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Cited by 2,762

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 133 of the 133 references it cites were found in a registry or an index.

Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate?

Stanovich, Keith E., West, Richard F.·2000·Behavioral and Brain Sciences
DOI 10.1017/s0140525x00003435
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Abstract

Much research in the last two decades has demonstrated that human responses deviate from the performance deemed normative according to various models of decision making and rational judgment (e.g., the basic axioms of utility theory). This gap between the normative and the descriptive can be interpreted as indicating systematic irrationalities in human cognition. However, four alternative interpretations preserve the assumption that human behavior and cognition is largely rational. These posit that the gap is due to (1) performance errors, (2) computational limitations, (3) the wrong norm being applied by the experimenter, and (4) a different construal of the task by the subject. In the debates about the viability of these alternative explanations, attention has been focused too narrowly on the modal response. In a series of experiments involving most of the classic tasks in the heuristics and biases literature, we have examined the implications of individual differences in performance for each of the four explanations of the normative/descriptive gap. Performance errors are a minor factor in the gap; computational limitations underlie non-normative responding on several tasks, particularly those that involve some type of cognitive decontextualization. Unexpected patterns of covariance can suggest when the wrong norm is being applied to a task or when an alternative construal of the task should be considered appropriate.

Overview

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Metadata

Authors
Stanovich, K. E., & West, R. F.
Venue
Behavioral and Brain Sciences
Publisher
Cambridge University Press (CUP)
Published
2000-10
Volume
23
Issue
5
Pages
645-665
ISSN
  • 0140-525X
  • 1469-1825
DOI
10.1017/s0140525x00003435
Cited by
2,762
References
133
Language
en
Licence
www.cambridge.org/core/terms (unspecified, 190 d)

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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.

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Data sources

Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.

Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).

Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.