public goods: The economics of corporate social responsibility
Besley, T., & Ghatak, M. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.07.006 · Cited by 586
Powell, R. (2006) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818306060061 · Cited by 585
Fiscal transparency, political parties, and debt in OECD countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2005.04.001 · Cited by 584
Kleptocracy and Divide-and-Rule: A Model of Personal Rule
Acemoglu, D., Verdier, T., & Robinson, J. A. (2004) · Journal of the European Economic Association · doi:10.1162/154247604323067916 · Cited by 581
Political institutions and policy choices: evidence from the United States
Besley, T. (2002) · Working Paper Series · doi:10.1920/wp.ifs.2002.0213 · Cited by 577
Kitschelt, H., Hawkins, K. A., Luna, J. P., Rosas, G., & Zechmeister, E. J. (2010) · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511750311 · Cited by 559
The Political Economy of Clientelism*
Robinson, J. A., & Verdier, T. (2013) · The Scandinavian Journal of Economics · doi:10.1111/sjoe.12010 · Cited by 554
Heckman, J. J., & Vytlacil, E. J. (2007) · Handbook of Econometrics · doi:10.1016/s1573-4412(07)06070-9 · Cited by 548
Bureaucrats or Politicians? Part I: A Single Policy Task
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (2007) · The American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282807780323578 · Cited by 548
Self-citationTransparency, Political Polarization, and Political Budget Cycles in OECD Countries
Alt, J. E., & Lassen, D. D. (2006) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00200.x · Cited by 548
Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and Empirical Work
Ashworth, S. (2012) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-031710-103823 · Cited by 535
E-ZTAX: Tax Salience and Tax Rates*
Finkelstein, A. (2009) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2009.124.3.969 · Cited by 530
Fearon, J. D. (2011) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr038 · Cited by 504
Endogenous Political Institutions
Aghion, P., Alesina, A., & Trebbi, F. (2004) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/0033553041382148 · Cited by 503
Decentralization and political institutions
Enikolopov, R., & Zhuravskaya, E. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.02.006 · Cited by 502
The Structure of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution
LUPU, N., & PONTUSSON, J. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000128 · Cited by 484
Besley, T., & Persson, T. (2013) · Handbook of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/b978-0-444-53759-1.00002-9 · Cited by 480
Self-citationA Political Theory of Populism *
Acemoglu, D., Egorov, G., & Sonin, K. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjs077 · Cited by 475
Albanesi, S. (2007) · Journal of Monetary Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jmoneco.2006.02.009 · Cited by 472
Reviving Leviathan: Fiscal Federalism and the Growth of Government
Rodden, J. (2003) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818303574021 · Cited by 462
Bättig, M. B., & Bernauer, T. (2009) · International Organization · doi:10.1017/s0020818309090092 · Cited by 455
Fixing Market Failures or Fixing Elections? Agricultural Credit in India
Cole, S. (2009) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.1.1.219 · Cited by 441
The Real Effects of Government‐Owned Banks: Evidence from an Emerging Market
CARVALHO, D. (2014) · The Journal of Finance · doi:10.1111/jofi.12130 · Cited by 436
Do Political Protests Matter? Evidence from the Tea Party Movement*
Madestam, A., Shoag, D., Veuger, S., & Yanagizawa-Drott, D. (2013) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjt021 · Cited by 431
Women's Suffrage, Political Responsiveness, and Child Survival in American History *
Miller, G. (2008) · Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/qjec.2008.123.3.1287 · Cited by 421
A Dynamic Theory of Public Spending, Taxation, and Debt
Battaglini, M., & Coate, S. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.1.201 · Cited by 421
E LECTORAL AND P ARTISAN C YCLES IN E CONOMIC P OLICIES AND O UTCOMES
Franzese, R. J. (2002) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.5.112801.080924 · Cited by 416
Constitutional Rules and Fiscal Policy Outcomes
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/000282804322970689 · Cited by 413
Self-citationPolitical Competition, Policy and Growth: Theory and Evidence from the US
BESLEY, T., PERSSON, T., & STURM, D. M. (2010) · Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2010.00606.x · Cited by 412
Self-citationThe Political Economy of Transition
Roland, G. (2002) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/0895330027102 · Cited by 409
Democracy and environmental quality
Farzin, Y. H., & Bond, C. A. (2006) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2005.04.003 · Cited by 407
Electoral Rules and Constitutional Structures as Constraints on Corruption
Kunicová, J., & Rose-Ackerman, S. (2009) · Corruption, Development and Institutional Design · doi:10.1057/9780230242173_1 · Cited by 407
Hallerberg, M., Rainer Strauch, R., & von Hagen, J. (2009) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511759505 · Cited by 405
(2012) · Econometrica · doi:10.3982/ecta9035 · Cited by 403
Political Institutions and Policy Choices: Evidence from the United States
Besley, T., & Case, A. (2003) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.41.1.7 · Cited by 401
Varieties of Clientelism: Machine Politics during Elections
Gans‐Morse, J., Mazzuca, S., & Nichter, S. (2014) · American Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1111/ajps.12058 · Cited by 394
The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending
BERRY, C. R., BURDEN, B. C., & HOWELL, W. G. (2010) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055410000377 · Cited by 377
The VAT in Developing and Transitional Countries
Bird, R., & Gendron, P.-P. (2007) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511619366 · Cited by 376
Policy Volatility, Institutions, and Economic Growth
Fatás, A., & Mihov, I. (2013) · Review of Economics and Statistics · doi:10.1162/rest_a_00265 · Cited by 366
The size and composition of government expenditure
Shelton, C. A. (2007) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.01.003 · Cited by 362
Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies
Persson, T., Roland, G., & Tabellini, G. (2007) · Quarterly Journal of Political Science · doi:10.1561/100.00006019 · Cited by 359
Self-citation'New' Views on the Optimum Currency Area Theory: What is Emu Telling Us?
Mongelli, F. P. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.357400 · Cited by 354
The Political Economy of Government Responsiveness: Theory and Evidence from India
Besley, T. J., & Burgess, R. (2002) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.319012 · Cited by 344
Political cycles in a developing economy: effect of elections in the Indian States
Khemani, S. (2004) · Journal of Development Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2003.01.002 · Cited by 340
The Politics of Bank Failures: Evidence from Emerging Markets
Brown, C. O., & Dinc, I. S. (2005) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1162/003355305775097506 · Cited by 335
Bureaucrats or politicians? Part II: Multiple policy tasks
Alesina, A., & Tabellini, G. (2008) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.06.004 · Cited by 334
Self-citationBuying, Expropriating, and Stealing Votes
Mares, I., & Young, L. (2016) · Annual Review of Political Science · doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-060514-120923 · Cited by 332
Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice
Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2013) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/jep.27.2.173 · Cited by 325
The effect of democracy and press freedom on corruption: an empirical test
Chowdhury, S. K. (2004) · Economics Letters · doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2004.03.024 · Cited by 324
What accountability pressures do MPs in Africa face and how do they respond? Evidence from Ghana
Lindberg, S. I. (2010) · The Journal of Modern African Studies · doi:10.1017/s0022278x09990243 · Cited by 317
Democracy comes to Europe: Franchise extension and fiscal outcomes 1830–1938
Aidt, T. S., Dutta, J., & Loukoianova, E. (2006) · European Economic Review · doi:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2004.07.004 · Cited by 315
Cai, H., & Treisman, D. (2005) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/0002828054201314 · Cited by 311
Grembi, V., Nannicini, T., & Troiano, U. (2016) · American Economic Journal: Applied Economics · doi:10.1257/app.20150076 · Cited by 311
Long-Run Impacts of Unions on Firms: New Evidence from Financial Markets, 1961–1999 *
Lee, D. S., & Mas, A. (2012) · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · doi:10.1093/qje/qjr058 · Cited by 310
The Control of Politicians in Divided Societies: The Politics of Fear
Padró i Miquel, G. (2007) · The Review of Economic Studies · doi:10.1111/j.1467-937x.2007.00455.x · Cited by 308
Land and Power: Theory and Evidence from Chile
Baland, J.-M., & Robinson, J. A. (2008) · American Economic Review · doi:10.1257/aer.98.5.1737 · Cited by 307
Constitutions and Economic Policy
Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (2004) · Journal of Economic Perspectives · doi:10.1257/089533004773563449 · Cited by 306
Self-citationAssessing the effects of corruption and crime on firm performance: evidence from Latin America
Gaviria, A. (2002) · Emerging Markets Review · doi:10.1016/s1566-0141(02)00024-9 · Cited by 305
Do Democracies Select More Educated Leaders?
BESLEY, T., & REYNAL-QUEROL, M. (2011) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s0003055411000281 · Cited by 303
Community-Based Targeting Mechanisms for Social Safety Nets: A Critical Review
Conning, J., & Kevane, M. (2002) · World Development · doi:10.1016/s0305-750x(01)00119-x · Cited by 302
Robinson, J. A., & Torvik, R. (2005) · Journal of Public Economics · doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2004.05.004 · Cited by 301
Political Economy of Public Policies: Insights from Distortions to Agricultural and Food Markets
Anderson, K., Rausser, G., & Swinnen, J. (2013) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/jel.51.2.423 · Cited by 298
Disentangling Accountability and Competence in Elections: Evidence from U.S. Term Limits
Alt, J., Bueno de Mesquita, E., & Rose, S. (2011) · The Journal of Politics · doi:10.1017/s0022381610000940 · Cited by 297
Rodríguez‐Pose, A., & Storper, M. (2006) · Economic Geography · doi:10.1111/j.1944-8287.2006.tb00286.x · Cited by 294
Exposing Corrupt Politicians: The Effects of Brazil's Publicly Released Audits on Electoral Outcomes
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2007) · SSRN Electronic Journal · doi:10.2139/ssrn.997867 · Cited by 293
Motivating Politicians: The Impacts of Monetary Incentives on Quality and Performance
Ferraz, C., & Finan, F. (2009) · National Bureau of Economic Research · doi:10.3386/w14906 · Cited by 290
Kittel, B., & Winner, H. (2005) · European Journal of Political Research · doi:10.1111/j.1475-6765.2005.00228.x · Cited by 288
From the Ballot to the Blackboard: The Redistributive Political Economy of Education
Ansell, B. W. (2010) · Cambridge University Press eBooks · doi:10.1017/cbo9780511730108 · Cited by 286
Spatial Voting in the 2004 Presidential Election
JESSEE, S. A. (2009) · American Political Science Review · doi:10.1017/s000305540909008x · Cited by 285
Acemoglu, D. (2005) · Journal of Economic Literature · doi:10.1257/002205105775362069 · Cited by 284
Aidt, T. S., Veiga, F. J., & Veiga, L. G. (2011) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-010-9644-3 · Cited by 279
Political business cycles 40 years after Nordhaus
Dubois, E. (2016) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-016-0313-z · Cited by 273
Public good provision under dictatorship and democracy
Deacon, R. T. (2009) · Public Choice · doi:10.1007/s11127-008-9391-x · Cited by 272
The quality of institutions and satisfaction with democracy in Western Europe — A panel analysis
Wagner, A. F., Schneider, F., & Halla, M. (2009) · European Journal of Political Economy · doi:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.08.001 · Cited by 272
Metadata
- Authors
- Bucovetsky, S., Persson, T., & Tabellini, G.
- Venue
- Southern Economic Journal
- Publisher
- JSTOR
- Published
- 2002-01
- Volume
- 68
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 738
- ISSN
- 0038-4038 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W1608361905
- Cited by
- 3,748
- References
- 0
- FWCI
- 413.20
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
About these checks
Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
Statistics and arithmetic are recomputed, not judged.
Confidence bands are shown only for fields calibrated on our annotated test set. None is calibrated yet, so no band is shown.
What counts as a claim ›How we measure confidence ›How we check this ›
Are you an author, or do you see a problem with this page? Request a review
Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.