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The Economics of Fairness, Reciprocity and Altruism - Experimental Evidence and New Theories
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Metadata
- Authors
- Fehr, E., & Schmidt, K. M.
- Venue
- RePEc: Research Papers in Economics
- Publisher
- Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
- Published
- 2005-01-01
- Volume
- 1
- Pages
- 615-691
- OpenAlex
- W2101590994
- Cited by
- 809
- References
- 153
- Type
- posted content
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.