Dual-Process Theories of Higher Cognition: Advancing the Debate
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Abstract
Dual-process and dual-system theories in both cognitive and social psychology have been subjected to a number of recently published criticisms. However, they have been attacked as a category, incorrectly assuming there is a generic version that applies to all. We identify and respond to 5 main lines of argument made by such critics. We agree that some of these arguments have force against some of the theories in the literature but believe them to be overstated. We argue that the dual-processing distinction is supported by much recent evidence in cognitive science. Our preferred theoretical approach is one in which rapid autonomous processes (Type 1) are assumed to yield default responses unless intervened on by distinctive higher order reasoning processes (Type 2). What defines the difference is that Type 2 processing supports hypothetical thinking and load heavily on working memory.
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“SWIFTSAGE [82] is an agent influenced by the dual-process theory of human cognition [83], which is effective for solving complex interactive reasoning tasks.In this agent, the SWIFT module constitutes a compact encoder-decoder language model, which is fine-tuned using human-annotated datasets.”
From A survey on large language model based autonomous agents (2024) · cites this paper as [83]
In the citing paper
“Dual-process models of reasoning [15,16] suggest that AI tools may encourage intuitive acceptance (System 1) rather than reflective evaluation (System 2), particularly when fluency and coherence mask logical weaknesses.”
From From Offloading to Engagement: An Experimental Study on Structured Prompting and Critical Reasoning with Generative AI (2025) · cites this paper as [15]
In the citing paper
“This association is inconsistent with a simple claim that additional deliberation necessarily reduces heuristic reliance (Evans and Stanovich 2013;Kahneman 2011), but it does not show that deliberation caused deference.”
From Limits of Interventions in AI-Assisted Decision Making (2026) · cites this paper as Evans and Stanovich 2013
In the citing paper
“Dual-process accounts propose that fast, automatic Type 1 processing typically generates a default response, whereas working-memory-dependent Type 2 processing becomes more fully engaged when more deliberate judgment is required (Evans and Stanovich, 2013).”
From Responsible use of generative AI in Chinese vocational education: eye-tracking evidence on source verification and immediate near-transfer across three information-seeking conditions (2026) · cites this paper as Evans and Stanovich, 2013
In the citing paper
“According to research on neuro psychology (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013;Ullman, 2016), humans have two memory and learning systems, and the two systems are so distinct that they cannot be integrated.”
From Harnessing Dual Memory Systems: A Balanced Approach to Explicit and Implicit Reading Instruction for Young EFL Learners (2026) · cites this paper as Evans & Stanovich, 2013
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A Survey on Large Language Model based Autonomous Agents
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A survey on large language model based autonomous agents
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“…useful, it has to be noted that bottom-up (reactive, or Type I) and topdown (deliberate, or Type II) are on a continuum, not absolute categories (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; MacLeod, 1991; Nigg, 2000; Posner & Snyder, 1975; Schneider & Shiffrin, 1977) in part due to successive reciprocal neural…”
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Metadata
- Authors
- Evans, J. S. B. T., & Stanovich, K. E.
- Affiliations
- University of Plymouth (GB)
- University of Toronto (CA)
- ORCID
- Stanovich, Keith E.
- Venue
- Perspectives on Psychological Science
- Publisher
- SAGE Publications
- Published
- 2013-05
- Volume
- 8
- Issue
- 3
- Pages
- 223-241
- ISSN
- 1745-6916 (ISSN-L)
- 1745-6924
- OpenAlex
- W2084335597
- Cited by
- 4,271
- References
- 137
- Citations by year
- 2026: 566 · 2025: 493 · 2024: 363 · 2023: 343 · 2022: 332 · 2021: 367 · 2020: 370 · 2019: 403 · 2018: 265 · 2017: 229 · 2016: 217 · 2015: 159 · 2014: 116 · 2013: 37
- FWCI
- 128.32
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
- Licence
- journals.sagepub.com/page/policies/text-and-data-mining-license (tdm)
- Locations
- Perspectives on Psychological Science (publishedVersion)
- PubMed (publishedVersion)
- Topics
- Social Sciences › Decision Sciences › General Decision Sciences › Decision-Making and Behavioral Economics
- Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
- Social Sciences › Psychology › Applied Psychology › Behavioral Health and Interventions
- Keywords
- dual-process theory, dual-system theory, higher cognition, autonomous processes, working memory, hypothetical reasoning
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Data sources
Bibliographic data: Semantic Scholar, OpenAlex, Crossref.
Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.