Cited by 540Mindfulness and Compassion InterventionsAnxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive ProcessesIdentity, Memory, and Therapy

Decentering and Related Constructs: A Critical Review and Metacognitive Processes Model

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Bernstein, Amit, Hadash, Yuval, Lichtash, Yael, Tanay, Galia, Shepherd, Kathrine, Fresco, David M.·2015·Perspectives on Psychological Science

Abstract

The capacity to shift experiential perspective—from within one’s subjective experience onto that experience—is fundamental to being human. Scholars have long theorized that this metacognitive capacity—which we refer to as decentering—may play an important role in mental health. To help illuminate this mental phenomenon and its links to mental health, we critically examine decentering-related constructs and their respective literatures (e.g., self-distanced perspective, cognitive distancing, cognitive defusion). First, we introduce a novel metacognitive processes model of decentering. Specifically, we propose that, to varying degrees, decentering-related constructs reflect a common mental phenomenon subserved by three interrelated metacognitive processes: meta-awareness, disidentification from internal experience, and reduced reactivity to thought content. Second, we examine extant research linking decentering-related constructs and their underlying metacognitive processes to mental health. We conclude by proposing future directions for research that transcends decentering-related constructs in an effort to advance the field’s understanding of this facet of human experience and its role in (mal)adaptation.

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Crossref · 10.1177/1745691615594577

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  • Items in the (non)reactivity to internal experience factor reflect (non)reactivity to thoughts, feelings, and emotions, and therefore reflect reactivity to internal experience beyond thought content per se.

    “Second, items in the (non)reactivity to internal experience factor reflect (non)reactivity to thoughts, feelings, and emotions, and therefore reflect reactivity to internal experience beyond thought content per se (Bernstein et al., 2015; Hadash et al., 2017).”

    From The metacognitive processes of decentering scale: Development and initial validation of trait and state versions (2020) · cites this paper as Bernstein et al., 2015

    The “Reduced Reactivity to Thought Content” section describes thoughts having reduced effects on other processes, including emotion, and “Disidentification from internal experience” includes thoughts and emotions among internal states. But the paper does not describe the cited factor’s items or establish that they measure reactivity to feelings and emotions beyond thought content. (LLM, conf=0.82)

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  • Immersion may amplify emotional and behavioral reactivity to internal experience.

    “whereas immersion may amplify emotional and behavioral reactivity to internal experience”

    From The metacognitive processes of decentering scale: Development and initial validation of trait and state versions (2020) · cites this paper as Bernstein et al., 2015

    The Self-distanced perspective section reports less emotional reactivity when people analyze negative memories from a self-distanced rather than self-immersed perspective. The Reduced Reactivity to Thought Content section describes avoidance as a possible behavioral consequence of elevated reactivity to thoughts, but does not link that behavioral response specifically to immersion. The emotional part is supported; the behavioral part is not established for immersion. (LLM, conf=0.83)

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  • It may be that meta-awareness alone is not directly associated with psychological well-being, and confers psychological benefit only through, or in combination with, non-reactivity and dis-identification with internal experience.

    “It may be that meta-awareness, alone, is not directly associated with psychological well-being, and confers psychological benefit only through, or in combination with, non-reactivity and dis-identification with internal experience (Bernstein et al., 2015; Desrosiers, Vine, Curtiss, Klemanski, 2014).”

    From The metacognitive processes of decentering scale: Development and initial validation of trait and state versions (2020) · cites this paper as Bernstein et al., 2015

    In “Decentering and metacognitive awareness” (page unavailable), the review says disidentification may mediate the effects of meta-awareness on mental-health outcomes. But it does not establish that meta-awareness alone lacks a direct association with well-being or that benefit occurs only through or alongside the other processes. “Future Directions—Mental health mechanisms” also proposes possible mechanisms for meta-awareness itself. (LLM, conf=0.83)

    Experimental — accuracy not yet measured
  • EFA and B-ESEM results from Studies 1 and 2 indicated that the MPoD-t was multidimensional and could assess a global higher-order decentering factor and three independent yet related lower-order metacognitive processes: meta-awareness, (dis)identification, and (non)reactivity.

    “First, EFA and B-ESEM results from Studies 1 and 2 indicated that the MPoD-t was multidimensional and could be used to assess a global, higher-order decentering factor and three independent yet related lower-order metacognitive processes: meta-awareness (e.g., “I can watch my thoughts and emotions drift by like leaves on a stream.”), (dis)identification with internal experience (e.g., “My sense of”

    From The metacognitive processes of decentering scale: Development and initial validation of trait and state versions (2020) · cites this paper as Bernstein et al., 2015

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  • Greater practice of regulatory skills following mindfulness treatment is associated with increases in decentering.

    “a recent empirical study showing that greater practice of regulatory skills following mindfulness treatment was associated with increases in decentering”

    From Moderators and mediators of emotion regulation therapy for psychologically distressed caregivers of cancer patients: secondary analyses from a randomized controlled trial. (2021) · cites this paper as [22]

    The ‘Decentering and metacognitive awareness’ section (page unavailable) reports that increases in mindfulness during interventions were associated with increases in a decentering-related measure. It does not report that greater practice of regulatory skills following treatment was associated with increased decentering; it reviews other studies rather than presenting the described empirical study. (LLM, conf=0.86)

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Research works printed but not linked: 3

  1. Anālayo B 2003 Satipaṭṭhāna: The direct path to realization Cambridge, England Windhorse Publications
  2. Moore RG Hayhurst H Teasdale JD 1996 Measure of Awareness and Coping in Autobiographical Memory: Instructions for administering and coding Unpublished manuscript University of Cambridge United Kingdom
  3. Wells A 2000 Emotional disorders and metacognition: Innovative cognitive therapy Chichester, United Kingdom Wiley

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Authors
Bernstein, A., Hadash, Y., Lichtash, Y., Tanay, G., Shepherd, K., & Fresco, D. M.
Affiliations
  • University of Haifa (IL)
  • Kent State University (US)
Corresponding author
Bernstein, Amit
Venue
Perspectives on Psychological Science
Published
2015-09
Volume
10
Issue
5
Pages
599-617
ISSN
  • 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
  • 1745-6924
OpenAlex
W2337549616
Cited by
539
References
134
Citations by year
2026: 62 · 2025: 75 · 2024: 50 · 2023: 49 · 2022: 63 · 2021: 55 · 2020: 47 · 2019: 45 · 2018: 35 · 2017: 38 · 2016: 18 · 2015: 2
FWCI
38.44
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • PubMed Central (acceptedVersion)
Funders
National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute (R01HL119977)
Topics
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Clinical Psychology › Mindfulness and Compassion Interventions
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Experimental and Cognitive Psychology › Anxiety, Depression, Psychometrics, Treatment, Cognitive Processes
  • Social Sciences › Psychology › Developmental and Educational Psychology › Identity, Memory, and Therapy
Keywords
decentering, metacognition, cognitive distancing, cognitive defusion, meta-awareness, mental health
MeSH terms
Metacognition, Humans, Mental Health, Models, Psychological, Self Concept

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