Corporate Governance and Control
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Metadata
- Authors
- Becht, M., Bolton, P., & Röell, A.
- Venue
- Handbook of the Economics of Finance
- Publisher
- Elsevier
- Published
- 2003
- Pages
- 1-109
- ISSN
- 1574-0102 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W2099199959
- Cited by
- 795
- References
- 426
- FWCI
- 173.19
- Type
- book chapter
- Language
- en
- Open access
- green
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