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Cited by 7,219Anxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive ProcessesEmotions and Moral BehaviorBehavioral Health and Interventions

Self-discrepancy: A theory relating self and affect.

Higgins, E. Tory·1987·Psychological Review
DOI 10.1037/0033-295x.94.3.319
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Abstract

This article presents a theory of how different types of discrepancies between self-state representa-tions are related to different kinds of emotional vulnerabilities. One domain of the self (actual; ideal; ought) and one standpoint on the self (own; significant other) constitute each type of self-state representation. It is proposed that different types of self-discrepancies represent different types of negative psychological situations that are associated with different kinds of discomfort. Discrepan-cies between the actual/own self-state (i.e., the self-concept) and ideal self-stales (i.e., representations of an individual's beliefs about his or her own or a significant other's hopes, wishes, or aspirations for the individual) signify the absence of positive outcomes, which is associated with dejection-related emotions (e.g., disappointment, dissatisfaction, sadness). In contrast, discrepancies between the ac-tual/own self-state and ought self-states (i.e., representations of an individual's beliefs about his or her own or a significant other's beliefs about the individual's duties, responsibilities, or obligations) signify the presence of negative outcomes, which is associated with agitation-related emotions (e.g., fear, threat, restlessness). Differences in both the relative magnitude and the accessibility of individu-als ' available types of self-discrepancies are predicted to be related to differences in the kinds of discomfort people are likely to experience. Correlat…

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  • Self-discrepancy is not conceptualized as a conscious construct that the individual can readily self-report.

    “In fact, self-discrepancy is not conceptualized as a conscious construct that the individual can readily self-report (Higgins, 1987).”

    From The L2 motivational self system: A meta-analysis (2018) · cites this paper as Higgins, 1987

  • Possible selves can change with respect to self-discrepancy between an individual's actual and ideal self, i.e. possible selves can be adjusted to narrow the gap between real and ideal.

    “They can change with respect to self-discrepancy between an individual's actual and ideal self, i.e. possible selves can be adjusted to narrow the gap between real and ideal (Higgins 1987).”

    From The change in pre-service primary teachers’ possible selves in relation to science teaching (2022) · cites this paper as Higgins 1987

  • These specific possible selves are congruent with the PSTs' current identities.

    “These specific possible selves are congruent with the PSTs' current identities (cf. Higgins 1987; Oyserman and Leah 2011), and are also decisive, meaning that they have a strong selfdevelopment orientation (Lutovac and Kaasila 2014).”

    From The change in pre-service primary teachers’ possible selves in relation to science teaching (2022) · cites this paper as Higgins 1987

  • The studies on belief change clearly bring forth the idea that disequilibrium in experiences is required to induce change.

    “The studies on belief change, clearly bring forth the idea that disequilibrium in experiences is required to induce change (Higgins 1987; Pajares 1992).”

    From The change in pre-service primary teachers’ possible selves in relation to science teaching (2022) · cites this paper as Higgins 1987

  • A BDD-s páciensek esetében a perfekcionizmus tovább fokozza az aktuális és ideális én közötti különbséget, mivel túl magas standardokat állítanak fel a testi megjelenéssel kapcsolatban, aminek nem tudnak megfelelni.

    “A BDD-s páciensek esetében a perfekcionizmus tovább fokozza az aktuális és ideális én közötti különbség et ( ' self-ideal discrepancy ' hypothesis, Higgins, 1987), mivel túl magas standardokat állítanak fel a testi megjelenéssel kapcsolatban, aminek nem tudnak megfelelni.”

    From A testdiszmorfiás zavar pszichológiai vonatkozásai (2023) · cites this paper as Higgins, 1987

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Authors
Higgins, E. T.
Corresponding author
Higgins, E. Tory
ORCID
Higgins, E. Tory
Venue
Psychological Review
Publisher
American Psychological Association (APA)
Published
1987
Volume
94
Issue
3
Pages
319-340
ISSN
  • 0033-295X (ISSN-L)
  • 1939-1471
DOI
10.1037/0033-295x.94.3.319
OpenAlex
W2162153512
Cited by
7,219
References
0
Citations by year
2026: 364 · 2025: 373 · 2024: 349 · 2023: 336 · 2022: 350 · 2021: 340 · 2020: 392 · 2019: 359 · 2018: 327 · 2017: 318 · 2016: 314 · 2015: 321 · 2014: 317 · 2013: 276 · 2012: 274
FWCI
35.91
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
closed
Locations
  • Psychological Review (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
Funders
National Institute of Mental Health (MH39429)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Anxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive Processes
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Social Psychology › Emotions and Moral Behavior
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
Keywords
self-discrepancy theory, actual self, ideal self, ought self, self-concept, emotional vulnerability, dejection, agitation, discomfort, self-esteem
MeSH terms
Adaptation, Psychological, Affect, Humans, Motivation, Self Concept

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