Cited by 273Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on BehaviorNeural and Behavioral Psychology StudiesCognitive Science and Education Research

The DOI matches its Crossref record; 157 of the 161 references it cites were found in a registry or an index; none of the 233 sources its claims cite is checked for support yet.

Evolving Concepts of Emotion and Motivation

Open access
Berridge, Kent C.·2018·Frontiers in Psychology

Abstract

This review takes a historical perspective on concepts in the psychology of motivation and emotion, and surveys recent developments, debates and applications. Old debates over emotion have recently risen again. For example, are emotions necessarily subjective feelings? Do animals have emotions? I review evidence that emotions exist as core psychological processes, which have objectively detectable features, and which can occur either with subjective feelings or without them. Evidence is offered also that studies of emotion in animals can give new insights into human emotions. Beyond emotion, motivation concepts have changed over decades too, and debates still continue. Motivation was once thought in terms of aversive drives, and reward was thought of in terms of drive reduction. Motivation-as-drive concepts were largely replaced by motivation-as-incentive concepts, yet aversive drive concepts still occasionally surface in reward neuroscience today. Among incentive concepts, incentive salience is a core motivation process, mediated by brain mesocorticolimbic systems (dopamine-related systems) and sometimes called 'wanting' (in quotation marks), to distinguish it from cognitive forms of desire (wanting without quotation marks). Incentive salience as 'wanting' is separable also from pleasure 'liking' for the same reward, which has important implications for several human clinical disorders. Ordinarily, incentive salience adds motivational urgency to cognitive desires, but 'wanting' and cognitive desires can dissociate in some conditions. Excessive incentive salience can cause addictions, in which excessive 'wanting' can diverge from cognitive desires. Conversely, lack of incentive salience may cause motivational forms of anhedonia in depression or schizophrenia, whereas a negatively-valenced form of 'fearful salience' may contribute to paranoia. Finally, negative 'fear' and 'disgust' have both partial overlap but also important neural differences.

Overview

AI snapshot

Written from the paper’s full text.

TL;DR

This review argues that emotion and motivation include objective core processes that can occur with or without subjective feelings, and it traces the historical shift from drive-reduction accounts to incentive motivation. It emphasizes the distinction between ‘wanting’ and ‘liking,’ mesocorticolimbic dopamine in incentive salience, and clinical implications for addiction, anhedonia, paranoia, and fear/disgust.

Key findings

  • Emotions need not be conscious: subliminal happy versus angry faces changed thirsty participants’ pouring, drinking, and willingness to pay without changing their subjective mood ratings; implicit prejudice and introspection studies also indicate verbal reports can miss or distort affective processes.
  • ‘Wanting’ and ‘liking’ are separable: dopamine mediated ‘wanting’ but not ‘liking’ in rats, including normal sweetness ‘liking’ after near-total dopamine lesions despite eliminated ‘wanting’; human studies around 2000 confirmed dopamine blockade or reductions did not reduce subjective liking for food, cocaine, or heroin but reduced wanting. The distinction rests on 30 years of animal results and 15 years of human confirmatory findings.
  • Motivation concepts shifted from aversive drive/drive reduction to incentive motivation: brain electrode stimulation could be both rewarding and motivating, hunger/thirst cues alone were weak motivators, and drive reduction was weak—rats bar pressed for intragastric nutrients at only about 30% of normal intake, and dogs given intravenous calories still ate customary amounts and became obese.
  • Clinical applications include incentive-sensitization in addiction; dopamine dysregulation syndrome in 15% or more of Parkinson’s patients on direct agonists; motivational anhedonia/avolition in schizophrenia, depression, and Parkinson’s as possible loss of ‘wanting’ rather than ‘liking’; and negatively valenced ‘fearful salience’ in nucleus accumbens as a possible contributor to paranoia.

Methods

  • Narrative historical review of motivation and emotion concepts in psychology and affective neuroscience, drawing on both animal and human studies; no systematic search, meta-analysis, or formal quantitative pooling is described.
  • Evidence discussed includes rat taste-reactivity, dopamine lesions and microinjections, brain stimulation, Pavlovian-instrumental transfer, human neuroimaging and drug studies, and clinical observations.
  • Main analysis is conceptual synthesis and argument rather than primary data collection.

Limitations

  • Stated: not all conclusions from animal affective neuroscience will transfer to humans; some predictions, such as a human nucleus accumbens desire-dread keyboard, remain untested, and exactly how neural differences produce qualitative emotional differences remains to be understood.
  • Evident: as a single-author narrative review, evidence selection and interpretation reflect the author’s theoretical framework; no systematic review protocol, inclusion criteria, or formal bias assessment is reported.
  • Evident: many cited animal manipulations use invasive microinjections, lesions, or brain stimulation, and the paper itself notes that extreme or unnatural stimulation parameters may affect conclusions about aversive drive.

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Integrity signals

Registry

Crossref · 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01647

Cites

157 of 157 references verified0 citation errors · 0 not checkable

Statistics

Nothing to recompute.

Verification

Claims the paper makes

0 of 233 cited sources checked · 0 supported · 0 flagged

Show all 141 claims

  • It may state two separate claims as one. 85
  • Probably not a substantial claim. 52
117 of 117
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Verbal reports from other human adults about their feelings are accepted as evidence of emotion on the basis of a socially convenient agreement based on mutual empathy, not scientific certainty.

    “But this is a socially convenient agreement based on mutual empathy. It is essentially an assumption we are willing to make for each other (and perhaps evolutionarily compelled to make), but not a scientific certainty.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    It is possible to induce mesolimbic sensitization without drugs in susceptible individuals, such as by exposures to traumatic stresses or strong specific appetites.

    “However, it has subsequently become clear that it is also possible to induce mesolimbic sensitization without drugs in susceptible individuals, such as by exposures to traumatic stresses, exposures to strong specific appetites, etc.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Some people who are especially vulnerable to developing mesolimbic sensitization may become spontaneously sensitized in particular situations via endogenous mechanisms, resulting in behavioral addictions.

    “Recently it has even become plausible that some people, who may be especially vulnerable to developing mesolimbic sensitization, may become ‘spontaneously’ sensitized in particular situations via endogenous mechanisms, resulting in behavioral addictions.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    There are strong individual differences in sensitization vulnerability, due to genes, hormones, previous experiences, etc.

    “There are strong individual differences in sensitization vulnerability, due to genes, hormones, previous experiences, etc.”
  • The authors state this as an assumption.

    Those who develop behavioral addictions are the most vulnerable individuals, able to develop mesolimbic sensitization via endogenous mechanisms, without need of drugs.

    “Presumably those who develop behavioral addictions are the most vulnerable individuals, able to develop mesolimbic sensitization via endogenous mechanisms, without need of drugs.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    Modern people and modern lab rats have more than enough NaCl in their foods, so that they have never in their lives been sodium deficient.

    “modern people and modern lab rats have more than enough NaCl in our foods, so that we have never in our lives been sodium deficient.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    An incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages.

    “Of course, an incremental difference at one overlapping stage of a neural circuit can still be translated into qualitative neural and psychological differences at other stages to recruit different anatomical patterns of activity.”
  • The paper relies on this without support.

    ‘Fear’ defends against external bodily danger threats, while ‘disgust’ defends against oral and internal toxic threats.

    “‘Fear’ defends against external bodily danger threats, while ‘disgust’ defends against oral and internal toxic threats.”
8 of 8

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Citations

Cites

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4 of the 161 references couldn’t be matched to a known paper.

Research works printed but not linked: 11

  1. Clore, 1994, Why emotions are never unconscious, The Nature of Emotion: Fundamental Questions, 285
  2. Frijda, 2007, Universal The Laws of Emotion.
  3. Hull, 1951, Essentials of Behavior.
  4. Huston, 1972, Classical conditioning of consummatory behavior, Control Mechanisms of Drinking, 165
  5. Miller, 1973, How the project started, Brain Stimulation and Motivation: Research and Commentary, 53
  6. Olds, 1973, The discovery of reward systems in the brain, Brain Stimulation and Motivation: research and commentary, 81
  7. Popper, 1972, The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Impression Revised
  8. Rozin, 2008, Disgust, Handbook of Emotions, 757
  9. Salamone, 1991, Behavioral pharmacology of dopamine systems: a new synthesis, The Mesolimbic Dopamine System : From Motivation to Action, 599
  10. Titchener, 1902, A Primer of Psychology. Rev.
  11. Toates, 1986, Motivational Systems.

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Metadata

Authors
Berridge, K. C.
Affiliations
University of Michigan (US)
Corresponding author
Berridge, Kent C.
Venue
Frontiers in Psychology
Published
2018-09-07
Volume
9
Pages
1647-1647
ISSN
1664-1078 (ISSN-L)
OpenAlex
W2890468836
Cited by
273
References
161
Citations by year
2026: 21 · 2025: 31 · 2024: 31 · 2023: 47 · 2022: 49 · 2021: 36 · 2020: 27 · 2019: 30 · 2018: 1
FWCI
3.04
Type
journal article
Language
en
Open access
Locations
  • Frontiers in Psychology (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • Europe PMC (PubMed Central) (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed Central (publishedVersion, cc-by)
  • PubMed (publishedVersion)
  • DOAJ (DOAJ: Directory of Open Access Journals) (submittedVersion, cc-by-sa)
Funders
National Institutes of Health (DA015188, MH63649)
Topics
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cellular and Molecular Neuroscience › Neurotransmitter Receptor Influence on Behavior
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Neural and Behavioral Psychology Studies
  • Life Sciences › Neuroscience › Cognitive Neuroscience › Cognitive Science and Education Research
Keywords
emotions, motivation, incentive salience, want, incentive motivation, drive reduction, reward, dopamine, mesocorticolimbic system, anhedonia, depression, schizophrenia, paranoia, fear, disgust, animal emotions, subjective feelings

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