Selfhood triumvirate: From phenomenology to brain activity and back again
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Abstract
Recently, a three-dimensional construct model for complex experiential Selfhood has been proposed (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Kallio-Tamminen, 2016b,c). According to this model, three specific subnets (or modules) of the brain self-referential network (SRN) are responsible for the manifestation of three aspects/features of the subjective sense of Selfhood. Follow up multiple studies established a tight relation between alterations in the functional integrity of the triad of SRN modules and related to them three aspects/features of the sense of self; however, the causality of this relation is yet to be shown. In this article we approached the question of causality by exploring functional integrity within the three SRN modules that are thought to underlie the three phenomenal components of Selfhood while these components were manipulated mentally by experienced meditators in a controlled and independent manner. Participants were requested, in a block-randomised manner, to mentally induce states representing either increased (up-regulation) or decreased (down-regulation) sense of (a) witnessing agency ("Self"), or (b) body representational-emotional agency ("Me"), or (c) reflective/narrative agency ("I"), while their brain activity was recorded by an electroencephalogram (EEG). This EEG-data was complemented by first-person phenomenological reports and standardised questionnaires which focused on subjective contents of three aspects of Selfhood. The results of the study strengthen the case for a direct causative relationship between three phenomenological aspects of Selfhood and related to them three modules of the brain SRN. Furthermore, the putative integrative model of the dynamic interrelations among three modules of the SRN has been proposed.
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Carruthers, G. (2008) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.02.001 · Cited by 184
EEG development of healthy boys and girls: results of a longitudinal study
Benninger, C., Matthis, P., & Scheffner, D. (1984) · Electroencephalography and Clinical Neurophysiology · doi:10.1016/0013-4694(84)90002-6 · Cited by 179
Toward a unifying taxonomy and definition for meditation
Nash, J. D., & Newberg, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00806 · Cited by 177
Berkovich-Ohana, A., Dor-Ziderman, Y., Glicksohn, J., & Goldstein, A. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00912 · Cited by 171
Extending predictive processing to the body: Emotion as interoceptive inference
Seth, A. K., & Critchley, H. D. (2013) · Behavioral and Brain Sciences · doi:10.1017/s0140525x12002270 · Cited by 164 · cited 1×
“…brain areas) to affect (through a top-down control mechanism or predictions) the integration of the activities related to the body, including interoceptive and exteroceptive signals has been clearly documented (Craig, 2010; Seth, 2013; Seth & Critchley, 2013; Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2015b).”
BackgroundPhenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
Metzinger, T. (2003) · Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences · doi:10.1023/b:phen.0000007366.42918.eb · Cited by 162 · cited 3×
“…episodic memory events related to self, as well as projecting the self into the future, thus enabling the sense of invariance of a narrative self over time (James, 1890; Neisser, 1988; Damasio, 1999, 2010; Gallagher, 2000; Demiray & Bluck, 2011; Metzinger, 2003; Klein, 2016; Friston et al., 2017).”
BackgroundHow does it feel to lack a sense of boundaries? A case study of a long-term mindfulness meditator
Ataria, Y., Dor-Ziderman, Y., & Berkovich-Ohana, A. (2015) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2015.09.002 · Cited by 154
The Relationship Between Wandering Mind, Depression and Mindfulness
Deng, Y.-Q., Li, S., & Tang, Y.-Y. (2014) · Mindfulness · doi:10.1007/s12671-012-0157-7 · Cited by 149
Brain imaging of the self-conceptual, anatomical and methodological issues
Northoff, G., Qin, P., & Feinberg, T. E. (2011) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2010.09.011 · Cited by 135
Developing an observing attitude: an analysis of meditation diaries in an MBSR clinical trial
Kerr, C. E., Josyula, K., & Littenberg, R. (2011) · Clinical Psychology & Psychotherapy · doi:10.1002/cpp.700 · Cited by 132 · cited 4×
“…be voluntary manipulated (enhanced and sharpened), for example, as a function of meditation training (Fingelkurts et al., 2016b,c; Lutz et al., 2008; Kerr et al., 2011), or arise in pathologic circumstances like depression (Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2017a), and post-traumatic stress disorder…”
BackgroundInfluentialThe Contribution of the Parietal Lobes to Speaking and Writing
Brownsett, S. L. E., & Wise, R. J. S. (2010) · Cerebral Cortex · doi:10.1093/cercor/bhp120 · Cited by 131
Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples
Metzinger, T. (2007) · Progress in Brain Research · doi:10.1016/s0079-6123(07)68018-2 · Cited by 123 · cited 13×
“Further, as it has been discussed in detail by Metzinger (2004, 2008, 2013), this phenomenology also contributes to a sense that one has the capacity for selective, top-down attentional control, and also knows that it (oneself) possesses this capacity – thus having the phenomenal ownership…”
BackgroundInfluentialDeep temporal models and active inference
Friston, K. J., Rosch, R., Parr, T., Price, C., & Bowman, H. (2018) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2018.04.004 · Cited by 119
Being a self: considerations from functional imaging
Gusnard, D. A. (2005) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2005.04.004 · Cited by 116
Moseley, P., Fernyhough, C., & Ellison, A. (2013) · Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.neubiorev.2013.10.001 · Cited by 113
Psychedelics and the science of self-experience
Nour, M. M., & Carhart-Harris, R. L. (2017) · British Journal of Psychiatry · doi:10.1192/bjp.bp.116.194738 · Cited by 87
Metzinger, T. (2013) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2013.00746 · Cited by 84 · cited 17×
“14 As it has been argued in detail by Metzinger (2013, 2020), the feeling of being an extensionless point in space is sufficient for phenomenal self-identification that is tied to an individual phenomenal first-person perspective.”
BackgroundInfluentialSelf-awareness deficits following loss of inner speech: dr. Jill Bolte Taylor's case study
Morin, A. (2009) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2008.09.008 · Cited by 83
I know how you felt last night, or do I? Self- and external ratings of emotions in REM sleep dreams
Sikka, P., Valli, K., Virta, T., & Revonsuo, A. (2014) · Consciousness and Cognition · doi:10.1016/j.concog.2014.01.011 · Cited by 70
Feinberg, T. E. (2012) · Physics of Life Reviews · doi:10.1016/j.plrev.2011.10.019 · Cited by 59 · cited 1×
“In a nested hierarchy, higher levels are physically composed of lower levels (Feinberg, 2012).”
BackgroundSelf-specific processing in the default network: a single-pulse TMS study
Lou, H. C., Luber, B., Stanford, A., & Lisanby, S. H. (2010) · Experimental Brain Research · doi:10.1007/s00221-010-2425-x · Cited by 59
Dissolving the self: Active inference, psychedelics, and ego-dissolution
Deane, G. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.39 · Cited by 46
Being for no-one: Psychedelic experience and minimal subjectivity
Letheby, C. (2020) · Philosophy and the Mind Sciences · doi:10.33735/phimisci.2020.i.47 · Cited by 20
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A landscape of consciousness: Toward a taxonomy of explanations and implications
Kuhn, R. L. (2024) · Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology · doi:10.1016/j.pbiomolbio.2023.12.003 · Cited by 135
Psychedelics, Sociality, and Human Evolution
Rodríguez Arce, J. M., & Winkelman, M. J. (2021) · Frontiers in Psychology · doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2021.729425 · Cited by 86
Metadata
- Authors
- Fingelkurts, A. A., Fingelkurts, A. A., & Kallio-Tamminen, T.
- Venue
- Consciousness and Cognition
- Publisher
- Elsevier BV
- Published
- 2020-11
- Volume
- 86
- Pages
- 103031
- ISSN
- 1053-8100 (ISSN-L)
- OpenAlex
- W3093856228
- Cited by
- 41
- References
- 107
- FWCI
- 4.86
- Type
- journal article
- Language
- en
- Open access
- closed
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Registry, retraction, Cites and statistics results are computed, not judged, with one exception: a printed reference that no index lists is read once by a model before it counts as a citation error. Claims are extracted by a model and kept only when their quote appears verbatim in the text; each cited source is then checked, with a model’s help, for whether it says what the claim relies on. Those verdicts can be wrong — read the claim’s quote and the cited source before relying on one.
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Contains information from the Semantic Scholar Academic Graph Datasets, made available under the ODC Attribution License (ODC-BY 1.0).
Semantic Scholar’s data is described in: Kinney, R., et al. (2023). The Semantic Scholar Open Data Platform. arXiv:2301.10140.